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The key objective of this proposal is to present one of the problems that the Portuguese economy, as 
well as other European countries, have been facing in regard to the civil society intervention in the 
democracy: the decrease of turnover rates in the voting system. The main objective is to propose the 
use of Blockchain technology in the Portuguese Voting System, as a mechanism to counter this trend. 
In order to understand how the possible application of a remote e-voting system succeeds, Estonia 
was selected as the case of study. Its architecture, as well as the legal, social and technological issues 
and challenges associated are investigated in the light of the information collected in the literature 
review.  
Considering the case analysis and discussion, a set of recommendations that purpose the use of a 
remote electronic voting system in the Portuguese electoral system are presented and a critical 
analysis about the introduction of a Blockchain algorithm is made. This dissertation concludes about 
the advantages and disadvantages from the use of this decentralized system when compared with a 
system involving a third-party as the one used in the Estonian I-Voting. 
The validation is based on interviews and discussions with professors in the area of information 
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1.1. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
 
Nowadays, many nations around Europe have been facing a general decrease of the turnover rates in 
both National elections and in European elections. The last European elections, on 2019, turn out to 
be a different case, where the turnout was the highest in the last 20 years. This situation has been 
discussed by many journalists, critics, commentators, some politicians and even among the general 
citizens themselves who contribute largely to the increase of abstention. Several analysis and 
speeches focus on the understanding of its roots and causes but the consequences are what 
incentivise policymakers to move to the next level and build a new model able to deal with the new 
circumstances that the modern society is living and express its vision or feeling through the act of not 
voting and not showing up in the polls. This is one of the concerns that democracies have been 
facing. Portugal is not and exception and is the priority for this thesis.  
According to Pordata, a certified statistics database about Portugal, the abstention rate in the 
European elections has been increasing continuously since the first year after joining the European 
Union (currently 69.3%). In the case of Portuguese citizens residing outside of the country, this rate 
goes up to 99%. These data give us a reason for concern regarding the political power sustainability. 
However, one of the main causes may not be neglected: the difficulty of voting associated to the lack 
of polling places and long distances to travel in order to be able to vote. Nowadays, but mainly in the 
near future, this might not be an explanatory variable for the output anymore.  
Moreover, another factor that may be take into consideration for the low turnout performance, is 
the problem of trust between people and institutions due to imperfect information. Lack of trust in 
the representatives is mentioned as one of the principal causes and it is the time to meet a 
technological institution, with a high level of enforcement, efficient and capable to provide a solution 
to the trust crisis just presented. 
In this paper, it will be introduced and explained the e-voting and e-government concepts, analysed 
and some real examples will be given. This way, one may contextualize regarding the last updates in 
the use of technology in this matter.  
In the district of Évora, Portugal, a pilot project of electronic in-person voting was introduced in the 
last European elections. Despite of its success, people still need to attend the polling places, use a 
card that enables the unique vote, print it and drop the paper in the poll. The mobility issue for many 
citizens still does not take advantage of this initiative.  
Furthermore, in the case of e-voting, a short number of European countries such as Estonia, Belgium, 
France, Bulgaria and Germany already used in one way or another, successfully or unsuccessfully, 
electronic voting machines. Only Estonia became the first country to enact E-voting law, and this 
country will be a case of study in this paper. However, one may keep in mind that the majority gave 
up from the official implementation of this mechanism in both National and European elections, due 
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to the possibility of hacking electronic systems, issues with the certification of election results and 
the existence of software errors. The distrust and consequent fear in becoming this method 
constitutional have been contributing for the progress delay.  
In order to deal with this trust crisis on one hand and with the mobility issue on the other hand, a 
more complex, cryptographic and revolutionary technique may take place in order to change the 
paradigm. A more powerful technology with a practical applicability may be explored and purposed: 
a decentralized trustless voting system developed by the Blockchain technology. 
Blockchain technology may become a glove of fresh air in the next future. It started with Bitcoin and 
quickly an umbrella of possible applications has been developed during the past few years. Departing 
from the concept, it is known that cryptography makes the records that are splited into blocks a 
secure process, and tell us that we can trust in the system. An anomaly in one block is easily detected 
and its detection avoids immediately the propagation of the problem among the rest of the system. 
The list of records (also called distributed ledger) is decentralized and available for everyone to see 
and verify. Blockchain goes beyond of how we know Internet nowadays. It is capable to solve the 
problem of one, and only one, unique identifier, which makes its application highly relevant in the 
voting system. Last, but not least, the decentralization enables the speed of data processing by 
allowing the results to be visible in a country as a whole, despite of the possibility of each district 
operate with its own system for load distribution.  
Concluding, one may use the literature review as a contribution for the research development and, in 
the end, be able to add knowledge to the existing work by making a purpose of the use of this 
technology in the Portuguese Voting System. 
 
1.2. MOTIVATION & JUSTIFICATION 
 
Departing from the principle that confidence in the institutions and participation in voting are two 
important variables that measure the life satisfaction of a nation, as well as its development (Society 
at a Glance OECD Social Indicators, 2019), in this thesis one will explore the potential of technology 
as a mechanism that contributes for social cohesion. Additionally, the fact that Portuguese residents 
living outside of the country are the main contributors, in a comparison among different society 
classes, to the abstention rate, one may keep in mind the important role of young people.  
Based on the report European Parliament Spring Eurobarometer 2019 (Schulmeister et al.,2019), a 
survey was conducted to all European countries. A sample of around 28000 observations was 
collected and, in the case of Portugal, 1004 people answered to this survey. Hence, the study was 
able to conclude that among young people (age in the range of 15-24 years old), only 3% manifested 
high interest in the European elections, showing the most unsatisfying result when compared to 
young people of the same age questioned in other European countries. At the same time, all the 
Portuguese citizens aged 15-24 use Internet every day. Furthermore, regarding the general results, in 
Portugal the main reasons for people not voting are “You believe your vote will not change anything” 
and “You distrust the political system”. If a correlation between both variables would be calculated, 
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one will be able to resume both in “Distrust”. These results meet the initial considerations presented 
in the previous chapter, and are, ultimately, a reason of concern for life satisfaction in Portugal. 
Considering these results and further analysis and opinions that come to public from the most 
various sources, one concluded that only a revolutionary and complex technology would be able to 
deal with some of the factors that influence the problem presented. Some studies have been made 
about the potential of Blockchain and its introduction and implementation in some areas, especially 
in the finance and banking systems. It matters to continue its exploration and implementation in 
further areas in such a way that a whole society can benefit from it (the general civil society who 
vote, but also the politicians elected). It may take time and resources until this technology to be 
understood and used by everyone, but one may contribute to the share of this knowledge, as well for 
its development applied to the Portuguese economy itself. One may be able to purpose by the end of 
this thesis the use of Blockchain-based voting system in Portugal, taking into consideration social and 
economic factors. 
Another important topic that may be pointed out is the use of this thesis as a mechanism for 
extension of the existing knowledge of the area, within the limits of assumptions, with a theoretical 
application in order to explain, predict and understand the phenomena when applied to a real 
context. This study aims to contribute for breaking the assumption that still exists a long path to the 
adoption of technology that supports the online voting. 
 
1.3. STUDY OBJECTIVES 
 
The main objective of this study is to purpose the use of Blockchain technology in the current 
Portuguese voting system.  
In order to argument and fundament its use one will need to study the already implemented E-voting 
systems and projects, the interactivity with the Blockchain technology, as well as the current 
electoral system in Portugal and retrieve information regarding possible initiatives to apply 
technological solutions in this environment and how they succeeded. Summing up, it matters to 
understand the possible beneficial results of a Blockchain-based voting system in Portugal as a 
solution for the mobility concern and trust crisis. In a secondary level, it is relevant to learn how its 
use would impact the abstention rate and the trust in the Portuguese political system. 








2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT 
2.1.1. Concepts 
 
To begin with the exploration of concepts, presentation of models and explanation of applications 
related to the buzzword “E-Government”, it is important to understand what this term brings beyond 
the books and what it implies. E-Government can be considered a building process, similar to the 
“(…) process of building a bridge” (Evans, G. (2017)).  The author in his book makes an analogy 
between the two processes, where all the components of a physical bridge “must be strong and 
robust”. Imagining two towers, both represent the “Business Support and Transformation Services”, 
the main cables are the “Business Requirements and Benefits”, the deck, where the roadway is 
located on the surface reflects the “Targeted Government Services, the headstock right behind the 
bridge deck, denominated in this analogy by “Interoperability backbone”, in which transparency is 
the key, and, finally, the main anchors representing the Stability of the Infrastructure. In this book, 
the author states and explains with this terminology the “five fundamental components of our e-
Government bridge”, which are essential to “bridge the gap between the old governance and the 
new”. According to this statement, two models, adopted by and simply idealised to the United 
Kingdom government, are explored, explained and compared side by side. The “old governance” 
corresponding to the past and the “new governance” belonging to the future. In the old model, 
corresponding to the era before the “Modernising Government” - a white paper where was 
introduced and listed the programme of reform and modernisation of the UK’s government, the 
ministries, agencies and non-governmental bodies were in the middle, while stakeholders, citizens, 
communities and businesses were in the periphery. Hence, these surrounding groups “felt their 
opinions were not valued”, citizens were not aware of their benefits and “income went unclaimed”, 
“very difficult to deal with government at any level” and only the “wealthier and computer literate” 
could gain from this model. One of the main conclusions one can retrieve from this old model was 
the term “digital divide” and its implications felt within the society, where the discrimination 
between those who “could access the technology and those who could not” was clear. Consequently, 
citizens “felt disconnected from the governance process”. 
Alternatively, the more recent model mentioned above “puts the citizens, stakeholders, communities 
and businesses at the heart of governance”, while agencies and non-governmental bodies working 
with the ministries support the population in the middle. This is the core of the “e-Government” 
according to the author. As main results, one may state the citizens becoming “better educated to 
take advantage of opportunities”, higher responsiveness of the government, citizens become aware 
of the governance process, “services become more targeted”, higher flexibility, “cost reductions and 
efficiency gains” and, overall, “the social and digital divide shrinks”. However, it matters to highlight 
the different results between the old and the new governance models in regard to the voting system: 




Drawing relevant conclusions from this book, the author uses the word “roads” to make an analogy 
between the bridge example and the E-Government policies necessary to adopt in order “to link our 
e-Government road system with that of European, and eventually global, networks”. Lastly, E-
Government is described as “not just about technology replacing old processes and standards.”, but 
mainly a “strategy that sought to completely reinvent the way to implement the governance model 
in the future. It redefined how government should interact with its stakeholders and created a 
completely new framework for the internal interactions between departments and agencies”. 
 
Despite of the fact that e-Government is considered as a “bridge” for this author between different 
Governance models, the difference between this concept and e-Governance is clear for other 
authors and not addressed in this book, creating a limitation to make use of both concepts in a more 
intelligent and flexible manner.  
In the book of Bhatnagar, S. C. (2004), the author retrieves the concept of Governance from a World 
Bank publication, defined as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for development.” The term “accountability” is important 
and used to distinguish from “efficiency”, in the matter of management of resources on behalf of 
public officials without “abuse of power”. Bearing this in mind, the author distinguishes also 
Governance as “a broader concept that encompasses the state’s institutional arrangements, decision 
-making processes, implementation capacity and the relationship between government officials and 
the public”. Hence, E-Governance is defined as “the use of ICT by the government, civil society and 
political institutions to engage citizens through dialogue and feedback to promote their greater 
participation in the process of governance of these institutions”. On the other hand, E-Government is 
considered by the author as a “subset of e-governance”, focused mainly “on improving 
administrative efficiency and reducing administrative corruption”, and sometimes both terms are 
confused. Finally, the concept is introduced in a paragraph, where he affirms this buzzword 
“harnesses information technologies (such as wide area networks, the Internet and mobile 
computing) to transform relations with citizens, businesses and other arms of government”. This is a 
good example of a beneficial use of technology to promote better delivery of services to society, 
create smarter interactions between the government and businesses and contributing to a more 
efficient management of the government. In the end, the author indicates “less corruption, increased 
transparency, greater convenience, revenue growth and/or cost reductions” as benefits.  
In order to address the voting system thematic, in the article of Alhawawsha, M. (2017), it is studied 
a new E-Government voting system that supports the government with the election process. Hence, 
this term considers “the use of electronic mediums to facilitate the services to the public of the 
country”, making use of the “information and communication technology” and “allows the citizen to 
engage with the government at all the levels”, helping him/her to “involve in the local and national 
governance”. Beyond the definition of the use of Information and Communication Technology in the 
provision of public services to citizens with higher efficiency and effectivity in the management of 
government, other authors add to the E-Government concept its benefits as well. “E-government is 
recognized as a tool for improving transparency and openness in the public sector and for 




2.1.2. Architecture & Tools 
 
In order to implement policies and provide services to citizens through the use of electronic devices, 
it is required an architecture framework for the e-government adoption that facilitates the 
understanding of requirements, both technological, as well organizational and governmental. Hence, 
this framework can support the decision makers and policy makers in their “vision statement and 
strategic action plan for future direction in the information technology age through identifying key 
elements and stages of action” (Ebrahim, Z., & Irani, Z. (2005)). In this paper, the authors study an 
architecture framework for e-government, demonstrating its potential, risks (security issue) and 
further limitations. For the purpose of this study, one will focus on the framework developed and 
explain each of the main components. 
In the appendix 1, there are four layers (access layer, e-government layer, e-business layer and 
infrastructure layer), connected, in a sense of flow schema. However, the authors start by defining 
the meaning of e-government architecture as “the standards, infrastructure components, 
applications, technologies, business model and guidelines for electronic commerce among and 
between organizations that facilitates the interaction of the government and promotes group 
productivity”. Furthermore, they state what this paper contributes for the state of art and adds in 
regard to other studies already developed and published of the architecture: “provide an integrated 
architecture framework for e-government that represent the alignment of IT infrastructure with 
business process management in public sector organizations”. Right after, the indication and 
description of the four layers is presented, starting by the top level and concluding in the bottom 
level of the schema. 
Firstly, the Access layer is described as “the channels that government users can access the various 
government services”, and the explanation goes further regarding the access channels as “online and 
offline channels or routes of distribution through which products, service and information are used, 
access and communicated by multiple technologies.” Some examples are indicated by the authors 
such as web sites, kiosks, mobile phones (WAP), Digital TV and call and contact centers. After, the 
second layer is introduced and gives the name to the architecture: E-government layer. It integrates 
data of organizations into a “web-portal of government services, in the form of a one-stop e-
government portal”. Through a single window, it is visible and accessible all information in one place. 
The “web-based front-end application” allows different sources of information to be linked among 
them. According so, the integration, linkage and share of information between different 
organizations has a big potential for citizens who may benefit of an easier and more efficient way of 
updating personal details, such as a new address (“citizen moves from his/her residence”), allowing 
“this cumbersome process to a single step”. In the end, the authors explain some of the reasons and 
cons that lead to the slow adoption of a web-portal. On one hand, the difficulty in choose the most 
relevant applications and features, on the other hand, a more technical reason related to the 
required interconnection of public organizations and the transparency between of their systems 
(interoperability). It is necessary “comprehensive technology, systems integration and project 
management skills”. The last issue pointed our is the Security, “through deploying government 
authentication and privacy standards to secure online transactions and protect the portal contents.” 
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The third layer is the E-business. It is focused on “using ICT applications and tools to harness a 
network of trust, knowledge sharing and information processing that takes place both within and 
between organisations”. In another words, the government portal incorporates front-end 
applications (“online catalogues and transactions interfaces”), with back-end activities (“existing 
databases and data warehouses”). The authors address the topic by distinguishing from the 
traditional method, where government bodies maintain “separate databases that are not connected” 
between each other. It is classified as a challenge for the implementation of an e-government portal, 
once transmission of data and communication have barriers. However, in this layer is required 
“computer systems and applications of different public departments and organizations” to being 
“connected” and/or “communicating with each other”. Thereon, a table is presented (appendix 2) 
and a collection of applications and systems, relevant for the architecture, are indicated as a mean to 
deliver through different channels information and services to the population. 
DBMS (Data Base Management System), CRM (Customer Relationship Management), Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP), Web service application, Data Warehousing, EDI (Electronic Data 
Interchange) and Document management systems, are some of the applications/systems discussed 
in this paper that “help determine, assess, and achieve consistent and integrated processes and 
information systems in public sector organisation”. 
The fourth and last layer is the Infrastructure. It is represented in the bottom level and “focuses on 
technologies that should be in place before e-government services can be offered reliably and 
effectively to the public”. These technologies may “support and integrate the operations of 
information systems and applications in e-business layer organizations”, through the use of 
appropriated network and communication infrastructure: “intranet, extranet, and internet”. Another 
two technologies described is the LAN and Server, which counting the five mentioned, they are 
powerful technologies used to “support the acquisition, storage, and transformation of data”.  In the 
end, the authors mention the biggest issue associated: the security of infrastructure. Once the use of 
public networks increases, as well the databases holding citizens personal information and 
government information, it is required major security tools that ensure protection against fraud. 
“Digital signature and certificate, and sophisticated encryption technique, which secure e-
government interoperation, government electronic transactions, and delivery systems” are some 
technologies capable to protect the system from cyber-attacks, for example.  
In the paper “E-Government Based on Cloud Computing and Service-Oriented Architecture” (Cellary, 
W., & Strykowski, S. (2009)), another two types of architectures are studied by the authors and they 
defend that the circumstances on that time of computer infrastructure development together with 
the user’s skills and knowledge of computers and Internet, are two good factors to stimulate the 
adoption of the two new architectures: “cloud computing and service-oriented architecture, in the 
public sector”. Hence, one will describe the two models and arguments for their adoption. 
Before that, the main obstacle for the evolution of e-government is introduced: “Interoperability”, 
already addressed by Ebrahim, Z., & Irani, Z. (2005), however in the current paper that is being 
analysed, this concept is more emphasized. According to the authors, this problem rises “under two 
conditions”: e-government achieves “such a level of development that integrated inter-unit services 
are required” and “systems providing e-services in different administrative units are incompatible”. 
Also, in this sense, “lack of leadership” is pointed out as the biggest cause for “incompatibility of IT 
8 
 
systems providing e-services in different administrative units”. They explain that the “local solutions” 
created are easily appreciated by “local governments and customers”, once they are “user friendly 
and efficient”, but only because of the “limited functionality” that leads to “simplicity”. However, 
once the need for integrated e-services arises, these local solutions are not adapted and even an 
obstacle. If IT developers would work on the integration of these solutions with other systems, their 
life would not be easy: “they are not able to cooperate with other systems developed independently 
under different assumptions”. After that, two solutions are presented: either “replace or rebuilt the 
local systems” to reach common standards with the non-local systems, or develop “intermediary 
systems that make cooperation of heterogenous local systems possible”. As an alternative, Cloud 
computing is mentioned as “a business model of delivering IT resources and applications as services 
accessible remotely over the Internet rather than locally”. Instead of users purchasing products sold 
or licensed from a vendor, with cloud computing, “a user purchases remote access” to hardware or 
software “via the Internet”. 
This model has three levels: “Infrastructure as a Service – IaaS” (examples of infrastructure are 
“servers”, “network equipment and system software like operating systems and database systems”), 
and IaaS delivers computer infrastructure as a service and “is one of many virtual environments 
hosted simultaneously on the same physical infrastructure resources”; “Platform as a Service – PaaS” 
(delivers “application development environment”); “Software as a Service – SaaS” (delivers complete 
applications such as CRM or ERP over the internet and “a client purchases an access to these 
applications instead of purchasing licenses and exploiting them locally”). Following the Software as a 
service concept, the main benefits of cloud computing come “from aggregation that permits to 
eliminate redundancy”. In this sense, there are two levels of aggregation: “Aggregation at the level of 
organizational units”, meaning, “hospitals, schools, agencies of local governments”, among other 
public institutions, have “similar needs of data processing”, mainly due to legal requirements. Hence, 
these similar units “require the same software functionality to manage their operations”. Cloud 
computing plays a crucial role in this area. The same center providing SaaS may serve all the units of 
the same type (hospitals, schools, etc), and knowing that two hospitals are different from one 
another, the software may be adjusted to meet the specific requirements of each one; regarding the 
“Aggregation at the level of functional modules”, once the legal regulations may be the same across 
different units, “some functions performed” are the same. The authors mention some examples such 
as “management of human resources, payroll, business trips”. Hence, a common function may be 
used as a SaaS for any unit and, also, cloud computing offers “different software modules” adjusted 
to customers’ needs. In the end of the exploration of this model, the authors list the advantages of 
its adoption: “Dynamic load of resources”, meaning a customer can purchase more or less of 
hardware and software resources, according to its needs in a given moment; “Professional 
maintenance and administration”, a cloud computing provider manages the hiring process of 
appropriate staff capable to maintain and administrate with high quality the hardware and software; 
“Timely software updates”, customers do not need to worry with last versions of software, once the 
cloud computing system automatically and continuously adapts new updates, as well as changes 
according to the legal regulations; “Higher security”; “Higher performance”; “Shift from investment 
cost to operational costs”; “Dissemination of good practices”, meaning with the adoption of cloud 
computing, local institutions will be more capable to follow e-government initiatives, instead of 
“purchasing and deploying e-government solutions by themselves”. Summing up, the model 
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described facilitates the dissemination of e-government tools across different units and the data 
processing in the whole public sector.  
In the same paper, another architecture is presented: “Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA)”. 
According to the name itself, the author considers the “primary building block” the service, at the 
moment of designing and developing IT solutions. Among many other definitions, service is 
considered a “container of capabilities associated with a common purpose”. In order to implement 
services, three technologies are mentioned by the author, which facilitate the development of 
“service compositions” (“ordered invocation of services to automate executions of a task, or a 
business or administrative process”), and “service repository” (“collection of services running in an 
enterprise” and “organized and managed according to a local policy”). Hereupon, the main goal of 
this architecture is to avoid the existence of “redundancy among services” and that “services can 
interoperate”. Thus, efficiency and high impact in the life of citizens in the provision of these service 
compositions can be guaranteed.  
Another relevant characteristic worth of mentioning is the “information sharing in and outside the 
public sector”. This means among public entities and external ones (businesses and citizens). In order 
to exemplify the features mentioned before, the author shows a figure where the provision of a mix 
service, “composed of services provided by both governmental and business units”, where these 
entities are working independently but providing each one its service that, all combined, constitute 
the final service that the citizen benefits. In an “heterogeneous environment”, suitable for public and 
private sectors collaboration, the “Enterprise Service Bus (ESB)” tool takes an important role, 
enabling in this type of environment “application and system connectivity”, taking into consideration 
the integration of legal requirements and components of the “governmental IT environment”. 
In the end, the author concludes that combining the two models, Cloud computing and Service-
Oriented architectures, bring many advantages into place, at different spheres: “technical, 
organizational, social and economical”. However, he alerts to the need of the government 
understand deeply the importance of electronic government and, as a consequence, reconsider the 
legislation and adapt to the implementation of these architectures. 
In the last paper reviewed for this study (Mosa, A., El-Bakry, H., El-Razek, S., & Hasan, S. (2016)), 
another architecture is explained, conciliating the Cloud Computing and Service-Oriented models’ 
benefits, such as interoperability, flexibility, manageability, saving of time, cost and economies of 
scale, among others. Hence, the main purpose of this paper is to “propose a framework of e-
government services that bases on using pros of cloud computing environment” and is “evaluated on 
deep discussion relative to interoperability and integration”. To start with, the authors write about 
the Internet as the special form of innovation that e-government can use as a mean to “giving helpful 
access to administrations and government data”. Therefore, “Web service systems” are understand 
as a way to “facilitate interactions between government agencies area unit and general public”. Thus, 
it matters to know the implications to a database system. Its design replicates subsets of the 
government units’ databases “into the Integrated Central Database” which the main features are 
“replication and accessibility”, but both of them “suffer from the lack of vital features which are: 
interoperability, flexibility and manageability”. As a solution, the authors come with another 
architecture already mentioned: “Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA)”. It is able to achieve the 
weakness of a typical Web Service Based Architecture with its integrated central database. Hence, 
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experts have tried to become a web service model into a SOA. However, despite of important 
characteristics as interoperability, flexibility and manageability, it is still missing some relevant ones 
that a Cloud Computing Architecture is able to overcome: “save time, cost, scale, etc”.  
Concluding, the proposed model is based on an e-government application which faces and seeks to 
solve some challenges as “information management systems, central database, robust infrastructure, 
interoperability, integrity and much more”. The authors refer that the focus of this study is on 
“handling quality of service, integrity, delivery status, workflow notification, cost, security and 
interoperability between different organizations under approved unified government umbrella.” 
Furthermore, this model is dedicated to solve the issues related to a web service architecture, 
consisting in “technical issues and functional challenges”. Hence, this web limited architecture is 
characterized by the “single user profiling”, meaning that in the application there is only a single-
entry point for all users. This point makes accessibility restricted and discourages users to access. It is 
required system stability, data, actions and flows of client’s requests consistent. Hence, 
synchronization is needed and an important technical issue to be considered. Afterwards, one meets 
the functional requirements, which are the basis for the creation of the proposed cloud based e-
government framework. These requirements are divided in three blocks: “user interface”, “data 
storage” and “back end” (appendix 3). The User Interface scope is a range of possible entry points of 
the application and computing terminals. “Web Pages” are known as the “basic entry point”, the 
“Native App” is the interface for mobile devices, tablets, laptops, and also web page. The third 
example is the “Cross Platform App”, “fully supported depending on different technologies” and, 
finally, “Resources”, which focus on the need of sharing resources across these types of user 
interfaces globally. According to the synchronization challenge and central data storage feature, both 
are required to keep the UI consistency. In the second block, Data Storage, is able to “satiate one or 
more instance of database”. These instances are transparent, offering the guarantees required for a 
strong database repository: “data integrity checks”, “consistency” and “consolidation”. Moreover, 
synchronization is again mentioned as the key to keep the data up-to-date. “Android SDK”, “Asp.net 
SDK” and “Other SDK” support “high precision of application development, integrity and 
compatibility”. In the last block mentioned, management, logistic, among other important tasks are 
stored. “User management service”, focused on facilitating user authentication and enabling the 
storage of data in user accounts. This service also makes possible to users authenticate internally 
through the app or with social networks (Facebook, Twitter and Google+ account). The “Workflow 
management service” is also useful when it comes to deal with different data formats and, on the 
other hand, the “Document Management” service dedicates to find files efficiently and effectively, in 
a short period of time (seconds), enables also concurrent users who seek to access the same file at 
the same time and free to edit, access further information, manage security, among other settings. 
“Notification services” is another module, which enforces users to keep up-to-date and track their 
enquiry. 
Summing up, “interoperability”, “integrity”, “transparency”, as well as “accessibility”, “flexibility” and 
“manageability” are issues and challenges to other models, but according to this authors’ study, they 
are overcame with this proposal of a Cloud based e-government framework. In the financial and 





2.1.3. Case Studies 
 
In order to investigate and understand better the potential of E-government, in this chapter one will 
present some examples already implemented in different geographies. 
In Melin, U., & Axelsson, K. (2009), two e-government projects implemented in Sweden, as main 
purpose to better understand the chances of success or failure of these type of initiatives. The author 
explores an “e-government systems development life cycle”, claiming based on other studies that 
typically this cycle consists in five phases: starting in “Project assessment”, going to “Analysis of 
current reality”, passing through “Design of the new system”, “System construction” and, finally, its 
“Implementation and beyond”. Supported by this development life cycle, the author explores two 
projects: “the provisional driving licence application project” and “the driving licence web portal 
project” (appendix 4). The overall idea is that in Sweden anyone who wants to get a driving license, 
needs to apply firstly for a “provisional driving license”. After, the regional County Administration 
(CoA) will judge the applicant, in order to determine if he/she is able to drive in a responsible 
manner. This judgement process in order to an applicant get a driving license is a cycle full of 
requirements and some bureaucracy is needed (“health declaration”, “certificate of good eyesight”, 
application that states a “parent is permitted to act as a private instructor”, criminal record, among 
others). Hence, this mix of declarations, information, contacts and responsibilities is considered as a 
good opportunity to develop the provision of an e-service.  
The first project mentioned, “provisional driving license application project”, was created in order to 
automate the decision in more simple applications that do not “call for any extensive handling 
process”. Hence, the resources could be reallocated to more extensive and complex cases. This e-
service would be able to check the veracity, quality and accuracy of the data in the filling forms for 
the driving license application. Also, this service helps citizens to redirect to the right CoA. On the 
other hand, the “driving license web portal project” would facilitate the share of information and 
provision of different services by different authorities in order to get a license. This web portal is an 
“one-stop e-government solution”, establishing a bridge between citizens and government agencies 
and organizations. Further, both projects were analysed and discussed by the author, which reveals 
the web portal as the most successful one. Different stages of development were pointed out, as the 
“project assessment” itself, “analysis of current reality”, “design of the new system”, “system 
construction” and “implementation and beyond”. In the first mentioned stage, two main factors for 
the development of an application project were cited: “government’s commission” to incentivize an 
e-service development and, then, the fact that this e-government solution is easier to accomplish. In 
the second stage, some challenges were faced by the parts involved. There was a need to hire 
external consultancy firms to execute the technical development, as well the project manager 
required, in a later phase of the project, external help to manage the activities. For the design stage, 
the lack of knowledge and experience of the staff involved, together with the need of legal 
regulation’s update, this development became more time-consuming than expected. The second last 
phase identify the problems in the management of customer’s needs, once they were “unclear and 
imprecise”, missing the interpretation and expertise of senior consultants to facilitate the 
communication and meet of expectations. In the end, the implementation was not clear once it was 
not defined in a raw stage who were the ones responsible for the IT system maintenance. However, 
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the development and implementation of the web portal happened in the other way around. Since 
the clear objectives from scratch (“only place to find governmental information about driving 
licenses and the portal should be a joint agency responsibility”), to the relevant experience of the 
project manager and consequent follow of a well-defined model, the design organization (“focus 
groups” with citizens to gather different opinions and a way to evaluate the development and 
performance), the possibility of delivering good results before the deadline and below the initial 
budget and, finally, in the implementation stage, every steps were well-defined since the beginning: 
the portal existed at the same time as the remaining former websites in the area. This period of time 
was used efficiently for testing the user’s experience and, in the end, the former sites were closed, 
making this portal the only one able to provide this type of e-government service. 
Sweden is among the top countries in the world that more successfully implemented e-government 
strategies (the index rating of EGDI – E-Government Development Index in 2018 is 0.89). Although it 
matters to understand better which factors bring Nordic countries to the top of this ranking 
evaluated across different nations worldwide. 
In the article from Joseph, S. & Avdic, A. (2016), entitled “Where do the Nordic Nations’ Strategies 
Take e-Government?”, the authors study the leading nations in Europe (Sweden, Norway, Denmark 
and Finland) regarding the implementation of e-government strategies. These four countries 
demonstrate a will to become world leaders in the improvement of efficient and effective public 
sector services, supported by “electronic information and communication technologies” tools. As 
main results, in this article is presented a table where is accounted the number of strategic measures 
adopted by the different governments within different sectors and categories of the economy. From 
Public sector reforms, to Economic reforms, and without forgetting e-Democracy, the Public sector 
takes in all countries the major efforts (higher number of measures). Some examples are “legal 
measures for e-Identification”, “service sector reforms” and “public sector integration efforts”. 
“Digitized welfare” is another generic example of public sector reform, focused on the “delivery of 
welfare services using digital means”. Regarding e-Participation, the generic example of e-
Democracy, only Sweden and Finland adopted measures. In order to explain more effectively what 
each nation has been developing, the authors constructed a matrix where the Infrastructure 
component is presented. In the case of Sweden (already studied in the paper of Melin, U., & 
Axelsson, K. (2009), the “Government Information portals for citizens and single point portal for 
businesses” is the main example indicated, as well as the security between government and EU 
bodies through an “IP-based network”. In Denmark, a “single Internet entry point for citizens with 
self-service and mobile platforms” was developed, and also an “online trading portal and educational 
materials website with special design for digital illiterates”. These progresses are not exclusive to the 
Danish case. In Norway, further developments were achieved as well. “One-stop service portal to 
citizens with secured interaction point”, as already implemented in Sweden, “point of single contact 
for businesses, standardization portal, and portal for geo-spatial infrastructure”. Finally, Finland is 
not an exception and a portal with single access point was also developed to citizens to access it. In 
this portal, they can benefit of e-services provision, “enterprise services” and “geo-data portal”. 
Closer to the end of this article, the authors discuss the results and draw some conclusions as the 
organization of these Nordic countries, as the government initiatives departing from the ministries 
and other Public departments. They offer the opportunity and invest strongly in the implementation 
of measures as the ones already mentioned, incentivizing also the citizens participation, creating 
conditions that facilitate their involvement in policy making. Another relevant topic addressed in the 
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end is the interoperability offered through the standardization of “software, systems and other e-
Government artefacts”. 
For this dissertation, it matters to understand what is the position of Portugal regarding the adoption 
of e-government measures. According to the United Nations E-Government Survey, published in 
2018, Portugal is the 29th country performing better in this context. In order to understand better 
what has been done, in the article from Paiva Dias, G., & Gomes, H. (2014), the authors study the 
evolution of the Portuguese nation. Hence, a “three-dimensional maturity model” is developed to 
support the characterization of the “local e-government evolution”. The three dimensions are 
“access to government information (information)”, “electronic service delivery (services)” and 
“participation in public decisions (participation)”. They represent three different supply sides of e-
government.  
For the information dimension, it is evaluated different stages: the general information about the 
municipality, the possibility to download public documentation (without previous authentication), a 
search tool to find information in the documents and, also, the possibility to “parametrize searches 
for documents based on their characteristics”. The second dimension is the services one, as already 
mentioned. In the website of any municipality, it is provided information about services that citizens 
may benefit of. They may authenticate in the website in order to monitor the services and, also, it is 
made available the upload of files, even if the formalization is done in physical interaction. In a final 
stage, citizens are allowed to “request and complete at least one electronic service provided by the 
city council” after authentication. Regarding the third dimension mentioned, the participation one, in 
a first stage, with or without authentication, everyone is free to “submit suggestions and/or 
complaints”. In a second stage, with or without authentication, anonymously or not, citizens have 
the freedom to participate more actively in “policy areas of the city council”, through “opinion polls” 
and “discussion groups”. In a third stage, the city council has the duty to respond and take into 
consideration the public discussion regarding several matters, and finally, in the fourth and last stage, 
influence on public budget is included and mechanisms are adopted in order to consider 
participatory democracy. However, with this methodology adopted and the performance evaluated 
across different dimensions and different municipalities, “local e-government in Portugal remains 
substantially underdeveloped”. This conclusion is achieved when comparing the results of 2013 with 
2010. Also, the possibility for citizens to participate actively in opinion polls, discussion groups, share 
their suggestions and complaints, is still very conditioned by municipalities. 
In another study about the local e-government in Portugal, from Soares, D., Amaral, L., Ferreira, L. & 
Lameiras, M. (2019), the performance of 308 municipalities in Portugal is measured and a global 
ranking is calculated about the provision of online services, conditions created to stimulate citizen’s 
participation, which topics are addressed via web and searching parameters. The four structural 
dimensions that are integrated in this study are: Contents (evaluate topics addressed, made 
available, as well as their continuous update); Accessibility, Searching and Utilization,  which focus on 
the citizen’s experience while surfing on the website; the Online Services, based on the evaluation of 
them, as well as the authentication and email services and, finally; Participation, where the level of 
participation is measured and the facilities that each City Council offers to its citizens in order for 
them to participate more actively in discussion and suggestion polls, as well as specific areas 
dedicated to transparency, open data and other initiatives (participative budget). Among these 
dimensions, the most critical ones are the online services and participation. However, in this study 
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from 2019, the authors recognize the general efforts to increase dematerialization, de-
bureaucratization and simplification of processes from Public Administration. Hence, greater 





In the paper from Zissis, D. & Lekkas, D. (2011), the authors conclude an important fact about citizen 
participation, already discussed before. According to them, Electronic Voting that complies with all 
necessary security and it is made available to population, increases citizen participation. The 
importance of voting is study in schools, remembered by news and recalled in the voting days in 
order to raise awareness. In this study, it is emphasized the need to become the voting system 
digital, “offer citizens a timely, location-independent, and transparent means of participation in 
governance.” In this sense, two types of electronic voting are mentioned: the remote e-voting and 
“Poll-site” e-voting. The first one presents advantages over the second: “cost reductions due to 
economies of scale and increased participation due to voter geographic independence.” Moreover, 
by complying with all security requirements, together with the cost reductions and mobility issue 
solved, the turnout may increase.  
In this sense, it matters to understand better the concept of E-Voting. According to Al-Ameen, A. & 
Talab, S. (2013), E-voting is “a voting system in which the election data is recorded, stored and 
processed primarily as digital information.”  Furthermore, the authors summarize the main benefits 
of Electronic voting and why it is better: “E-voting may become the quickest, cheapest, and the most 
efficient way to administer election and count vote since it only consists of simple process or 
procedure and require few workers within the process.” In this paper, the authors also describe E-
Voting as “any type of voting that involves electronic means” and further, they distinguish two types 
of E-voting: “in-site” and “remote”. “The in-site E-voting system” is when voters are identified 
through their identification card, but “push buttons” on an electronic device instead of the 
traditional paper form. This way, the citizens still need to mobilize to the polling stations where they 
can find the electronic devices. The other type is “the remote voting process”. Through this system, 
voters are allowed to choose either to vote “by using computers at remote locations or at polling 
stations”. Both computer and internet are used to vote through an application, where voters go 
through all the same steps as in-site voters, but remotely, reducing the mobility cost. 
In an article written by Bosova, E. & Reut, D. (2019), entitled by “Remote Electronic Voting: search for 
legislative formalization”, the authors investigate the introduction of E-Voting via remote in Russia. 
They mention the two forms of E-voting: “electronic and remote”. Right after, they define the 
concept of E-Voting as “voting without the use of a ballot made on paper, using a technical means”. 
These “technical means” are later listed under different types of electronic voting: “means of 
electronic counting of votes”, “electronic voting facilities”, “voting with the help of terminals 
installed at polling stations”, and “remote voting: via the Internet (using disks and social cards) and 
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mobile communication”. Regarding the “means of electronic counting of votes”, the authors explain 
the need for “new software and hardware-complexes of processing of ballots”. 
In another article written by Abba, A., Awad, M., Al-Qudah, Z., & Jallad, A. (2017), “Security Analysis 
of Current Voting Systems”, the authors define the concept of Electronic Voting: “a voting procedure 
that enables voters to cast a safe, secret, and secure ballot over an electronic system”. Furthermore, 
they distinguish clearly this concept from I-Voting (Internet Voting): “e-voting is different to Internet 
Voting where voters cast their ballots remotely over the Internet”. Hence, these authors bring a 
different approach of E-Voting types by not considering the use of Internet as a technical mean of 
traditional E-Voting. This lack of consensus between different authors leads one to explore further 
research over the two concepts and how Internet is considered: as a type of Electronic Voting or if an 
independent concept. 
According to the article from Beroggi, G. (2014), “Internet Voting: An Empirical Evaluation”, the 
author focuses his study in the Internet Voting system. However, he addresses this topic as an 
important process to be integrated in the “government’s electronics systems”: “E-citizens enable 
Internet voting to go completely paperless, along with its integration into the government’s 
electronic systems”. Also, he makes a reference to other electronic government services that are 
already performed via Internet, voting is an important act that may benefit from internet capabilities 
as well. Furthermore, he declares that the “True Internet voting should be based fully on digital 
communication, which means delivering the voting material electronically as well as casting votes in 
that format.” In another study (Powell, A., Williams, C., Bock, D., Doellman, T. & Allen, J. (2012)), the 
implementation of Internet Voting as a mean of electronic voting is also point of interest: “With the 
increased interest in e-voting, it is natural that attention has been given to the potential for 
implementing online voting via the internet.”  In another more recent study (Chondros, N. Zhang, B. 
et. Al (2019)), the authors base their work in previous literature that mention e-voting systems 
already introduced, as “the kiosk-based systems” and “internet voting systems”.  
For the purpose of this dissertation, one will consider Internet Voting as one type of Electronic 
Voting, besides of other possible definitions defended by different authors. 
 
2.2.2. Architecture & Tools 
 
In order to understand how the E-Voting schema works, which processes are involved, tools and the 
methods and characteristics involved that become the system secure, one will explore different 
Electronic Voting architectures. 
Starting with an example of an architecture based on “Elliptic Curve ElGamal (EC-ELGAMAL) 
cryptography”, explored in the article written by Sodiya, A., Adelani, D., & Onashoga, S. (2011), has as 
its main principle ensuring the security of all voting process. This security exists once “privacy”, “non-
coercion” and “receipt-freeness” (voter cannot prove and reveal his ballot in any bribery 
circumstance). The idea is, first, encrypt the vote and, in a final stage (tallying phase), decrypt it. 
In the figure 1, the Electronic Voting Architecture based on EC-ELGAMAL is put in schema. It is 
constituted by six phases. 
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Firstly, the registration before the election act is executed. At this moment, voters need to prove 
their “identity” and “eligibility”. Age and more personal details of each voter are consulted in a 
national database in order to ensure that is not involved in any crime and is able to proceed. Other 
relevant features to be included in this registration phase are “fingerprint” or “face recognition”. 
Then, two details are required: username and a token number generated randomly to log-in in the 
next phase. 
Secondly, the validation is done when the voters authenticate by supplying the username and the 
previous generated random pin number. Hence, the voter is now eligible to vote or, otherwise, 
his/her access will be denied. 
Thirdly, the voting phase takes place and the voter’s choice follows to the tallying one. Cryptography 
guarantees the following: Privacy or “Anonymity”, “non-coerciveness” and “receipt-freeness”. 
Privacy implies that a vote cannot be linked to the voter; non-coercion and receipt-freeness, ensure 
that bribery cannot be committed in the process.  
The middle phase between the casting and tallying is the “Election Controller”, more concretely, “EC-
ElGamal Encryption”. The main idea is using points “on an elliptic curve for encryption parameters of 
an ElGamal Encryption except the private key “. A logarithm algorithm is used to determine these 
points, in which the encryption and decryption is executed. 
In the end, all encrypted votes are decrypted while sending them to this phase. The “Audit trail” is 
where the results are verified and made known to the public. 
 




In another study (Cooke, R. & Anane, R. (2012)), it is presented a different architecture that uses as 
its basis the FOO92 protocol. According to Kremer, S. & Ryan, M (2005), this protocol works with 
Blind signatures. Also, it complies with most of the properties which electronic voting protocols may 
address: “fairness”, “eligibility”, “privacy” and “individual verifiability”. 
However, the authors state that this accomplishment is under informal analysis. In this paper, they 
are able to prove formally three of the four properties: “fairness”, “eligibility” and “privacy”. Fairness 
is about the fact that no voter is able to access early results, otherwise it would influence his/her 
decision. Regarding eligibility, only legitimate voters are able to vote (age, criminal record 
verification, among other requirements), and only once. Then, privacy guarantees the voting is not 
shared with anyone else. 
Theoretically, FOO92 protocol “involves voters, an administrator, verifying that only eligible voters 
can cast votes.” Furthermore, some cryptographic primitives’ techniques, such as “secure bi-
commitment” and “blind signatures”, and, “relies on anonymous channels”. 
Returning to the system architecture discussed in Cooke, R. & Anane, R. (2012), the voting process is 
splited in three main phases: 
• Validation: “The voter is known but the vote is unknown”; 
• Transmission: the vote is transmitted and, meanwhile, both voter and vote are not known; 
• Recording: when the vote is acknowledged but the voter persists unknown. 
The process schema which involves these three phases can be visualized in the appendix 5. Firstly, 
the voter is authenticated by the Administrator and also, this virtual agent retrieves the citizen’s 
identification information plus the election details themselves. After, a “personal random number” 
generated and the election details are sent to the “Validator” virtual space. The Validator has the 
function to sign the message sent by the voter with a “blind signature”, validate the details of the 
citizen and returns the blinded vote to the voter. This process prevents fraud from “multiple requests 
for validation from the same voter”. 
Secondly, once the validation is successful, the voter unblinds and encrypts the vote that was 
validated by the Validator in the previous step. With the use of a public key of the Counter 
(“V={{choice, electionId, RN} val−priv}count−pub”), the encrypted message will be transmitted 
through a chain of nodes (“routing nodes”) until reach the “Collector”. The Collector will extract the 
“packaged ballot”, check and validate the message, finishing its role in the chain by forward the 
message to the Counter. 
Thirdly, the Counter checks the ballot waiting for validation, “extracts the vote and adds it to the 
appropriate tally”. This vote will be also recorded in the database “against the personal random 
number of the Voter”.  
Finally, in order to understand the security of the process and anonymity involved, it matters to 
know the techniques used. The generation of a RN (Random Number) as a token by the Voter, 
preventing fraud by not allowing multiple votes by one single voter. Then, the use of blind signatures 
and symmetric encryption to guarantee the anonymity of the vote when it is sent to the Validator by 
the Voter. Later, the asymmetric encryption by using a public key (Counter) in order to encrypt the 
vote and a private one by the Validator. Summing up, the process of encrypting and decrypting the 
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vote is done repeatedly from node to node involved in the process. Decryption is done so the vote is 
accessed and the encrypted route is made known so the message can follow to the next node, and 
encryption happens afterwards, in order to guarantee the security.  
 
2.2.3. Case Studies 
 
After understanding how the electronic voting can be processed, one will present a general 
worldwide overview of the use of Information and Communications Technology (ICTs) in the Voting 
system, focusing in a higher level of detail in some countries that will be used as case studies. 
According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) 
survey related to “ICTs in Elections Database”, data and information about voting systems in each 
different country (mainly about the use of technology in the process and the current status about the 
adoption of electronic means to vote, as well as some existing pros and obstacles for its adoption), 
was retrieved from a questionnaire done to the many Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) across 
the world . The database collects data and information about 183 countries, and major efforts are 
applied in order to maintain the data up-to-date. The latest updates date back to 2018. 
In the table 1 below, some important numbers and percentages are presented in order to 
understand the status of Electronic Voting in the big picture. 
 
 
Question Answer & Conclusions EU framework 
“Is e-voting currently used in 
any elections with EMB 
participation?” 
Total #Countries: 176 
E-Voting is used: 34 countries 
E-Voting is not used: 142 countries 
E-Voting is used in 19.3% of countries 
worldwide 
E-Voting is not used in 23 countries of 
the EU and only used by 4 (Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Estonia and France) 
 
“If e-voting is currently being 
used, what type(s) of 
technology used?” (E-Voting is 
used in question 1) 
Total #Countries: 33  
Electronic ballot printers – EBPs 
(total): 4  
Internet voting systems (total): 10 
Direct recording electronic – DRE 
(total): 16 
Optical Mark Recognition - OMR 
(total): 9 
Machines with and without Voter-
Verified Paper Audit Trail - VVPAT 
(total): 16  
SMS voting system: 1 
Belgium uses EBPs, 
Bulgaria uses DRE and 
VVPAT, Estonia uses 
Internet voting systems 
and France DRE, VVPAT 





“If e-voting is currently being 
used, is it taking place in 
controlled or uncontrolled 
environment?” (E-Voting is used 
in question 1) 
Total #Countries: 33  
Controlled by EMB: 25 countries 
Uncontrolled: 4 countries 
Combination: 2 countries 
Both: 2 countries 
E-Voting in Belgium and 
Bulgaria is controlled, in 
France both 
environments rule and in 
Estonia is uncontrolled. 
“If e-voting is currently being 
used, is it available for all voters 
or only some groups of voters?” 
(E-Voting is used in question 1) 
Total #Countries: 33  
Everyone can vote electronically: 15 
countries 
Some groups can vote electronically: 
18 countries 
In Bulgaria and Estonia 
everyone can vote. In 
Belgium only people in 
certain constituencies. In 
France, in certain 
constituencies and 
voters from abroad. 
“If e-voting is NOT currently 
being used, what is the current 
status of e-voting in general?” 
(E-Voting is NOT used in 
question 1) 
Total #Countries: 142 
E-Voting has never been used: 103 
countries (representing 72.5%) 
Feasibility studies and/or tests are 
being carried out: 26 countries 
E-Voting had been used but has been 
abandoned: 9 countries  
Others status: 3 countries 
E-Voting has never been used in 13 EU 
countries, other 6 countries are 
making tests and studies, and 4 






In Austria, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Portugal and 
Spain, feasibility studies 
and/or tests are being 
carried out. 
 
Table 1 - Use of E-Voting worldwide (International IDEA survey “ICTs in Elections Database”) 
 
Summing up, it matters to explore in more detail the cases of some countries where all population 
can vote electronically. For purpose of this dissertation, one will focus in the Estonian case, exploring 
also Belgium (both European Union countries) and one of the BRICS – India. 
 
Estonia: 
Since 2002, Estonia introduced the national ID card. This card has a chip “with digital versions of the 
printed data, two 2048-bit RSA key pairs and certificates for the key pairs.” Each pair of keys is used 
for different purposes. The first one is used for authentication and the certificate associated connects 
the “citizen’s public key” to important personal details (name, national identification number and an 
email issued by the government). The second pair is used for the digital signature and the certificate 
associated connects the “citizen’s public key to their name and national identification number”. In 
order to make use of the chip, a card reader can be connected to a computer and a custom software.  
Three PINs are issued with the card: one to enable authentication, other before generating a digital 
signature, and a third one used in last case if the card is locked due to the wrong enter of one of the 
two previous PINs. 
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Furthermore, there are other two forms of digital identification: “Digi-ID” and “Mobiil-ID”. Digi-ID is a 
card which contains less personal information than the national one, but still useful for 
authentication and digital signature. Mobiil-ID is similar to Digi-ID in terms of functionality, but “built 
into a mobile phone SIM card rather than a chip and PIN card”. Due so, citizens are able to 
authenticate and digital sign only using a mobile phone. According to a study developed by McKinsey 
Global Institute intituled “Digital identification: A key to inclusive growth” (White, O., Madgavkar, A., 
Manyika, J., Mahajan, D., Bughin, J., McCarthy, M. & Sperling, O. (2019)), the adoption rate of Digital 
ID has achieved more than 70%. 
After understanding the connection between public key and the Estonian ID card, it matters to 
analyse the Internet Voting system adopted in this country. 
The process is based on the public key cryptography concept. “Voters encrypt their ballots with the 
public key of the election system, and then digitally sign them with their own private key.” The 
private key corresponds to the key for signature in the national ID card and, then, the electoral 
authority associates the voter with his/her public key. In this same book, the system operation is 
described across 28 steps. 
The first step is downloading the platform (“voting client”). Once the voter concludes successfully the 
installation, he/she will use the ID or Digi-ID card to authenticate. Then, enters the first PIN into the 
card reader. After, the Voting Forward Service (VFS), determines the list of candidates, the voter’s 
region, and filter the list of all candidates per region. VFS forwards this information to the Client 
(platform). The fifth step starts on the voter’s side. He/she chooses a candidate, the voting client 
generates and encrypted ballot and asks the voter to sign. Hence, the second PIN is entered, the 
encrypted ballot is signed and sent to VFS. The role of the VFS is again to forward, but to the Vote 
Storage Server (VSS) this time. In turn, VSS contacts the Validity Confirmation Server (VCS) to certify 
if the ballot’s signature is valid. At this point, there are two case scenarios: either the signature is 
invalid and the VSS rejects it, informing the VFS that reaches out the client and the process ends, or 
the signature is valid and the process continues. In this scenario, VSS stores the encrypted ballot, the 
voter’s ID number and a ballot’s hash in Log1. This Log1 is stored in the Log server. VSS checks in its 
turn if the voter has actually voted, stores the hash of the previous ballot, plus the voter’s ID number 
and the revocation reason in Log2, deleting then the previous ballot. Finished this step, VSS sends to 
VFS a receipt so it can be received by the voting client. In order to avoid duplication of votes 
registered by the same citizen, a list of e-voters is printed from VSS for each polling station and the 
cancelation of the electronic vote occurs in case of duplication (any ballot is deleted). Moving 
further, VSS acts again and this time removes digital signatures associated to the ballots and stores 
them as a proof of who voted (hash for each vote in Log3), sorting the ballots by constituency. Then, 
the encrypted ballots with no signature associated are sent to the Vote Counting Application (VCA) 
via a physical media object (DVD) with all anonymous votes. The VCA is in its turn attached to a 
Hardware Security Module (HSM) which has the role to decrypt all the ballots. At the end, VCA sends 
the decrypted ballots to each constituency. At this point, a final check is done regarding the 
candidate chosen. If invalid, the vote is not counted and the hash of the ballot is stored in Log4. If 
valid, the candidate’s tally increases by one and the ballot is stored in Log5. In order to visually 
summarize all this process, the following flow schema designed by Springall, D., Finkenauer, T., 




Figure 2 - Estonian I-Voting architecture (Springall, D., Finkenauer, T., Durumeric, Z., Kitcat, J., Hursti, 
H., MacAlpine, M. & Halderman, J. (2014)) 
 
According to the same study developed by White, O., Madgavkar, A., Manyika, J., Mahajan, D., 
Bughin, J., McCarthy, M. & Sperling, O. (2019), the authors concluded that “more than 30 percent of 
Estonians vote online, of whom 20 percent say they would not vote at a physical polling place”. 
  
Summing up, Estonia was the first country to announce the electronic voting adoption in 2001 
(Binder, N., Krimmer, R., Wenda, G. & Fischer, D. (2019)). This fact increases the responsibility of 
being the first country establishing a legal procedure in the adoption of E-Voting. In order to comply 
with legal requirements, the Riigikogu Election Act was introduced in June 2002 and “assumed legal 
effect on 18 July 2002”. Once this is a technology in continuous development, also the law needed to 
adapt and change. According so, with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) mission report in 2011 presented a set of recommendations and, at that time, also the 
Electronic Voting Committee was created. All these events contributed in a way or another to the 
continuous update of the Act. According to this study, the last time the Act was changed was in 2016, 
with “legal effect on 1 January 2017”. Many of these changes will “step into force in 2021”. The legal 
procedures will be described in more detail in chapter 4.2 named “Case Identification”. 
 
Belgium: 
Currently in Belgium, two voting methods are in use, according to Cock, D. & Preneel, B. (2007): 
“electronic and paper-based voting systems”. It matters to understand that “Voting is compulsory 
and the participation is in practice almost absolute”. This country is complex in terms of 
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governmental organization, for instance, the regionalization leaded to a “three-tiered federation”, 
where exist “federal, regional, and cultural/political community governments”. Due so, the 
organization of elections may vary between the three different regions of Flanders, Brussels and 
Wallonia. According to Smartmatic, the exclusive poll office election technology provider, it was 
announced in a case-study developed by them – “Belgian elections 2012 - 2019: Customized voting 
solution for a pioneer in electronic voting” - that the voting machines have been distributed across 
“185 municipalities in the Flanders region, the Capital Region of Brussels and the German-speaking 
community”. In the same paper of Cock, D. & Preneel, B. (2007), it is stated that the “Electronic 
voting was introduced with the federal elections in 1991” and also in June 2007 “44% of the voters 
have used the electronic system”. Some benefits are the availability of results quickly, the “reduction 
of costs” and “elimination of spoiled votes”. After, the authors explain the voting scheme of the 
Electronic Voting Machines.  
Once the voter enters the polling station, he/she receives a “blank magnetic stripe card and goes to a 
voting booth”. There is a computer in the booth and “the voter uses a light pen to select first the 
party and subsequently the candidates”. Once the voter makes his/her choice, the vote will be 
recorded in the “magnetic strip of the card”. As in a paper-based system, the vote ballot goes to an 
urn. In this case, the urn is “driven by a computer”, where the magnetic strip of card is read and 
counts the vote. At the end, the results “are written to a floppy and brought by courier to the 
cantonal headquarters”. According to this study, some procedures are followed as tests to the 
machines (“test votes”) before and after each election, the voting machines and the urn computers 
have also to comply with some requirements to start up, the voter can check his/her final choice in a 
different voting booth and, if there’s any failure in the urn computer, all votes can be recounted in a 
different machine. However, since 2007, some changes have occurred. According to Smartmatic, 
voters can correct and confirm their choices in an easier way in 2019, the floppies are no longer used, 
USD pen drives are used, among others innovations. All the equipment required includes “Voting 
Machines”, “Smart Cards”, (used to access the voting machine and automatically deactivated after 
the voting moment occurs and when it is delivered to the President Machine), “President Machines” 
(responsible to “activate smart cards that voters use to access the voting machines; to electronically 
register and store each vote; to count all votes and store the results; and to generate a polling station 
report”), “Smart card reader unit” (already two generations, one connected externally via USD, the 
second one is fully integrated in the President Machine) and, finally, the “e-Urn (electronic ballot 
box)”, connecting “to the PM via a combined power/USB cable”. 
 





In this emerging economy, Electronic Voting Machine became highly popular after an experiment 
that took place in three Indian states in 1998, leading to its official adoption in 2004 at a national 
level. Today, India is one of the few countries where it is possible to the Indian population to cast 
their vote through an electronic device (Chauhan, S., Jaiswal, M & Kar, A. (2018)). However, since 
1989 the law was amended by Parliament in order to spread the use of EVMs around the nation, 
taking effect in 1998.  
According to the study developed by Avgerou, C., Masiero, S. & Poulymenakou, A. (2019), The 
Electronic Voting Machine in India is constituted by two parts: the ballot and a control unit, 
connected by a cable. Before the election day, “each key on the ballot unit is marked with the name 
of a candidate and the symbol of their party”. Technically, the design of Indian EVMs is characterized 
by the software being provided as firmware, “meaning that it is encoded in the EVM’s EPROM 
(erasable programmable read-only memory)”. Basically, these machines are used for the voting itself, 
as well as for the counting. The votes are counted and stored in the machine, moving later forward 
to counting centres where the votes are “aggregated and tabulated”. During the election act, all the 
process occurs under a controlled environment. Around four officers intervein. The first one checks 
the “voter’s card against the printout register for the booth”. After, a second officer “crosses out the 
voter’s name in the printout, asks them to sign the register against their name, and marks their right 
index finger with an impermeable ink line”. A third officer unlocks the machine, following the 
moment of voting, where the voter presses the button corresponding to the candidate of his/her 
choice and, in the end, “a sound signal is heard confirming that vote has happened”. When the 
citizen leaves the booth, a fourth officer supervises. In the end, the same officer who unlocks the 
machine, also locks it, in order to prevent more votes. The machines are transported to a room 
where a manually aggregation of the outputs of all machines is done in order to determine the final 
results.  
In the paper written by (Chauhan, S., Jaiswal, M & Kar, A. (2018)), a Unified Theory of Acceptance 
and Use of Technology (UTAUT) model was used to validate a set of hypotheses that the authors 
intended to test in order to conclude about the main variables that affect the behavioural intention 
to use an Electronic Voting Machine. In the data collection process, the survey was conducted in the 
four main metropolitan cities of India, being these results related to an urban population. Despite of 
the major efforts to gather data from a larger sample of the population, “a total of 638 filled 
questionnaires were gathered out of which 356 were completely filled”.  
The variables considered were “Perceived Security”, dealing with how citizens perceive the “accuracy 
and confidentiality of EVMs”; “Trust in Technology”, measuring the people’s belief in the 
technology’s capability used to design the EVMs (firmware as already indicated before); 
“Performance Expectancy”, measuring at which extent voters consider EVMs useful; “Effort 
Expectancy”, related to the level of complexity and effort amount voters need to apply in the 
moment of voting, and; “Social Influence”, if the important relatives “believe he or she should cast 
the vote using EVMs”. As main conclusions, after the modelling process takes place, “Perceived 
Security”, “Trust in Technology”, “Performance Expectancy” and “Social Influence” are the 
determinants of the voter’s intention to use EVMs. In terms of age and gender factors, the authors 
reached relevant conclusions. First of all, the sample was divided in two groups: the older (citizens 
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with age over 35 years old) and younger groups (citizens with age equal or below 35 years old). Then, 
for the older stratum of the sample, all measures in the model are significant, while for the youngers, 
“Effort Expectancy” is not significant. Taking into consideration the culture and literacy rate of the 
Indian population, female and older stratums are the ones who consider “user-friendliness of EVMs 
is a major factor of consideration”. “Social Influence” is considered more relevant by men than by 
women. 
 
2.2.4. Issues & Challenges  
 
In this chapter one introduces the main challenges that the Electronic Voting (both EVMs and 
Internet Voting) face nowadays. 
According to a report published by the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies, European Union Democracy Observatory – EUDO, Trechsel, A. (2016), when the 
subject is challenges associated with the E-Voting, one may refer “legal considerations”, “political 
considerations”, “technological and security challenges” (both human-related and tech-related) and 
“social challenges”. Below, one can see the considerations and challenges listed by topic: 
 
Legal Considerations: 
• Principal of Universal Suffrage (“one voter, one vote”), states that “everyone is entitled to 
the right to vote”, and it “could only be harmed by the introduction of Internet voting as the 
only modality of voting”. The “Digital Divide” is introduced here as the critical aspect: people 
who do not have access to the Internet would not be able to vote; 
• Secret voting: ensure that the processes of counting the votes and checking who voted may 
be independent, ensuring “privacy and security” at its maximum level; 
• “Adjustment of existing legal norms”: the implementation of I-Voting needs to comply with 
all legal requirements. Then, the implementation needs to be “defined, organised and put 
into operation” by law. It may exist a legal basis for the adoption of this mechanism, so it can 
be adopted in more member states of the European Union. 
 
Political Considerations: 
• The adoption procedure of I-Voting may be “transparent, participatory, and involve all the 
relevant political actors and stakeholders”, so its implementation can be consensual. 
• A strong political consensus about the adoption of this E-Voting mechanism will motivate and 
increase confidence of citizens in the behavioural intention to use Internet Voting.  
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• It is required political neutrality about the I-Voting adoption once it may affect directly the 
results of future elections. 
 
Technological and security challenges – “Human-related technological risks”: 
• Citizens with lack of technical competencies to deal with remote I-Voting; 
• Electoral officials missing technical skills to be able to control the I-Voting process in an 
effective way; 
• Citizens’ assurance regarding secrecy and privacy of their votes; 
• “Lack of transparency when voters cannot be sure whether their votes are correctly counted 
and stored”; 
• Possibility of intimidation or any other kind of enforcement against the voter’s will while 
casting his/her vote remotely; 
• If I-Voting becomes the only way of voting, a significant portion of the population may not be 
capable to vote and feel discrimination. 
 
Technological and security challenges – “Tech-related technological risks”: 
• “Possibility of system attack or breakdown, or connection failure”; 
• Correct identification of the voter complexity; 
• “Provision of the preventive measures against multiple voting” and “transparency of 
tabulation”; 
• Voter’s personal computer can have virus and affect the system; 
• Digital divide and the risk that the electoral population capable of using I-Voting may not 
represent certainly the different socio-demographic groups (including the ones who are not 
capable to vote remotely). 
 
Social challenges: 
• “Social differences regarding who has a personal computer and internet at home” and “who 
is sufficiently technologically literate to be able to interact with an online voting platform”. 
Age, income level and literacy level are key components. 
 
In Beroggi, G. (2014), the question of voter’s personal computer being infected with malware is 
solved due to “the cryptographic protocol for transmitting encrypted data from the voter’s computer 
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to the electronic ballot is tightly linked to a separate device, which provides sufficient security”. 
However, the trust issue is prevalent. I-Voting may be seen by voters as a secure and trusted option 
and the belief that the ones who work directly with the system may manipulate the process exists. 
In a paper written by Abba, A., Awad, M., Al-Qudah, Z & Jallad, A. (2017), intituled as “Security 
Analysis of Current Voting Systems”, the authors refer the vulnerabilities associated to the electronic 
voting systems and incorporate them among seven categories. 
“Malware Insertion” – someone accesses the machines before entering the polling station, modify or 
insert the software in order to create a malfunctioning in the machine. Then, the machine could lose, 
add, mis-record and skip records. 
“Wireless and Other Remote-Control Attacks” – Can happen before or in the election day itself. 
Machines that have wireless components can be hacked (“program the machine to turn on or off, 
insert a malware, or install something malicious that could attempt to read the information recorded 
and stored by the voting machines”). 
“Denial-of-Service Attacks (DoS)” – This attack prevents voters to cast their vote successfully, once 
the communications between a client platform and a server can be disrupted. 
“Attacks on Counting Servers” – Occurs after the closure of the polls, when all votes have been 
already recorded. Hackers would interfere in the communications between the counting server and 
the server, making changes to the votes count and “information used to tally the sums of the entire 
votes”. 
“Attacks on Ballots or Verified Voter Paper Trail (VVPT)” – “ballot papers and the verified voter paper 
trail can get damaged when they are being transported to the counting centers or even at the polling 
unit” and “ballot and VVPT's could even be altered or wholly damaged before they are being audited 
or recounted at the counting centers”. 
“Shutting Off Voting Machine Features Meant to Help Voters” – Hack attacks in the features that 
guide the voters to certify that their votes’ cast succeeded may lead to missing recorded votes. 
“Social Engineering” - Attacks that entangle misleading individuals into compromising their safety. 





Blockchain is the crucial technology that matters for this study and the focus for further 




According to the white paper “BlockChain Technology: Beyond Bitcoin” written by Crosby, M., 
Nachiappan, Pattanayak, P., Verma, S. & Kalyanaraman, V. (2016), Blockchain is described as “a 
distributed database of records, or public ledger of all transactions or digital events that have been 
executed and shared among participating parties.” Furthermore, this technology “contains a certain 
and verifiable record of every single transaction ever made.”  
In other work developed by Osgood, R. (2016), the concept uses the term blocks to the “ever-
growing ledger of records (usually transactions)”. Right after, the author describes how this database 
processes the transactions. Blockchain is “managed by a network of nodes”, being these nodes 
computers connected all to the network that works and validates all the entries and exits 
(transactions) under “a set of rules”. Once a transaction is validated by a node, it is added to a block, 
and in its turn, added to the blockchain. Hence, valid transactions are added to a block, “grouped 
together and added to the database”. Blocks are added one after the other. Taking into account that 
this technology is “tamper-proof and secure”, the author describes the algorithm functioning based 
on the hash function, used to mark every block that enters in the system. For instance, the second 
block that joins will be “marked with a hash function that contains part of the first block’s hash 
function”, and so on. Any alteration in the hash function of a block that is about to enter in the 
system, this anomaly is automatically recognized by the remaining blocks and the update is rejected. 
Making use of the author’s words applied to the context of this dissertation, “the transactions stored 
in the database” are votes. 
In order to understand better the components that involve this technology, in Ayed, A. (2017), “A 
Conceptual Secure Blockchain- Based Electronic Voting System”, four fields are mentioned: “Block 
size”, “Block header” (“encrypted almost unique Hash”), “Transaction Counter” (“the number of 
transactions that follow”), and “Transaction” (which is saved in the block). According to Ayed, A. 
(2017), a list of records corresponds to blocks, each one containing transactions. Transactions “can 
hold different types of data”, and a block “contains a timestamp and a cryptographic link to the 
previous block.” Hence, security can be implemented through “cryptography” and “hash functions”, 
examples of “security functions”. In this paper, it is specified two types of Blockchain, depending on 
the security status: “Open blockchains” and “Closed blockchains”. The first one, as the name 
indicates, it is opened to everyone who wants to join and contribute to the development of further 
solutions. Due so, a security model is required in order to guarantee the transactions security and 
“consensus mechanism”. The closed ones “rely on traditional security mechanisms” in order to 
guarantee no unexpected change and unwanted access. Examples of open blockchains are “Bitcoin 
and Ethereum”. 
In a more recent study, Zhang, R., Xue, R., & Liu, L. (2019), the authors refer a third type of 
Blockchain. Starting by defining this technology as “a secure ledger” in which is responsible to 
organize the growing list of transaction records into a hierarchically expanding chain of blocks”. Each 
one of these blocks is “guarded by cryptography techniques to enforce strong integrity of its 
transaction records”. Furthermore, they mention that each block to be added to the chain needs to 
successfully comply with the “decentralized consensus procedure”. In this paper, the authors defend 
that this consensus is imposed by the network controlling three fundamental steps: the addition of 
blocks to the chain, “the read protocol for secure verification of the block chain” and the consistency 
assurance of the data in each transaction across different nodes in the chain. In this paper, another 
type of Blockchain is presented apart from the “Public Blockchain”, meaning that is open to anyone 
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(“to read, send, or receive transactions” and participate in the consensus procedure) and, also, apart 
from the “Private Blockchain” (only one agent can write but everyone or a group of participants can 
read). This is the “Consortium Blockchain”, in which it is open to every participant in the network to 
read but only a subset has written permissions and can participate in the consensus procedure. 
Summing up, “speed of consensus” and “trust authority” are what differ between these three types. 
However, all of them meet mutual properties: “decentralized peer to peer networks for 
transactions”, digital signature per transaction and “each peer node” keeps a full copy of the 
Blockchain, and, finally, all nodes maintain the consensus (consistency) across the network, so when 




In the paper written by Zheng, Z., Xie, S., Dai, H., Chen, X., & Wang, H. (2018), the Blockchain 
architecture is introduced. The algorithm itself is based on a continuous “sequence of blocks”, in 
which a block contains a “parent block hash” in the “block header”. A block that contains no parent 
block hash is called the “genesis block”, meaning, the first block of the chain. Then, a block is not only 
constituted by a block header, but also a “block body”. The block header, apart from the parent block 
hash, includes also other five features: “Block version” (“block validation rules” that matters to 
follow); “Merkle tree root hash” (“hash value of all transactions in the block”); “Timestamp” 
(“current time as seconds”); “nBits” (“target threshold of a valid block hash”); “Nonce” (“4-byte field” 
increasing for “every hash calculation”); and, finally, “Parent block hash” (“256-bit hash value that 
points to the previous block”). 
Regarding the block body, it is composed by a “Transaction counter” and transactions. In figure 4, 
one can visualize this structure. In this paper, “Digital Signature” is introduced as the way to validate 
the transactions authentication. This mechanism is composed by two phases: “signing phase” and 
“verification phase”. Also, two types of keys are used in the process: the “private key”, which is used 
by one user to encrypt the data (to sign one transaction), and after, in the validation phase, the 
“public key” of the first user is used by the second user to validate the message received. Hence, 
he/she will be able to verify if the data was tempered or not. This concept will be further investigated 





Figure 4 - Block’s structure (Zheng, Z., Xie, S., Dai, H., Chen, X., & Wang, H. (2018)) 
 
In a work developed by Kolb, J., Abdelbaky, M., Katz, R., & Culler, D. (2020), the authors focus on the 
basic elements that are adopted across blockchain systems, exemplifying with the Bitcoin case. They 
introduce the maintenance of a “ledger” by Blockchain, known as the most fundamental capability. 
“Ledger” is defined as “an append-only log for storing data”. Basically, new items (or transactions) 
are “batched together into a block”. Then, only blocks are appended to the ledger, one at a time. In 
the example of Bitcoin, this creation and addition of blocks to the ledger is done with an interval of 
10 minutes. This period of time is one important factor that ensures the security of the Blockchain 
system, called the “proof of work algorithm” that one will explain later on. Thus, each block contains 
“an ordered list of ledger entries” and the ledger is formed in its turn by a sequence of blocks. This 
component is very important in the Bitcoin’s Blockchain. For instance, each ledger keeps the record 
of Bitcoin’s ownership, represented by “virtual tokens”. They are distributed “among accounts”, 
being each account “uniquely identified by a public key”. Every transaction of Bitcoins that occurs 
within this system is “from one public key to another”. As already mentioned above, regarding the 
study from Zheng, Z., Xie, S., Dai, H., Chen, X., & Wang, H. (2018), in this paper the authors also 
confirm that each transaction is signed “by the sender’s private key”, preventing falsification. This is 
the first intervention of cryptography, where the sender encrypts the data. In this paper, the “parent 
block hash” is also mentioned and the involved process is explained. The authors call to this block 
header’s component a “cryptographic hash”, containing information encrypted regarding the 
previous block in the chain. Summing up, the cryptographic hash of block 1 is included in block 2. In 
its turn, the cryptographic hash of block 2 (containing its hash of block 1) is added in block 3. This 
sequence of integrating the hash of the precedent block into the block header of the following one 
continues, giving to the chain of blocks a “definitive order and makes their contents immutable”. In 
the white-paper written by Nakamoto, S. (2009), this transactions’ sequence and hash function 
mechanism was explained based on Bitcoin. In the figure 5 one can see how the terms private key, 




Figure 5 - Signing and Verification of signatures through the use of keys (Nakamoto, S. (2009)) 
 
In this mentioned paper, the timestamp component is also described. The “Timestamp server” 
proves that the data existed before get into the hash function. It works by “taking a hash of a block of 
items to be timestamped”. Hence, each timestamp includes the previous timestamp in its hash. This 
process is followed from block to block, where each block presents the timestamp that reinforces the 
previous ones. In this sense, one may describe the “proof of work” concept as already mentioned 
above.  
 
2.3.3. Areas of Application 
 
In order to understand more concretely how Blockchain is already implemented in markets and 
governmental institutions, in this section one will identify the main areas of application already in 
use and the potential ones for further developments in the near future. According to Xu. X, Weber, I. 
& Staples, M. (2019), in the book “Architecture for Blockchain Applications”, the authors mention 
that “financial transactions” are the first use case but not unique. Nowadays, several private and 
governmental institutions are investigating the use of blockchain technology in many areas such as 
“supply chain, electronic health records, voting, energy supply, ownership management, and 
protecting critical civil infrastructure” (it will be exemplified the different cases ahead in this 
section).  
In short, the Blockchain benefits are divided according to the development level of a country. The 
authors defend that in countries less developed, the trust in third-party organizations that work as 
intermediaries is little. “Immutability” (“not changing prior records on the ledger”) and “Non-
repudiation” (“not being able to disown prior actions on the ledger”) are the main benefits of 
adopting Blockchain and get rid of intermediary agents for these countries. In more advanced 
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countries, the benefits are others: “faster business model innovation”, “reducing the cost of 
establishing business relationships” and “reducing the cost or risk of transactions”, once the trust in 
third-party organizations is not so questionable as in undeveloped countries.  
Given the different benefits associated with the adoption of Blockchain among different nations 
around the world, it is important to understand exactly which platforms are in use these days. The 





This buzzword does not only mean a decentralized cryptocurrency but mainly the begin of a 
technological revolution in the financial markets extending to many other organizations.  
In the study presented by Tomov, Y. (2019), entitled as “Bitcoin: Evolution of Blockchain 
Technology”, the author starts by writing about the state-of-the-art of Blockchain, where all 
evolutionary phases are described until the year 2008 when, “a person or a group of people going 
under the pseudonym of Satoshi Nakamoto”, presented an article that became rapidly famous due to 
the working model.   
Departing from the year of 1982, David Chaum developed an “untraceable payment system based on 
blind signatures”. He is considered one of the founders of electronic payments. However, the blind 
signatures, according to David’s algorithm, preserves the anonymity of transactions that exist 
between individuals in the system to the bank (the third-party involved and the one that validates 
the transactions, “unlike in blockchain technologies”). Later, in 1991, despite of not being described 
in Tomov’s article, it is important to mention the Haber, S. & Stornetta, W. (1991) paper published 
under the name “How to Time-Stamp a Digital Document”. In this study, the authors depart from the 
problem “how can one certify when a document was created or last modified?”. In this sense, Time-
stamping method is adopted and may comply with two criteria: “time-stamp the actual bits of the 
document” and “the date and time of the time-stamp must not be forgeable”, meaning they may not 
be counterfeit. Timestamping became a key feature for the constitution of a block header. In 1997, 
Adam Black focused his study on a solution to email spam. To do so, hash function and the Proof of 
Work concept were used. As already studied before, the Proof of Work focus on the validation of the 
correct hash result and the search of the nonce to reach the appropriate hash target. Then, in the 
function "VALUE" used by Adam Black, the validation of the hash result is also performed. This 
function corresponds to the Proof of Work algorithm. Thus, the “Hashcash” method as a solution to 
the problem of email spam, uses the PoW algorithm which was "later used in many blockchain 
models". The validation is not performed by any third-party (bank), making "hashcash decentralized”. 
In 1998, other two important studies, in parallel, came to public and became relevant for the build of 
Bitcoin. Wei Dai proposed an anonymous distributed cash system named “b money”. The solve of 
computational problems in order to generate money, the use of public keys and the “copy of the 
database” that each participant keeps are major common features to Bitcoin. In parallel, Nick Szabo 
“proposed the Bit Gold model” also in 1998. Despite of applying in its model key features already 
developed by other computational researchers, as the PoW and Timestamp, the main add-in is “the 
last created string of bit gold provides the challenge bits for the next-created string”. As already 
studied before in this dissertation, the feature of a block containing the hash of the previous one in 
the chain may find its origin in the Bit Gold model.  
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Hereupon, Bitcoin construction adopted the strengths of these models presented and considered 
also the main weaknesses and limitations, in order to implement a solid product in terms of process 
and security. As defined by the author, Bitcoin is “a decentralized peer-to-peer network”. The 
transactions grouped into blocks, added into the system through the mining process, the block’s 
constitution, all these properties described in the Blockchain’s architecture chapter are part of 
Bitcoin. Yavor Tomov mentions the two main objectives of Bitcoin’s creation: “create a digital 
currency” and “to perform financial transactions”. Revisiting “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash 
System” the paper published by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008, where the Bitcoin’s system was 
introduced, the author starts by mentioning the financial institutions’ role as intermediaries for the 
execution of electronic payments. Banks, for instance, are entitled the “trusted third parties” in the 
mediation of financial transactions. However, once there are not completely irreversible transactions 
in this system, they “cannot avoid mediating disputes”. Fraud is considered “unavoidable”, and only 
a system which guarantees irreversible transactions may solve this problem. The author defends that 
the “electronic payment system” may be based on “cryptographic proof” and not “trust” in a third-
party.   
  
Following the book edited by Olleros, F., & Zhegu, M. (2016), entitled Research Handbook on Digital 
Transformations, one decided to use the applications examples provided by the authors, exploring in 
more detail six out of the nine cases presented in the book. To do so, the information was organized 
in one table for each application.  
 
Sidechain Technology and Smart Contracts  
Definition  Description  Examples  Use Cases  
  
"A sidechain is a 
secondary 
blockchain 
connected to the 
main blockchain 
with a two-way 
peg. Sidechains 








There are a primary blockchain 
(parent blockchain or 
mainchain) and a sidechain 
(secondary). The primary 
blockchain "operates a 
cryptocurrency called MainCoin" 
and "cannot execute non-trivial 
smart contracts". The sidechain 
"operates its own 
cryptocurrency 
named SideCoin", "has the 
capability of executing non-
trivial smart contracts" and 
"offers significantly higher 
transaction rate (i.e. higher 
transactions per second) than 
the mainchain".  
- Loom;   
- POA Network;    
- Liquid;   
- RootStock (RSK).  
Loom (Digital Social Interaction (e.g. 
Delegate 
call); Game Development (e.g. 
Relentless))  
POA Network (Swarm City, a 
decentralized commerce platform; 
Sentinel Chain; Virtue Poker; Colu 
Network)  
Liquid (International Exchange) / 
Advantage: Liquid, introduces improved 
security and privacy, with lower latency 
than the Bitcoin network.  
RSK (Retail Payment Systems; Supply 
Chain Traceability; Digital Identity)  
 
Table 2 - Sidechain Technology and Smart Contracts (Singh, A., Click, K., Parizi, R. M., Zhang, Q., 






Definition  Description  Examples  Use Cases  
"Ethereum is an 
open blockchain 
platform that 
allows anyone to 








exchanges in the 
different industry 







Ethereum requires a Virtual 
Machine (EVM) that executes 
the "complex algorithmic codes 
written in friendly programming 
languages" for each and 
every node, maintaining the 
consensus decentralized across 
the blockchain. This "confirms 
the extreme level of fault 
tolerance".  
In terms of process mining, the 
algorithm used is "Ethhash". It 
consists on "finding a nonce 
input to the algorithm so that 
the result is below a certain 
difficulty threshold". On 
average, it takes 15 seconds to 
mine a block and the winner 
miner of a certain block receives 
5.0 Ethers.  
Many Dapps (decent
ralized applications) 
are built on 
Ethereum, grouped 
in different 








There are eight principal groups 
according to Dannen, C. (2017):  
   
- The Internet of Ethereum Things  
  
- Retail and E-Commerce  
  
- Community and Government 
Financing  
  
- Human and Organizational Behavior  
  
- Financial and Insurance Applications  
  
- Inventory and Accounting Systems  
  
- Software Development  
  





Table 3 - Ethereum (TIFAC-CORE, S.P. (2018); Dannen, C. (2017); State of the DApps (2021)) 
Gridcoin  
Definition  Description  Sources  
Gridcoin is defined as an "altcoin", 
meaning, a cryptocurrency build as an 
alternative to Bitcoin. It is based on 
"peer-to-peer Internet-based crypto-
currency" aiming to reduce the 
environmental impact caused by Bitcoin 
(a solution to the "electricity usage 
problem"), being "more energy 
efficient".  
Currently, more scientific contributions 
are needed. Due so, users are rewarded 
when contribute with scientific projects 
published on the "BOINC project 
platform", the Berkeley Open 
Infrastructure for Network Computing.  
Grothe, M., Niemann, T., 
Somorovsky, J., & 
Schwenk, J. (2017)  
    
 









Ripple Labs  
Definition  Description  Use Cases  
  
Ripple is a tech company in San 
Francisco, which decided to 
adopt the potential of 
Blockchain to revolutionize the 
financial transactions system. 
XRP is the cryptocurrency 
created, allowing "currencies to 
be converted to XRP back and 
forth easily". Thus, Ripple system 
is a big challenge to the current 
SWIFT system, by enabling "very 
near to a real-time system" and 
offering lower cost.  
The key components of Ripple 
System are "distributed ledger" and 
"cryptocurrency". "Transaction 
data" and "actual fund" to be 
transferred are carried out at the 
same time. In SWIFT words, 
"messaging flow" and "fund flow" 
are synchronized. There is more 
transparency in some information 
as the "liquidity status" and 
exchange rates for each member 
bank of this decentralized peer-to-
peer network, comparing to the 
SWIFT system.  
Popular among banks. According to 
Ripple's website, banks as   
"American Express", "Santander", 
"Interbank", Personal Banking "PNC",   
are some of the customers that already 
joint the Ripple network.  
 
Table 5 - Ripple Labs (Qiu, T., Zhang, R., & Gao, Y. (2019); Retrieved from https://ripple.com/) 
Blockchain-Based Digital Identity Providers  
Definition  Description  Use Cases  
The need to share 
personal details and the 
security risks associated 
lead individuals to think 
about the elimination of 
the trusted third party 




individuals would be able 
to decide which identify 
details they want to share 
or not and with whom. 
Then, it emerges the Self-
Sovereign Identity 
concept, which is defined 
as the "lifetime portable 
digital identity that does 
not depend on any 
central authority and can 
never be taken away".  
Understanding what means 
having full control over its own 
identity implies the 
identification of Self-Sovereign 
Identity properties (ten as 
indicated in Stokkink, Q., 
& Pouwelse, J. (2018)): 
"Existence", "Control", "Access", 
"Transparency", "Persistence", 
"Portability", "Interoperability", 
"Consent", "Minimalization" and 
"Protection". By complying with 
all these properties, the system 
has the necessary requirements 
to implement the self-sovereign 
identity concept.   
The architecture of the Self-
Sovereign Identity is based on 
four agents and their 
relationships mainly, where the 
user is in the middle. It is based 
on the distributed ledger of the 
Blockchain. Then, the full 
process goes from Identification, 
to Authentication (use of 
public/private keys and 
cryptography), Verifiable claims 
and, Storage of the user's data 
(public and private).  
Remote Interaction,  
Automatic Procurement (offers a widen umbrella 
of applications for E-Procurement using "Smart 
Contracts", "Purchase Order (PO)/Supply Chain 
Visibility (SCV)"),  
Authentication, Authorization, and Trust 
of IIoT User/Devices,  
Part life-cycle support (industrial machines, 
management of their components, easier to track 
its brand and further manufacturing features),  
Big Data and Artificial Intelligence  
(need for some companies which produce devices 
to store the huge amount of data generated in a 
decentralized blockchain-based storage network, 
and the SSI is used)  




Table 6 - Blockchain-Based Digital Identity Providers (Aydar, M., & Ayvaz, S. (2019); Stokkink, Q., 
& Pouwelse, J. (2018); Bartolomeu, P. C., Vieira, E., Hosseini, S. M., & Ferreira, J. (2019); Tobin, A. and 
Reed, D. (2018); Mühle, A., Grüner, A., Gayvoronskaya, T., & Meinel, C. (2018) 
  
 
Social Inclusion in the Developing World  
Definition  Description  Use Cases  
Blockchain features 
reveal a big 
opportunity of 
problem’s solving for 
“people living in 
poverty” especially in 
the South economies 
less 
developed. Economic, 
social and political 










The main purposes of using 
Blockchain as a mechanism 
to promote Social Inclusion 
in Development 
Countries are:  
- “Overtaking institutional 
weakness through property 
registry, digital documents, 
and budget-tracking 
mechanism”;  
- “Empowering people and 
reducing power 
asymmetry”  
- “Increasing financial 
inclusion” (able to create a 
bank account, once many 
citizens cannot prove who 
they are – lack any proof of 
identity).  
E-Governance (working on services that require personal 
interactions and individual identification)  
Land titles (“assignation of private property”, e.g. in Ghana)  
Identity services (numerous startups are working on this, 
e.g. Humaniq’s Ethereum blockchain-based app creates user 
profiles  
based on biometric data such as facial and voice recognition 
algorithms)  
Anti-Corruption (increase government transparency –
 “Blockchain Trust Accelerator project”)  
Virtual Governments (e.g. Bitnation)  
Electoral Processes (algorithm applied in order to 
prevent “frauds and “identity theft”)  
Aid and Development (e.g. UN World Food Program’s 
pilot blockchain  
application to give financial support in Jordan)  
Remittances (e.g. UN Development  
Programme’s remittance pilot project in Serbia and UNICEF’s 
application to reduce child poverty)  
 
Table 7 - Social Inclusion in the Developing World (Mavilia, R., & Pisani, R. (2019); Kshetri, N. (2017)) 
  
Some other use cases exist among the following applications: Blockchain Technology for the 
Banking/Finance Industry; Enhancing the Transparency of Supply/Global Commodity Chains, and, 
more important for the purpose of this dissertation; Blockchain-Based Voting Systems (one will 
explore further in the chapter 2.3.5. E-Voting and Blockchain).  
 
2.3.4. Issues and Limitations 
 
The implementation of Blockchain in the most diverse areas, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, faces both technical and nontechnical limitations in its construction and adoption. The 
existent hurdle to commercialize the Blockchain’s use is due to these obstacles mainly. According to 
Drescher, D. (2017), in the book entitled “Blockchain Basics: A Non-Technical Introduction in 25 
Steps”, the author synthetizes the limitations associated to this algorithm. Below, one presents the 
set of limitations and a brief description of each one.  
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Technical limitations:  
  
• “Lack of privacy”:  
The Blockchain's level of transparency is not only an advantage, but a disadvantage by itself. On one 
hand, without transparency, Blockchain cannot "fulfil its duty" as a decentralized network, "purely 
distributed peer-to-peer ledger", where new transactions are verified avoiding problems of "double-
spending" nature and fraud. On the other hand, everyone having access to all transaction details 
(goods and amount transferred, the accounts involved in each transaction, and the exact time they 
occur) is a big limitation for the implementation of this algorithm in applications that require a higher 
level of privacy.  
  
• “The security model”: 
The Blockchain's security is strong, using the best cryptographic method known ("asymmetric 
cryptography"). Identification, authentication and authorization are supported by this method. The 
use of keys satisfies both the transparency needed and the privacy of each account's owner. The 
public key corresponds to an account number, visible to anyone in the network, and the 
corresponding private key, which only the owner possesses it and "can access the property" 
associated. However, even if the "plan A" is strong, it is not impossible to fail, and there is no "plan 
B". This inexistence of another privacy method, in case someone loses the private key to someone 
else, for the most diverse reasons, breaks the "security for that individual account" immediately. The 
Blockchain's security limitation is due to the absence of a plan B.  
  
 
• “Limited scalability”:  
The capacity of the Blockchain to become larger, by adding to the chain new transactions grouped in 
blocks, is considered limited. The mining process already presented in the chapter 2.3.2. Architecture 
prevents attempts that may take place in the network but, as a trade-off, the "processing speed" is 
reduced and, consequently, the "scalability" is limited. Implementing this algorithm in applications 
that require "high processing speed, high scalability, and high throughput" turns out a big limitation.  
 
• “High costs”:  
To guarantee a high level of security may be expensive. Complicated computational problems are 
necessary and have higher costs associated. These costs are measured in "computational cycles, 




• “Hidden centrality”:  
By solving mathematical computational problems, members of the network can add new blocks to 
the chain and receive rewards for "contributing to the integrity of the system". However, these 
members can be divided in two groups: the ones having the "financial resources" to "invest in 
specialist hardware" and the others which do not have financial capabilities to invest in specialist 
hardware. This financial discrepancy and consequent division of members causes one "very small 
group" to detain the computational power, solve almost all problems and receive the majority 
of rewards. On the contrary, the contribution of the members with worse hardware capability, 
become unprofitable to the system and, consequently, are discouraged from "contributing 
computational resources" to the chain. It is notorious that the decentralization is questionable. The 
system is still decentralized technically, but the integrity is "maintained by only a small number of 
entities".  
  
• “Lack of flexibility”:  
Blockchain is complex in its construction, with well-established procedures (e.g., cryptographic 
procedures that need to be valid for the "lifetime of the blockchain"). Another important limitation 
of the Blockchain algorithm is the lack of flexibility in adjusting the protocol and fix bugs that may 
occur. This immutability avoids people to develop further on the blockchain.  
  
• “Critical Size”:  
The size of the peer-to-peer systems is critical to determine the "robustness against manipulations" 
and how much the "history of transaction data" is trustworthy. In order to a Blockchain system 
succeed in these two characteristics it is required a majority of honest nodes, so the system can be 
"resistant to attackers with a lot of computational power". Summing up, the smaller is the system 
with limited computational power, the robustness is less. Hence, the attack risk is higher.  
  
Nontechnical limitations:  
  
• “Lack of Legal Acceptance”:  
One of the major limitations for the adoption of Blockchain in different countries is related to the 
legal framework and implications. The possibility that users of the peer-to-peer system have 
to "manage and transfer ownership" collectively leads to debates regarding the "safety, security, and 
sophistication" of Blockchain.  
In order to explore in depth some of the tensions that have been arising due to Blockchain’s features, 
different from the “centralized approaches” that are currently in law, one decided to clarify the 
relationship between this technology and the European law described in the thematic report “Legal 
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and regulatory framework of blockchains and smart contracts”, prepared by European Union 
Blockchain Observatory & Forum. written by Lyons, T., Courcelas, L., & Timsit, K. (2019). In this 
report, it is explained legal issues associated to the algorithm. As long as it is a decentralized system 
and is difficult to determine who is the data and network’s owner, hence, to whom the responsibility 
should be addressed, there are some “hurdles to overcome on the path towards the reconciliation of 
blockchain and the law”. In order to illustrate six critical legal issues, the following table resumes the 
main topics to be considered.  
Legal value of 
blockchain as 
registries  
There are many prerequisites that Blockchain needs to comply with in order 
to be legally accepted. However, among them, one can emphasize the "legal 
recognition of blockchain based signatures", "timestamps", "validations" 
and "documents". eIDAS is a term known in Europe for handling the 
"electronic IDentification, Authentication and Trust Services regulation". In 
this sense, the issue comes with eSignatures and eSeals, in other words, the 
signature of a "legal entity as opposed to a natural person". Despite of 
Blockchains meet the technical criteria, legally their transactions "do not 
have legal authority by themselves", according to eIDAS.  
Territoriality  
According to the current European legislation, in case of fraud or practice of 
any other illegal practice punished at law level, the responsibility is assigned 
based on the location where the act occurred. In the case of a distributed 
network as it is Blockchain, this legal responsibility is not clear where and 
whom to be assigned. Hence, this technology challenges the EU perspective. 
It is required to revisit the "European private international law". As informed 
in the Rome II Regulation, the country where the damage occurs is relevant: 
"the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a 
tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs", as 
stated in the Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations (Rome II). Also, in the Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (recast), the following is also written "in matters 
relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the 





Another important factor to enforce the law is the identification of the 
individual(s) identity that break the law. Blockchain supports the 
"pseudonymity" and "full anonymity" of members. In some circumstances, 
when both roles are used with criminal purposes, they can lead to the 
creation of "lawless zones". Governments try to circumvent these issues and 
adopt techniques to discourage the anonymization in blockchain networks 
through the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) rules. Another possible measure 
to be implemented is the use of identification tools, controlled by courts or 
private sector, in order to enforce the law and responsibility over the 




Across law systems, the types of liability imposed on individuals who fails to 
comply with the obligations and prohibitions, are diverse: "criminal", 
"administrative", "contractual" and "tort" liabilities. Other 
specific regulations are more recent and relevant, as it is the case of GDPR 
(General Data Protection Regulation). In the Blockchain example, it becomes 
harder to understand who may be the responsible in case of failure in the 
accomplishment of obligations. Questions regarding the role of Software 
developers exist: once they are the ones who write the code, understand 
the features of the algorithm, it matters to determine if they should be the 
responsible for not creating mechanisms that prevent illegal activities and 
creating an "open-source code that supports anonymity". According to the 
report, developers cannot be nominated as the responsible people for the 
illegal acts just because they are the creators. Governments try to deal with 
these circumstances and the creation of a "common insurance system" is 
between the options. This system would cover "damages caused by 
anonymous actors" or "risks borne by consumers". This measure would 
imply the rise of costs for the whole system, and the existence of tools to 
identify the members are preferable over the insurance system, so the 
liability enforcement could be done directly to the members.  
Data 
protection  
The more recent adoption since 2018 of GDPR rules within the European 
Union member-states, was written based on more traditional and 
centralized systems, and blockchain was not considered in these norms. 
There are three principal areas where tensions between GDPR and 
Blockchain exist: identification of "data controllers and processors" makes 
quite difficult the enforcement of GDPR's requirements; the anonymization 
of personal data making totally anonymous under the GDPR; and the GDPR's 
"right to be forgotten" provisions does not have effect when the data 
recorded on a blockchain is not "altered or deleted" generally.  
Risk to fair 
competition  
New competitors trying to enter in old markets can benefit from the 
“decentralisation and transparency” that Blockchain enhances. At the same 
time, there is an “increased risk of competition law infringements” that this 
technology enhances as well considering some “antitrust domains” as 
“collusive conduct” and “abuse of dominance”. The first one is related to the 
transparency in the exchange of information that leads to the reduction of 
stimulus to compete. Uncertainty between competitors is reduces once 
information as “prices”, “customers”, “production”, “turnover”, 
“capacities”, among others, are known. The second one, the abuse of 
dominance, in the case of permissioned blockchains, the existing members 
in the network could jointly refuse the enter of new competitors in the 
market by not giving access and leading to “competition 
enforcement scrutiny”.  




2.3.5. E-Voting and Blockchain 
 
Nowadays, the voting method we find mostly in place is the paper ballot voting. For the purpose of 
this dissertation, one will consider only the political electoral system which is organized and 
controlled by the government of each country.  
The method mostly known is filling a “ballot sheet and put it in a box”. The counting of votes occurs 
when the “box is emptied and the ballots are counted in public”. This process brings some problems 
related with transparency, trust and is time-consuming while counting votes, as is argued in the book 
of Xu, X., Weber, I., & Staples, M. (2019). Some doubts regarding the number of votes that were 
counted, the uncertainty if a voter exercised the right to vote only once and, in case a voter claims 
that his vote was not included in the tallying, it is not possible to verify in this system. Considering all 
these constraints of paper ballot voting system, new alternatives have been suggested in order to 
overcome avoidable problems. Electronic voting systems, as already discussed in the chapter 2.2, is 
ready to release improvements. With E-Voting it is possible to confirm who did not vote and "tallying 
votes" is faster and more reliable as one already learnt previously. According to Kovic, M. (2017), 
travel expenses and opportunity costs of a voter being present in the polling place in the election day 
can be highly reduced due to the introduction of E-Voting. Another important factor is the 
“mobilization effect” defending that people who had no incentive to vote before, can find a new 
option and become more enthusiastic, especially young people. 
An innovating system brings advantages but also some problems, and it matters to understand why it 
is not highly used worldwide. All problems are related in one way or another with verifiability. To 
keep the votes anonymized in E-Voting, for voters to verify if their vote was registered successfully 
"without revealing who they voted for" and to decide the votes that are valid "without a privileged 
role", are some of the questions and challenges presented in the book regarding the adoption of 
Electronic Voting. In the paper written by Kovic, M. (2017), “e-voting carries the greatest risk”. In this 
sense, some Blockchain technology features were identified as capable to overcome and solve 
problems presented by E-Voting. In the book Xu, X., Weber, I., & Staples, M. (2019), the author 
defends “using a blockchain alone is not enough”. The ideal solution is the Blockchain-based E-Voting 
system. According to Yi, H. (2019), the security of E-Voting is “very urgent” and this article presents 
some techniques to improve its security through the use of blockchain in a peer-to-peer network. 
In this article it is proposed a "blockchain-based e-voting scheme in P2P network", where three 
techniques are integrated to deliver the best product. The implementation of this product 
demonstrates that is a "practical and secure e-voting system", solving "the problem on forgery of 
votes during e-voting".  
The first technique is based on "distributed ledger technology (DLT)" by designing a "synchronized 
model of voting records". This model combats the "forgery of votes". In other words, the blockchain 
for e-voting is represented not in a different form as the one already described in the Blockchain’s 
architecture chapter: a sequence of “voting blocks chained to each other”. The composition of each 
block is technically similar to the one already studied. However, the entire scheme is improved due 
to the techniques used by the author:  
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• “Voter’s ID”, which is “randomly assigned” to the voter;  
• “Vote” representing the ballot of the chosen candidate by the voter in the voting ballot;  
• “Voter’s signature” where the voter signs the hash of the vote by using “his/her private key” 
in order to keep the vote’s authenticity and its secrecy to other members of the network; 
• “Timestamp” representing the block’s time submission to the chain and, in case there are 
two blocks with the same timestamp, the block that is added is the one “with a higher value 
of signature”; 
• “Hash of the previous block” guarantees the “non-repudiation” and resistance to 
“modification of the data” by using the SHA-256 algorithm (Secure Hash Algorithm) that 
computes “the hash value of the previous block”.  
 
The second technique described in the article is the design of a “user credential based on ECC to 
provide authentication and non-repudiation”. ECC stands for Elliptic Curve Cryptography and non-
repudiation means the assurance that the authorship or validity of previous actions performed by the 
voter cannot be denied by anyone else. The ECC model usage improves the following actions:  
 
• No one is able to see for which candidate a citizen has voted, once the voting ballot is 
marked with a signature by each voter; 
• The authenticity of the vote is guaranteed by the “ECDSA signature” (Elliptic Curve Digital 
Signature Algorithm). Each voter signs the hash of the vote using “his/her private key”. This 
way is possible to verify if the voter is who he/she claims to be. 
 
The ECC is defined in Sujatha, K., Arjuna Rao, A., Yejarla, P., & Sruthi, K. J. (2017) as “a public key 
cryptographic algorithm where it uses couple of keys as private and public”. By using the Elliptic 
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), the voter creates his/her private and public keys "to sign 
his/her vote v". In other words, to create a digital signature. The private key is an integer, which is 
generated randomly and the public key is computed through the multiplication of the private key 
with a curve point in the Elliptic Curve (the private key cannot be derived from the public one). In the 
signing process, despite of all mathematical computations involved in the algorithm, the first step is 
based on the use of SHA-256 to compute the hash value of the vote. This guarantees the integrity of 
data by comparing the expected hash value with the actual result. Also, as already discussed before, 
the case is not different in this voting scheme: the votes are “cryptographically linked block by 
block”. All miners belong to the same peer-to-peer network and they generate the blocks under the 
proof of work algorithm.  
The third and last technique presented by Yi, H. (2019) is “we design a withdrawal model that allows 
voters to change their vote before a pre-set deadline”.  
In the last chapters of the article, the author discusses why blockchain-based e-voting system is 
“more secure and anonymous” than the other e-voting systems. According to him, the privacy of the 
voters is kept due to the decentralized system without a third-party involved and the use of an ID 
instead of the real identity, the security is ensured by the difficulty of forge the votes due to the DLT 
model, the non-repudiation due to the ECC model and, the possibility that voters have of changing 
the final vote due to a withdrawable model. Regarding the initialization of the voting process, one 
can see it illustrated in the appendix 6 and explained below: 
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• Firstly, the voter receives a credential by the voting office (another party involved in the 
scheme), where it is visible the voter’s ID and the list of candidates 
• The private key is generated by the voter 
• The public key is computed by the voter 
• Then, the private key is kept by each voter (only the individual voter may keep this key in 
order to guarantee the ballot secrecy) and the public key is sent to the Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI), where the signature of the vote is able to be verified once the public key 
is known (PKI manages the public-key encryption) 
• The miners are elected randomly and they mine the first block to start the voting blockchain 
(the genesis block) 
However, it remains to explain how the voting is processed in the appendix 7.  
• ID, the Vote and the Timestamp are included in the argument of the SHA-256 function, 
generating the hash value; 
• The voter uses his/her private key created to generate the digital signature through the use 
of ECDSA on the hash value 
• The voter sends his/her ID, Vote and Timestamp to the miner 
• The miner obtains the public key that was sent to PKI previously through the voter’s ID and 
uses it to decrypt the digital signature, getting the hash value 
• The integrity of the vote is checked by applying the hash function on the ID, Vote and 
Timestamp information that miner receives by the voter 
• If both hash values match (the one as a result from the decryption of the signature and the 
one computed with the last application of the hash function), the miner accepts the 
signature. Otherwise, it is rejected. 
• In the end, the miner queries and verifies if “the voter has the right to vote or enough votes”. 
• This vote details together with the hash of the previous block generate a new block that is 
added to the chain by the miners. 
 
In blockchain-based e-voting, votes can be counted by everyone but the identity of a voter 
associated to his/her vote, no one is able to know.  
Also, for citizens that vote through an e-voting platform or a blockchain-based e-voting platform, the 
user experience is similar: the voter access an interface through a device and vote. However, the 
process behind is completely different between both platforms. 
 
2.3.5.1. Case Studies 
 
Some advantages of the integration of Blockchain technology in electronic voting systems were 
already explained before. Blockchain is based on immutability and when well implemented, forgery is 
eliminated. For all these reasons, social technology defined as “ways to communicate, cooperate, 
compromise, and make consensus with other people” (Jun, M. (2018)), is possible to be implemented 
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through the use of Blockchain and to replace bureaucracy. Having this in mind, in the research article 
written by Cucurull, J., Rodríguez-Pérez, A., Finogina, T., & Puiggalí, J. (2019), some “electronic voting 
system projects based on blockchain” are listed. This list includes both private projects and led by the 
government. For the purpose of this dissertation, one decided to consider the ones that have as 
application political electoral voting. 
In the table below, some of these projects are described. 
 
Organization System Technology 
Denmark Liberal Alliance Follow My Vote Graphene Blockchain Framework 
Description 
The Elliptic Curve Cryptography is used for the digital signature as well as the pairs of keys for signing 
the votes. These elements keep the anonymity and authenticity of voters. It uses a blind signature 
approach. 
Voters can verify if their vote is correctly recorded and counted once votes are added to the chain 
without encryption, making verifiability and auditability possible. 
Two disadvantages associated are the result of the election is possible to determine before the 
official announcement and "vote selling and coercion" may exist. 
 
Table 9 - Follow My Vote (Cucurull, J., Rodríguez-Pérez, A., Finogina, T., & Puiggalí, J. (2019)) 
 
Organization System Technology 
Podemos (Spain) Agora-Voting Bitcoin 
Description 
Encryption and verifiability are provided end-to-end. Immutability is guaranteed in ballots, in its 
configuration and consensus proofs. Once Bitcoin is the technology implemented in this application, 
the blockchain immutability exists due to Catena built on top of Bitcoin: an "append-only log". 
Anonymity of voters, authenticity and secrecy of votes are supported by the system and its design 
enables the prevention of "coercion and vote buying". 
Regarding verifiability already mentioned, Agora Voting provides all the necessary properties 
desirable: "Cast-as-Intended, Recorded-as-Cast and Counted-as-Recorded verifiability". Cast-as-
Intended is based on a process repeated a certain amount of times until the voter believe and be 
confident that the system is accurate and a real vote is casted (Cast-or-Challenge is the name of the 
mechanism used). Recorded-as-Cast occurs when voters verify that the "vote is correctly published in 
the blockchain". Counted-as-Recorded verifiability is based on the access to the data during the 
counting of votes and "the availability of the Zero Knowledge Proofs produced by the mixing and the 
decryption processes".   
 




Organization System Technology 
Texas Libertarian Party VoteWatcher Florincoin Blockchain 
Description 
Voting system developed by Blockchain Technologies Corp. Transparency and efficiency define this 
system, as well as all process is “highly auditable”. The QR code is used to prevent duplicated scanned 
ballots. Voters use paper ballots to vote. Then, OMR (Optical Mark Recognition) is used to scan the 
filled ballots. Once all ballots are scanned, transactions are created and form the blockchain. 
Florincoin Blockchain enables more data to be added to a transaction comparing to Bitcoin, so it is 
the technology used to upload ballot data. The Bitcoin Blockchain supports less data per transaction 
and is more expensive, but the security is granted. Hence, both technologies are combined and the 
“resulting hash is posted to Bitcoin’s robust blockchain”. 
Table 11 - VoteWatcher (Cucurull, J., Rodríguez-Pérez, A., Finogina, T., & Puiggalí, J. (2019)) 
 
One had mentioned the i-Voting in Estonia in chapter 2.2.3. The Public Key Cryptography useful for 
the ID-Card and digital signature are concepts that were described, as well as the use of the public 
and private keys of every voter. The ID-Card is used consequently in i-Voting. 
The chip of digital ID cards is built on top of public key encryption and not Keyless Signature 
Infrastructure (KSI), the “blockchain technology designed in Estonia” as retrieved from KSI Blockchain 
- e-Estonia. (2019, September 10) website. The National voting system in Estonia is electronic and not 
a blockchain-based electronic voting system. However, in the working paper Martinovic, I., Kello, L., 
& Sluganovic, I. (2017), the researchers state blockchain can bring a “revolution in the security and 
transparency that is needed to enable e-voting”. 
Investigating the publication written by Boucher, P. (2016), product of Scientific Foresight Unit 
(STOA) of European Parliamentary Research Service, the author affirms that Blockchain was already 
used in elections: “internal elections of political parties” and “shareholder votes in Estonia”. In Ojo, 
A., & Adebayo, S. (2017), the participants are named: “Tallinn Stock Exchange, Nasdaq and e-
Residency Programme”. 
In order to understand how this country digitally advanced behaves in terms of adopting Blockchain 
in various government electronic services in Martinovic, I., Kello, L., & Sluganovic, I. (2017) the 
authors name the applications: “Estonia’s Digital Court System” (integrity of records is guaranteed by 
hashing data with KSI Blockchain, enabling “transparent auditability” and records immutable); 
“Estonian e-Health Authority” (used to protect over a million of health records and enables proof-of-
record existence and “database integrity for internal, external and regulatory compliance purposes”; 
“Estonia Succession Registry” (the records chained have a “provable ordering” and it is not possible 








3.1. CASE STUDY 
 
Before starting with the definition of Case Study and what this methodology implies, it is important 
to revisit the research questions initially presented in this dissertation: “why” a Blockchain-based 
voting system in Portugal would be beneficial and a solution to the mobility concern and trust crisis 
and, on the other hand, “how” its adoption would impact the abstention rate and the trust in the 
Portuguese political system. Based on these two questions of “why” and “how”, one found Case 
Study as the most suitable methodology to explore, draw conclusions, validate and discuss possible 
solutions. 
In the book from Yin, R. K. (2009) entitled Case Study Research Design and Methods, the author 
arguments against some social scientist’s permissions that Case Studies are “only appropriate for the 
exploratory phase of an investigation”. He explains that some of the most well-known case studies 
have been explanatory rather than only exploratory. Hence, he defends “an inclusive and pluralistic” 
vision, and that may exist exploratory, descriptive and explanatory Case Studies. In another chapter, 
the author arguments under which circumstance(s) the use of this methodology is more adequate. 
The questions “why” and “how” are the core: “such questions deal with operational links needing to 
be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence”. When the type of research 
questions matches with these two, it means the researcher seeks for more “explanatory” reasons 
and Case Study is preferred over other research methods. Thereupon, the definition that the author 
of the book gives to this methodology helps one to understand its essence. He departs from other 
observer’s words who considers “decision or set of decisions” the major focus: “why they were 
taken, how they were implemented, and with what result”.  
According to Robert K. Yin, the technical concept of Case Study may be divided in two parts (the 
scope and technical characteristics as data collection and data analysis strategies). The author affirms 
that a case study is an “empirical inquiry” that focus on a contemporary phenomenon and its 
position in a real-life context, mainly when what separates the phenomenon from the context is not 
clear. Regarding the technical definition, “the case study inquiry” technically data points are not only 
sufficient once there are many other variables to consider in the investigation, having two main 
results: need for convergence of data in a "triangulating fashion" once there are "multiple sources of 
evidence", and the definition of "theoretical prepositions" in the start is fundamental to "guide data 
collection and analysis". 
In order to support the use of this methodology for future investigations, the author has in 
consideration the amin weaknesses defended by scientists and presents contra-arguments. 
“Lack of rigor”, not following “systematic procedures”, allowing equivocal or bias results that conduct 
the post-analysis of a study is a first prejudice presented. Robert K. Yin alerts for the fact that bias 
during experiments and in the design of questionnaires for instance also exist, however, in a case 
study "they may have been more frequently encountered and less frequently overcome". “Little 
basis for scientific generalization” is the second concern mentioned in the book. The author 
arguments that Case Studies as Experiments have a common goal: reach generalized theories and 
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analysis and not particular, and both research methods generalize results based on theoretical 
prepositions and not to populations or universes. The third concern is the long time that takes to 
produce a study based on this methodology, as well as results most of the times in “massive, 
unreadable documents”. This is not so linear for him once the long, massive documents and more 
traditional can be avoided nowadays and in the future by adopting more creative and innovative 
techniques. Finally, the fourth and last limitation is the impossibility of drawing “causal 
relationships”. He addresses the complementary role of a Case Study in this point, defending that 
while another method would provide evidence of success in the efficacy of a certain model, this 
methodology complements the others by explaining “why” and “how” the model actually works. 
As remarked in the book, most of the Case Study researches performed are considered “soft” once 
they do not follow systematic procedures. The book helps to overcome this constraint by providing 
to the reader “an array of such procedures”. In this dissertation, one will follow and adapt according 
to the needs this set of rules, so the model become complex and well-founded. 
 
3.2. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
In order to conduct the Case Study methodology, there are a set of steps that may be followed and 
completed. For any study to succeed while adopting this methodology, the researchers need to have 
a strategy. In the book from Yin, R. K. (2009), the author describes the important phases. 
Firstly, a researcher needs to develop a theory and design it. Once the research questions meet the 
ideal to do a case study, the "research design" may be defined. According to Robert, there is no 
"catalog of research designs" that help investigators and contradicts some incorrect thoughts that 
the case study is "one type of quasi-experimental design", by quoting a sentence of Cook & 
Champbell, 1979, p.96: "Certainly the case study as normally practiced should not be demeaned by 
identification with the one-group post-test-only design". Thus, the case study is not only a research 
method itself as well "has its own research designs". 
In order to define the Research Design concept, the author mentions the logical plan like almost a 
path to be followed from "here" to "there", where "here" means the initial research questions and 
"there" the answers that one aim to reach. This plan compromises a "process of collecting, analysing 
and interpreting observations" and deals with four main problems based on "what" and "how" 
questions: "what questions to study, what data are relevant, what data to collect, and how to 
analyse the results". Summing up, the researcher may ensure that the evidence addresses the 
research questions. 
To succeed in the planification of a research design, five major components may be addressed: 
"study's questions", "propositions, if any", "unit(s) of analysis", "logic linking the data to the 
propositions" and, "the criteria for interpreting the findings". 
The study questions were already mentioned in the previous chapter 1.3, the "how" and "why" 
questions. A good method to go ahead with this set of questions before hand is ensure that exist 
further studies supporting the ideas mentioned. For instance, finding studies that conclude about the 
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potential of a Blockchain-based voting system as a solution for the mobility concern and trust crisis, 
provide a good argument to support the theory.  
The second component is the "study propositions", the engine that moves the study to another level. 
By asking "how" and "why" this technology studied in this dissertation can solve existent problems, 
one may think and elaborate a set of propositions that help to "look for relevant evidence". To the 
question "why" a Blockchain-based E-Voting system would solve the mobility concern, one may think 
that it offers to citizens an extra and more flexible way of voting. From this proposition, one may 
study if this situation is verified in a role model system and taper which options would exist and how 
they would be reconciled (paper ballot votes versus electronic votes). Through the design of 
propositions, one may be able to defend successfully a possible judgement of this dissertation. 
The third component is the "unit of analysis", which is directly related to the way how the initial 
research questions were defined. In order to study the Portuguese voting system with the 
introduction of Blockchain-based E-Voting, one may study and take the best example existent in the 
world. For the purpose of this dissertation, and taking as an example of what is discussed in the 
book, one may define the case (a real-life situation of a more advanced way of voting) which is the 
Estonian I-Voting system. This I-Voting system is indeed a case-study of the potential to implement a 
Blockchain-based E-Voting system in Estonia. Furthermore, the case has embedded at least one "unit 
of analysis", for instance the Estonian government policies in terms of electronic voting and citizens' 
adherence to electronic voting and government digital services. At last, this case-study works as a 
role model to apply in Portugal. 
The fourth and fifth components of the research design correspond to “linking data to propositions” 
and “criteria for interpreting a study’s findings”, respectively. There is no detailed guidance for these 
two components, according to the author, but it is based on the combination or calculation of case 
study’s data “as a direct reflection” of the initial propositions and, on the other hand, the 
interpretation’s criteria defends that it is important to anticipate rival explanations to the case 
study’s research design work. In this sequence, the author describes the importance of “theory 
development” as a part of the design phase. All the five research design components described 
embody a “theory” of what is being studied. Once for the purpose of this dissertation the case study 
will be used to develop theory, it matters to distinguish between theory in favour and rival theory. A 
theory in favour would be the use of the Case Study will demonstrate that Blockchain applied to an E-
Voting system is only possible when a government reforms its most traditional public services 
provision methods by moving towards a digitization process. A rival theory would be that the Case 
Study will also show how the lack of trust and knowledge towards the technological system are 
significant barriers for its widely adoption. By defining the theory before the collection and analysis 
of data will provide guidance on how to succeed in the next steps. 
Another important part of this theory development is to which extent is possible to generalize from 
case study results to theory. The author defends the “analytic generalization”, where a “previously 
developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case 
study”. This analytic generalization can be made based on one single-case study or more than one 
from which results are reached and inferences are made (policy implication and rival policy 
implication which are compared with a previous generalized theory granted). 
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In order to conclude the Define and Design phase, the author describes the matrix shown in figure 6, 
divided in four quadrants: single-case designs (holistic), multiple-case designs (holistic), single-case 
designs (embedded) and multiple-case designs (embedded). For this dissertation, one will follow the 
single-case design with embedded units of analysis. As stated by the author, following a single-case 
study is advised under certain circumstances. The first one is when it represents a “critical case in 
testing a well-formulated theory”. The single case is enough to contribute to “knowledge and theory 
building” and is able to invite for future studies about a field. Estonian digital society is a global 
example in terms of development of e-solutions.  
Another circumstance is when the case is “representative or typical”. It represents a typical project 
among others, being informative enough about and average “person or institution”. In this sequence, 
Estonia is a member of European Union and Euro Zone, two common areas with Portugal. Hence, 
Estonia is aligned with Portugal by sharing identical political and economic objectives, converging to 
identical development stages. A third reason is because it is a “revelatory case”. Few countries reach 
the same level of success and recognition regarding the government and society adherence to 
benefit from public electronic services over more traditional means. The last reason presented is a 
“longitudinal case”. By looking to different points in time and concluding about how much time it 
took the transition from the only paper ballot voting method to the implementation of the additional 
option of I-Voting, could reflect the potential different stages that the Portuguese voting system 
would go through. Regarding the embedded units of analysis, one finds it preferable, once offers 
more extensive analysis of the single-case over a holistic one.  
In order to collect data, some preparation steps need to be completed. In the book from Yin, R. K. 
(2009), the author emphasizes the importance of protect human subjects. In case of proceeding to 
interviews to collect data, for instance, one may ask the participants for volunteerism in participating 
and aware them about the nature of the study. Besides one may inform the protocol involved and 
make clear that each one will be protected against any harm. "Privacy" and "confidentiality" may be 
preserved and do not put any participant in an undesirable position.  
As a way to conduct a training agenda for doing the case study, one decided to do a Case Study 
Protocol template. This protocol includes, further than a simple questionnaire, a set of "procedures 
and general rules to be followed". The advantages of doing a protocol are various: focus on the topic 
of the Case Study, foreseeing problems and planning possible solutions ahead, and target the 
audience even before writing the case study report. 
Regarding the Protocol's structure, there are four main sections that may be considered. The first 
one is an "overview of the case study project". Here, a background information is included about the 
study, such as the research questions, propositions, the logic model, reference to relevant reading 
material, the protocol’s role of guiding. The purpose may be explicit so anyone can contextualize and, 
last but not least, a letter or introduction can be accompanied to send to the potential participants. 
The second section is called “field procedures”. They are required, once there is space for open 
answers and sometimes going out of the questions boundaries initially planned. Making a schedule, 
with timings and expected activities to be completed, is a way to manage. 
Thirdly, the case study questions. They may be formulated based on evidence and their sources and 
keep one on track as data collection proceeds. Questions can be formulated at five different levels 
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(“questions asked of specific interviewers”, “questions asked of the individual case”, questions asked 
of the pattern of findings “across multiple cases”, “questions asked of an entire study” and, 
“normative questions about policy recommendations and conclusions, going beyond the narrow 
scope of the study”. 
All different phases of a case-study methodology can be found in figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 6 - Types of designs for case studies (Yin, R. K. (2009)) 
 




4. CASE STUDY – ESTONIA 
 
Figure 8 - Different phases inspired from Yin, R. K. (2009) and adapted to this dissertation 
 
4.1. CASE SELECTION 
 
Generally speaking, Estonia and Portugal follow a set of rules and rights that are common to these 
two countries: European Union law (European Union treaties and European Union legislation, for 
instance). Also, in political terms, they are a Democratic Republic, even with some differences across 
national executive and legislative branches. The fact that they are both EU member-states, there is a 
political framework convergence and enables one to wonder about the existent gap about the 
technology adoption in e-government services in Portugal when compared to the Estonian strategy. 
In this chapter will be pointed out arguments for choosing Estonia as the Case Study of this 
dissertation. Also, one will take into consideration the different acts and politics existent between 
both nations, despite of considering the integration of electronic voting and the Blockchain 
application perspective by Estonia a good opportunity and example to mirror in the future 
development of electoral law in Portugal. This last topic will be developed in chapter 4.5. 
According to SCOOP4C, that stands by Stakeholder Community Once-Only Principle For Citizens, a 
project funded by the European Union, the Estonian Internet Voting is studied and is concluded that 
this country “became the first nation to hold legally binding general elections over the Internet for 
the municipal elections in 2005”. Two years later, Estonia became the first country worldwide to use 
internet voting in the Parliamentary Election. In Maurer, A. D., & Esteve, J. B. (2016) book, the 
authors mention that the major principles of traditional voting are followed by I-Voting, as “freedom, 
universality, uniformity and secrecy (anonymity) of the vote”. In other words, the adaptability of the 
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new system with the traditional one in order to facilitate the voter’s understanding of its process is 
relevant to notice. Also, the Parliament’s liberal approach to voting that states the voter has the 
option to vote either via Internet or in the traditional way in a polling station, and, not less 
important, the Estonian system is a pioneer of internet voting. These three subjects are good 
arguments to choose this country as a case study. 
Departing from the literature review, one concluded that before binding elections over Internet in 
2005, Estonia announced previously in 2001 the adoption of electronic voting as stated in Binder, N., 
Krimmer, R., Wenda, G. & Fischer, D. (2019). Due so, this fact increased responsibility to this nation 
become the first one establishing a legal procedure in the adoption of Electronic Voting. One year 
later, in 2002, the Riigikogu Election Act was introduced and assumed legal effect in the same year 
(will be further discussed in the next chapter 4.2). There were amendments at the same time the 
technology was developing, the act was updated and today many changes will step into force in 
2021, for instance. In order to become legally accepted, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) mission report in 2011 presented a set of recommendations regarding e-
voting and the Estonian Electronic Voting Committee was created. Hence, the need to legislate and 
document both the technology used as well as all the process, shows transparency, convergency in 
adoption steps, a clear cooperation between public and private sectors, are crucial factors for 
successful citizens acceptance and accession to the new way of voting, as well as worldwide 
recognition as a country that is a step ahead in the introduction of technology in national elections. 
Furthermore, it was investigated in the literature review that currently Estonia does not integrate 
Blockchain technology in the National internet voting system architecture. However, as defended in 
the working paper Martinovic, I., Kello, L., & Sluganovic, I. (2017), blockchain can bring a “revolution 
in the security and transparency that is needed to enable e-voting”.   
In the Issues & Challenges – chapter 2.2.4, some E-Voting constraints are identified, according to a 
report published by the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
European Union Democracy Observatory – EUDO, Trechsel, A. (2016). E-Voting faces “legal 
considerations”, “political considerations”, “technological and security challenges” (both human-
related and tech-related) and “social challenges”. While several aspects can be handled according to 
the increase of legal acceptance and convergence in the European Union (Legal Considerations), 
increase of transparency and communication from the government side to citizens so they feel 
confident to vote electronically (Political Considerations), Technological and security challenges are 
the ones that are still more critical and reason for not existing a broader adoption in other European 
countries. Further on, in “E-Voting and Blockchain” - chapter 2.3.5, it is indicated why E-Voting is not 
widely used and a Blockchain-based E-Voting system solution (not blockchain alone once it is not 
enough) is introduced as capable to overcome and solve problems presented by E-Voting. Although 
one describes in this chapter a theoretical model where are presented Blockchain techniques that 
can overcome issues of the current system (“synchronized model of voting records”, “user credential 
based on ECC to provide authentication and non-repudiation” and “withdrawal model that allows 
voters to change their vote before a pre-set deadline”, according to Yi, H. (2019)), one defends that a 
blockchain-based e-voting system is “more secure and anonymous” than the other e-voting systems. 
According to the author Yi, H. (2019), the privacy of the voters is kept due to the decentralized 
system without a third-party involved and the use of an ID instead of the real identity, the security is 
ensured by the difficulty of forge the votes due to the DLT model, the non-repudiation due to the 
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ECC model and, the possibility that voters have of changing the final vote due to a withdrawable 
model. Moreover, in blockchain-based e-voting, votes can be counted by everyone but the identity of 
a voter associated to his/her vote, no one is able to know. For all these technical fundamentals, 
Blockchain is promising for technological development at the election level. 
In Estonia, there are private elections (“internal elections of political parties” and “shareholder votes 
in Estonia”) and government electronic services (“Estonia’s Digital Court System”, “Estonian e-Health 
Authority” and “Estonia Succession Registry”) that use currently Blockchain.  
 
4.2. CASE IDENTIFICATION 
 
Estonia, officially the Republic of Estonia, is a Parliamentary Republic. Like Portugal, there is a head of 
government, the prime minister, and a head of state, the President of Republic. In 1st of May 2004, 
this country became an EU member state. In electoral terms, the President in Estonia is elected every 
five years, the Parliament deputies are elected every four and the European Parliament deputies are 
elected every five years. Summing up, this political system is highly defined by the National elections 
results that are obtained either by Estonian citizens going physically to the voting polls or voting via 
internet, as one already mentioned. As part of this Case Study, it matters to understand the existent 
Electoral Acts in the Estonian Constitution: Riigikogu Election Act (most commonly known as the 
Estonian Parliamentary election), Local Government Election Act (municipal councils), European 
Parliament Election Act (Estonian members of the European Parliament - MEPs), Referendum Act 
("the Riigikogu shall submit any amendment of Chapters 1 and 15 of the Constitution to a 
referendum. The Riigikogu may submit other draft Acts that amend the Constitution, and other draft 
Acts or other national issues to a referendum") and President of the Republic Election Act, according 
to the official elections website of Riigi Teataja. 
As defined in the Maurer, A. D., & Esteve, J. B. (2016) book “E-Voting Case Law: A Comparative 
Analysis”, the members of the Riigikogu, government and European Parliament are elected in “free, 
general, equal and direct elections”, as well as “voting shall be secret”. There is a legal framework for 
I-Voting in all electoral acts mentioned above, but it is in the Riigikogu Election Act that the stipulated 
provisions are more described. Hence, one will focus on this act (English translated version and in 
force until 31.12.2020) and understand what is documented regarding Electronic Voting.  
In the chapter 71 Electronic Voting of the Riigikogu Election Act, that entered into force on 
11.11.2012, the following set of provisions are documented: "General principles of electronic voting", 
"Preparation of electronic voting", "Electronic voting procedure", "Change of electronic votes", 
"Verification of electronic votes", "Taking into account of electronic votes" and "Suspension, 
termination and not starting electronic voting". In each of these seven provisions blocks, it is 






Chapter 71 ELECTRONIC VOTING of the Riigikogu Election Act  




The right of the voter to change his or her vote cast by electronic means is 
enunciated in this provision. Right after, the roles of the Electoral Organizers, 
the National Electoral Committee and State Electoral Office, respectively, are 
identified through the intervention in ensuring the proper application of the 
Electronic Voting. The National Electoral Committee is responsible to "establish 
by a resolution" the organization of electronic voting through technical 




In this phase, the State Electoral Office has a crucial role. This organizer 
receives the amendments to the list of voters at least once a day and must 
organize these entries at the same time frequency. Moreover, it is responsible 
for all the technical set-up prior to any election: ensure and inform about the 
operating systems compatible with the voter application; creation of the 
encryption key for electronic votes and the vote-opening key; guarantee 
support to visually impaired citizens in the voter application usage; make 
publicly available (publish) the voter application, votes verification application 
and the authenticity and integrity of the website information. All these 
required procedures may be finished "not later than by the thirteenth day 
before election day". 
"Electronic voting 
procedure" 
The electronic voting may be done between the tenth and fourth days before 
the election day, twenty-four hours a day and closing at 6 p.m. on the fourth 
day before election day, following the proper organization of the E-Voting as 
established by the National Electoral Committee. 
The list of candidates is then displayed to the voter after his/her identification. 
The candidate is chosen, the vote is encrypted with the vote-encryption key 
and the digital signature is used to confirm the vote ("in conformity with the 
requirements of the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic 
Transactions Act"). The E-Voting procedure ends with the notice displayed to 
the voter, confirming the voting is done. 
"Change of 
electronic votes" 
The voter has the right to change his/her vote during the seven day-period 
mentioned before. It is also possible to change from Electronic Voting to ballot 
paper voting, during the same seven day-period for the cases of Advance 
voting, "Voting in custodial institutions, hospitals and twenty-four hour social 
welfare institutions" and voting of voters residing in foreign countries (40–43, 






The verification of votes is possible. Any voter has the opportunity to verify if 
the application has transferred the vote correctly (this verification is only 
possible since 2015). The vote verification application is developed by the State 
Electoral Office as already mentioned and, this is only possible to be checked 




In this provision, the conciliation between electronic voting and paper ballot 
voting systems is reached. First of all, in case of several electronic votes 
submitted by the same voter, only the last one is taken into account. Then, in 
order to avoid misleading information, the State Electoral Office may send not 
later than two days before the election day to all "rural municipality or city 
secretaries" the list of voters who voted electronically by voting district. One 
day before the election day, all district committees may have access to this list. 
Regarding the electronic voting and traditional voting, the Act sets some rules 
to ensure the unique vote, based on a "nested if's" relationship: 
Voter voted electronically → his/her name is notated; 
Voter voted electronically + ballot paper →  ballot paper vote is the only taken 
into account; 
Voter voted electronically + voted several times outside of his/her voting 





Suspension of electronic voting → the National Electoral Committee must 
notify voters and ask to restart the electronic voting; 
Not starting or termination of electronic voting → the National Electoral 
Committee must notify voters and provide the alternative to electronic voting; 
Suspension or termination of electronic voting →  the National Electoral 
Committee must notify voters about the necessity to vote again and provide 
the alternative to electronic voting. 
 
Table 12 - Electronic Voting articles in Riigikogu Election Act (Riigikogu Election Act (2002)) 
 
4.3. CASE INFORMATION RETRIEVING 
 
In order to proceed with the case analysis in the next chapter, one retrieved information from 
different data sources – official electoral website from Estonia, where could access official 
documents and papers regarding the Internet Voting architecture published by people responsible 
for the development of the system (Cybernetica company) and further data and information 
regarding the adoption behaviour of I-Voting among the Estonian population across last years. The 
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paper written by Heiberg, S., Laud, P., & Willemson, J. (2011) was analysed regarding the security 
challenges of this online system deployment. 
Furthermore, one conducted an interview with Florian Marcus, the Digital Transformation Adviser in 
e-Estonia Briefing Centre about the Internet Voting in Estonia and also attended a conference (“e-
Estonia Live: i-Voting as key to future elections”) where it was asked the opinion and perspective 
about the use of Blockchain integrated in Estonian I-Voting. Steven Heiberg, I-Voting Product 
Manager Cybernetica AS (company also known for the Internet Voting development) shared his 
thoughts about this integration. 
 
4.4. CASE ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter, one will start by revisiting the three pillars addressed in the literature review: E-
government, E-voting and Blockchain (namely the Blockchain-based E-voting system). It is important 
to indicate on this phase the most relevant parameters, data and information in the Estonian 
framework.  
In the E-Government pillar, one studied the importance of implementing policies and providing 
services to citizens through the use of electronic devices. It was defended that a well-structured E-
government architecture is capable to improve transparency and openness in the public sector, as 
well as combatting corruption. Greater efficiency and cost reductions are mentioned also. According 
so, it matters to understand in the Estonian case if the same is verified. In the paper “Estonian e-
Government Ecosystem: Foundation, Applications, Outcomes”, Vassil, K. (2015), the author explains 
how the modernization of ICTs of the public sector and governance contribute to “provide 
transparent governance”, “offer efficiency in terms of money and time saved” and, last but not least, 
the electronic services provided are considered “trustworthy and reliable”.  
Right after, one puts in perspective two models, an E-Government architecture model studied in the 
literature review from Ebrahim, Z., & Irani, Z. (2005) side by side with the Estonian E-Government 
technical architecture that is defended in the article from McBride, K., Kütt, A., Yahia, S., & Draheim, 











Framework of E-Government Architecture 
(Ebrahim, Z., & Irani, Z. (2005)) 
Estonia’s Technical Architecture (McBride, K., 
Kütt, A., Yahia, S., & Draheim, D. (2019)) 
Access Layer Electronic identity 
“The channels that government users can access 
the various government services” 
“Allows for citizens to be able to identify 
themselves in order to access the delivered 
services.” Based on a chip-based ID card, a SIM-
based MobileID application and SmartID. 
E-Government layer Delivery channels 
“Web-portal of government services, in the form 
of a one-stop e-government portal”, 
“integration, linkage and share of information 
between different organizations” 
They are a “combination of a centralized “single 
window” portal in conjunction with private 
services offerings by public service providers”. A 
single portal. 
E-Business layer Interoperability 
Government portal incorporates front-end 
applications (“online catalogues and transactions 
interfaces”), with back-end activities (“existing 
databases and data warehouses”). 
“Distributed service bus called X-Road which 
allows for different agencies to provide and 
consume services”. X-Road provides services that 
are accessible via the "Information System 
Registry which lists all datasets in Estonia, and 
the services available for accessing them". 
Infrastructure layer Infrastructure 
“Focuses on technologies that should be in place 
before e-government services can be offered 
reliably and effectively to the public”. It is the 
“Network Infrastructure”. 
“Consists of three main components”: “network 
solution called ASO, data embassies, and a 
private cloud solution”. 
 
Table 13 - E-Government architecture model adapted to Estonia’s Technical Architecture 
 
Moving from the E-Government pillar to the E-Voting one, the concept of E-Voting was given based 
on different sources and authors. In the literature review, E-Voting and I-Voting concepts were 
distinguished from one another: “e-voting is different from Internet Voting where voters cast their 
ballots remotely over the Internet”, as quoted from Abba, A., Awad, M., Al-Qudah, Z., & Jallad, A. 
(2017). Regarding the Estonia case, it is known that is used Internet Voting as one mean of voting 
beyond the traditional method. Hence, according to Zissis, D. & Lekkas, D. (2011), the remote e-
voting offers advantages over the “poll-site” e-voting (in the case of Estonia, I-Voting over the paper-
ballot voting): “cost reductions due to economies of scale and increased participation due to voter 
geographic independence” and, “by complying with all security requirements, together with the cost 
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reductions and mobility issue solved, the turnout may increase”. Hence,  it is important to 
understand if these advantages are verified in Estonia.  
Regarding the increase of total turnout in Elections, one considered data from the Valimised website 
(the official Estonian elections website). The participation in voting (%) since 2005, year when I-
Voting started being used in this country, did not increase consistently as verified in the visualization 
below.  
 
Figure 9 - Elections Turnout in Estonia (Valimised website) 
However, the evolution of the proportion of I-Voters is a different scenario. In the line charts in 
appendix 8, one can see that since 2005, the percentages of eligible, advance and participant I-Voters 
have been increasing consistently. In the European Parliament elections of 2019, the total number of 
I-Voters reached almost 50%, as it is visible in the figure 10. The I-Voting adoption rates are evidence 
that the trust and willingness of more and more Estonians to use I-Voting as the preferable way of 




Figure 10 - Percentage of I-Voters in Estonia (Valimised website) 
 
In order to validate the cost reductions of using I-Voting as the preferable channel to vote, one will 
reference the values calculated in Krimmer, R., Dueñas-Cid, D., Krivonosova, I., & Vinkel, P. (2018), a 
paper where the cost differences between the existent voting channels in Estonia were investigated 
and accounted, allowing researchers to conclude with greater accuracy about the administrative 
costs associated to each channel. Relying on the Local elections of 2017, the authors were able to 
achieve that the cost per ballot, in Euro, is around 2,32 through I-Voting channel, the cheapest one 
when compared to the remaining voting channels considered in this analysis: “Early Voting in country 
centres” (5,07), “Advance Voting in country centres” (6,24), “Election Day Voting in country centres” 
(4,61), Advance Voting in Voting District Committees (VDC) (20,41) and “Election Day Voting in VDC” 
(4,37).  
Since 2002, Estonia introduced the national ID card. Furthermore, there are other two forms of 
digital identification: “Digi-ID” and “Mobiil-ID”. Digi-ID is a card which contains less personal 
information than the national one, but still useful for authentication and digital signature. Mobiil-ID 
is similar to Digi-ID in terms of functionality, but “built into a mobile phone SIM card rather than a 
chip and PIN card”. According to the official Estonian election’s website, the proportion of Mobile-ID 
I-Votes among all I-Votes have been increasing consistently election after election, from 1.9% in the 
Parliamentary elections in 2011, year of Mobiil-ID introduction, reaching 30.1% in the European 
Parliament elections of 2019. 
In the E-Voting case of Estonia explored in the section 2.2.3, it was studied the architecture of the 
system, how the different components are associated from the moment when the citizen opens the 
voting client application until the moment when the vote is successful registered for tallying and the 
voter can verify his/her vote by reading the QR Code with the smartphone in the verification 
application. In this section, one will analyse the experience of the end user which goes through four 
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different stages: “Authentication”, “Introduction”, “Choices” and “Voting”. In order to understand 
how the vote is registered in practice, one went to the same Estonian website already referred and 
watched a demonstration by Florian Marcus, Digital Transformation Adviser in e-Estonia Briefing 
Centre. In the “Stages of i-Voting in voter application” session, the “Authentication” tab goes through 
all steps to identify the voter - choose the ID-card (enter PIN1 code) or Mobile-ID (mobile phone 
number and personal identification code) for voting. After sending, the verification code is displayed. 
The system checks if the person has already voted and the list of candidates are loaded. The 
“Introduction” stage starts and its main goal is to display the voter’s name and proof of how it was 
correctly identified in the previous stage and it is also informed if any i-vote was already registered 
previously by the voter. Moving to next stage, “Choices”, the list of political parties and candidates is 
displayed in drill down hierarchy (the political parties are displayed first and only after selecting one 
party, the list of candidates associated are visible). There is also a search box to type the candidate 
names (results are filtered when are typed at least two symbols). After click on “Vote”, the last stage 
“Voting” is designed to confirm the choice with digital signature. In order to so, the voter can go back 
to the previous stage or click in the “Confirm” button. Once the click is done on Confirm, the vote is 
encrypted and the digital signature is required (in the case of ID-card, voter just needs to insert the 
PIN2; with Mobile-ID, the PIN2 needs to be inserted as well but the voter needs to guarantee that 
the verification code displayed on the computer screen is identical to the one displayed on the phone 
screen first). If everything is fine, the final window informs about the registration of the vote and 
exhibits a QR code. From the demo that one followed, a screenshot of this last window was taken 
and is visible in figure 11, and about which Florian Marcus informed that the QR code is made 
available for the voter to use it through his/her mobile phone in order to verify that the vote was 
correctly received through a different communication channel. This QR code is only valid for few 
minutes so by sharing it on the internet for everyone to see who the citizen voted for is not possible. 
Furthermore, to generate a new QR code, a new vote needs to be submitted. 
 
Figure 11 - Screenshot took during Florian Marcus’ demo of how to register an I-Vote through the I-
voting application 
In this process described above, the public key cryptography concept is present. As concluded in 
White, O., Madgavkar, A., Manyika, J., Mahajan, D., Bughin, J., McCarthy, M. & Sperling, O. (2019), a 
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study aborded in the literature review, “Voters encrypt their ballots with the public key of the 
election system, and then digitally sign them with their own private key.” The private key 
corresponds to the key for signature in the national ID card (PIN2 as mentioned) and, then, the 
electoral authority associates the voter with his/her public key. 
In the last topic of E-Voting investigated in the literature review, some issues and challenges were 
listed. They were divided in "Legal Considerations", "Political Considerations", "Technological and 
security challenges – Human-related technological risks", "Technological and security challenges – 
Tech-related technological risks”, "Social Challenges", and other possible vulnerabilities that an 
electronic voting system can face. In order to comprehend how the Internet Voting system in Estonia 
adapted, one had the opportunity to have a conversation with Florian Marcus from the e-Estonia 
Briefing Centre and collect further information from a technical document "Mobile voting feasibility 
study and risk analysis" (Buldas, A., Heiberg, S., Krips, K. & Willemson, J. (2020)) and from  a technical 
paper explaining the security considerations regarding the system (Heiberg, S., Laud, P., & 
Willemson, J. (2011)), published in the year when the number of votes cast in the Parliamentary 
elections over the internet among all votes reached 24.3%. Below, you can find a table where the 
issues and limitations of internet voting mentioned in the literature review are put side by side with 
the Estonian case. 
European University Institute, 
Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies, European 
Union Democracy Observatory – 
EUDO, Trechsel, A. (2016) 
Estonian I-Voting  
“Legal Considerations” 
“Digital Divide” is introduced here 
as the critical aspect: people who 
do not have access to the Internet 
would not be able to vote 
People who do not have access to the Internet are able to 
vote on site (paper ballot voting). 
Processes of counting the votes 
and checking who voted may be 
independent, ensuring “privacy 
and security” 
There are two servers: Vote Storing Server (VSS) which 
stores the i-votes and anonymization of the i-votes before 
the tabulation. The Vote Counting Server (VCS) does the 
tabulation and is offline. 
It may exist a legal basis for the 
adoption of this mechanism, so it 
can be adopted in more member 
states of the European Union. 
 
In the chapter 71 Electronic Voting of the Riigikogu Election 
Act, that entered into force on 11.11.2012, a set of 
provisions are documented about the electronic voting. In 
the European Commission website, I-Voting in Estonia is 







Procedure of I-Voting may be 
“transparent, participatory, and 
involve all the relevant political 
actors and stakeholders”, so its 
implementation can be consensual 
and strong political consensus will 
motivate and increase confidence 
of citizens to use Internet Voting 
The Estonian Election Acts have already a chapter 
dedicated to the all the procedures of voting and counting 
of I-votes. In 2019, for the European Parliamentary 
Elections, almost half of the voters used I-Voting to choose 
the Estonian members of the European Parliament. 
Technological and security challenges – “Human-related technological risks” 
Citizens with lack of technical 
competencies to deal with remote 
I-Voting 
The number of internet users in Estonia is significantly high, 
around 90% in 2017 (according to The World Bank), where 
internet users have used the Internet (from any location 
and any device) in the last 3 months). This relevant 
majority of the Estonian population who are familiar with 
Internet, makes the I-Voting process easier to understand 
and enhances its use.  
Electoral officials missing technical 
skills to be able to control the I-
Voting process in an effective way 
The anonymization of i-votes can only occur in the 
presence of at least 2 election officials, an auditor and 
possible external observers. All procedures are defined 
beforehand in written form, and all actions and outcomes 
are recorded on tape. Without enforcing those regulations, 
the IVS owner could manipulate the election results on a 
large scale by adding or removing votes from the digital 
ballot box without getting caught. 
Citizens’ assurance regarding 
secrecy and privacy of their votes 
The citizen cannot assure by himself/herself the secrecy of 
the vote.  
However, the system uses the asymmetric encryption to 
guarantee the secrecy of voting. The use of the public key 
to encrypt the vote (but with no power to decrypt it) and 
the private key used to decrypt the anonymous votes, not 
associated to personal details of the voter, and never 
before the counting process, ensure the secrecy.  
“Lack of transparency when voters 
cannot be sure whether their votes 
are correctly counted and stored” 
A QR Code is made available for the voter to use it through 
his/her mobile phone in order to verify that the vote was 
correctly received through a different communication 
channel. This QR code is only valid for few minutes so by 
sharing it on the internet for everyone to see who the 
citizen voted for is not possible. 
62 
 
Possibility of intimidation or any 
other kind of enforcement against 
the voter’s will while casting 
his/her vote remotely 
 
The solution is “You can vote again electronically in order 
to change your choice.” According to the Riigikogu Election 
Act, chapter 71, the “Change of electronic votes” provision 
states that the voter has the right to change his/her vote 
during a seven day-period.  
If I-Voting becomes the only way of 
voting, a significant portion of the 
population may not be capable to 
vote and feel discrimination. 
Paper ballot voting is another alternative to participate in 
elections. 
Technological and security challenges – “Tech-related technological risks” 
“Possibility of system attack or 
breakdown, or connection failure” 
The voting application is executed in malicious 
environment, where malware could manipulate its 
behaviour. Several weaknesses present in Estonian i-voting 
scheme were materialized. The analyzed events indicate 
real-life attacks that an i-voting system has to withstand. 
From these events we conclude that it is necessary to work 
toward new, more secure i-voting protocol. We need to 
reduce the level of trust required in the voter’s computer 
and provide the NEC with means to show that it could not 
act malicious even if it wanted to. It is possible that i-voting 
related legislation may be refined to meet these 
requirements. 
Correct identification of the voter 
complexity 
Voter’s identification is confirmed by asking the voter to 
submit his/her personal identification code. The credentials 
users by the citizen to authenticate can be “knowledge-
based” – username/password and PIN, or physical 
authentication token (“chip card, SIM-card, etc.”) 
combined with a knowledge-based PIN. The identity of the 
voter is proven by the digital signature, and consists on the 
basis to take the i-vote into account. 
“Provision of the preventive 
measures against multiple voting” 
and “transparency of tabulation” 
 
The conciliation between electronic voting and paper ballot 
voting systems is reached. First of all, in case of several 
electronic votes submitted by the same voter, only the last 
one is taken into account. Then, in order to avoid 
misleading information, the State Electoral Office may send 
not later than two days before the election day to all "rural 
municipality or city secretaries" the list of voters who voted 
electronically by voting district. One day before the 
election day, all district committees may have access to this 
list. Regarding the electronic voting and traditional voting, 
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the Act sets some rules to ensure the unique vote. 
Voter’s personal computer can 
have virus and affect the system 
As with the IVS (I-voting system) server’s side problems, 
there exist i-voting protocols which handle the problem of 
trusting voter’s computer. The Estonian i-voting scheme 
relies on the assumption that we can trust the owner of the 
IVS and we can trust voter’s computer. However, some 
measures to reduce the necessary trust have been taken. A 
detection system for known attack-vectors is built into 
IVCA (I-voting client application) and methods are used to 
complicate reverse engineering. 
Social challenges 
“Social differences regarding who 
has a personal computer and 
internet at home” and “who is 
sufficiently technologically literate 
to be able to interact with an 
online voting platform”. Age, 
income level and literacy level are 
key components 
Elderly people are actually using I-Voting (according to 
statistics available in the Valimised website, retrieved from 
https://www.valimised.ee/en/archive/statistics-about-
internet-voting-estonia, 17% of I-Voters in the European 
Parliament elections 2019 belong to the age group >65 
years old, for instance). The number of internet users in 
Estonia is significantly high, around 90% in 2017 (according 
to The World Bank, as mentioned previously). 
 
Table 14 - Estonian I-Voting and how it overcomes issues and limitations identified in e-voting 
The third and last pillar presented in the literature review was Blockchain and Blockchain-based E-
Voting system. This algorithm architecture was studied as well as some issues and limitations. 
Regarding the application of Blockchain to an E-Voting system, one started by defining what the 
integration of this solution could add to a current existent electronic voting. It is known that in E-
Voting the process to confirm who did not vote and tallying votes is faster and more reliable, at the 
same time that travel expenses and opportunity costs of a voter being present in the polling place in 
the election day can be highly reduced due to the introduction of E-Voting. Another important factor 
mentioned was the “mobilization effect” - people who had no incentive to vote before, can find a 
new option and become more enthusiastic, especially young people. However, the existent problems 
are associated with verifiability. To keep the votes anonymized in E-Voting, for voters to verify if their 
vote was registered successfully "without revealing who they voted for" and to decide the votes that 
are valid "without a privileged role", are some of the questions and challenges. In the paper written 
by Kovic, M. (2017), “e-voting carries the greatest risk”. In this sense, some Blockchain technology 
features were identified as capable to overcome and solve problems presented by E-Voting. In the 
book Xu, X., Weber, I., & Staples, M. (2019), the author defends “using a blockchain alone is not 
enough”. The ideal solution is the Blockchain-based E-Voting system.  
In order to see the three mentioned challenges applied to the Estonian case scenario, one based the 
analysis over the paper written by Heiberg, S., Laud, P., & Willemson, J. (2011). 
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Keep the votes anonymized in E-Voting - ballot secrecy relies heavily on organizational procedures in 
the Estonian i-voting scheme. It is theoretically possible for the NEC (National Electoral Committee) 
not to anonymize i-votes and use a modified VCS to break the secrecy of all ballots. To break the 
secrecy of one ballot, it is sufficient to decrypt it separately from others and later analyse audit log-
files. 
Ability of voters to verify if their vote was registered successfully "without revealing who they 
voted for" – during the verification process, the application downloads the QR code information 
from the voting server, decrypts the votes so it can display the name of the candidate the voter 
voted for. Some attacks may occur at this stage, but by verifying the vote with the QR code together 
with the new verification method (smart card readers with PIN-pads and PIN-firewalls), malware 
attacks are avoided. 
Decide the votes that are valid "without a privileged role" - The fact that the IVS auditing logfiles 
can link original voters to the hashes of the encrypted ballots means that if the invalid i-vote was 
indeed decrypted separately from other i-votes, the ballot secrecy would be protected only by 
organizational means. An IVS implementing a mix network-based anonymization system would have 
reduced the required trust in the NEC and allowed the analysis of invalid i-vote in a secure manner 
with respect to ballot secrecy. 
 
Also, in order to understand what is the current opinion and perspective about the use of Blockchain 
integrated in Estonian I-Voting, in the conference “e-Estonia Live: i-Voting as key to future elections”, 
that took place on 18th June 2020, Florian Marcus, Digital Transformation Adviser e-Estonia Briefing 
Centre, made a question to Sven Heiberg, I-Voting Product Manager Cybernetica AS (company also 
known for the Internet Voting development):  
While Estonia started to using Blockchain on a national level almost 10 years ago, I-Voting is not 
really associated with Blockchain implementation. Was there ever the thought of implementing 
Blockchain for I-Voting, maybe even right now, or for the future, and if not, why do you think is not 
necessary?  
To this question, Steven Heirberg confessed that “using Blockchain on top of Online Voting system 
definitely crossed our minds”. Also, “we have looked into the properties and capabilities of 
Blockchain applications, such as Etherium or Bitcoin, and we have determined that it is not suitable 
for Online voting at this stand”. They are currently investigating a different model based on “private 
permissions”. However, a major argument for retarding the adoption of Blockchain is the fact that 
currently the Online Voting system relies on a “single component to store the information” and exists 
a “separation of duty and distribution of tasks” which is crucially in the current implementation 
architecture. Blockchain does not rely on a single component. Another important topic discussed was 
regarding Blockchain encryption. As stated by Steven Heirberg, “to go through Blockchain, we need a 
different kind of encryption and we need to consider every last thing towards we publish into the 
Blockchain” once exists the risk of the key length being “approachable to hackers” and, then, “we 
might be linking historical voting results is possible to make a link once this key is saved for years”. 
The remaining discussion can be read in appendix 9. 
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4.5. DISCUSSION/ KEY LEARNINGS 
 
As a matter of fact, Estonia was the first country to announce the electronic voting adoption in 2001. 
This achievement brings great responsibility and it was the first country to establish a legal procedure 
in the adoption of E-Voting. In order to comply with legal requirements, the Riigikogu Election Act 
was introduced in June 2002 and “assumed legal effect on 18 July 2002”. Once this is a technology in 
continuous development, also the law needed to adapt and change. According so, with the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission report in 2011 presented a set 
of recommendations and, at that time, also the Electronic Voting Committee was created. All these 
events contributed in a way or another to the continuous update of the Act. According to this study, 
the last time the Act was changed was in 2016, with “legal effect on 1 January 2017”. Furthermore, 
the Electronic Voting discussed during this dissertation makes part of one of the public services 
provided by the government. Generally speaking, one considered the E-Government Development 
Index (EGDI) from 2020, that assesses the e-government development at national level, calculated 
based on the average value between three components (Online Service Index, Telecommunication 
Infrastructure Index and Human Capital Index). In the year of 2020, Estonia is in 3rd place in the 
world ranking and in 2nd place in the European ranking, a notable very high EGDI, according to this 
mentioned report issued by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of United Nations. 
Estonia was also the country at world scale which recorded the most significant increase since the 
EGDI registered in 2018. Regarding the e-Participation Index 2020, Estonia is considered the country 
in the world that performs better in the provision of information to citizens, consultation and 
decision-making, knowing how to promote socially inclusive governance. 
Being a pioneer of I-Voting adoption worldwide, together with the fact that it is considered one of 
the fastest raising countries for digital transformation in the world, one believes that this country is a 
good case-study for Portugal. However, there are factors that may be reflected and analysed in a 
possible application in the Portuguese framework. Before starting with the set of recommendations 
in this sense, that will be highlighted in the chapter 5.2, one will focus on the discussion of the I-
Voting limitations. 
In order to create trust and confidence in such a way that citizens take the initiative to adopt Internet 
Voting, there are several factors to be taken into account. Existing adequate and transparent voting 
procedures, good coordination between different voting bodies involved, technical requirements 
that guarantee all the credibility of the system from the front to back end (“end-to-end verifiable”), 
are basic requirements that will influence the propensity of citizens to vote online. However, keeping 
the anonymization of i-votes, guarantee the verifiability of the successful registration of the i-vote 
without revealing the output, tallying the votes that are valid without privileges usage, and 
susceptibility to system attack, breakdown or connection failure, are the limitations that were not 
completely overcame and may lead to lack of confidence on citizens behalf. This affirmation is based 
on the paper “The Application of I-voting for Estonian Parliamentary Elections of 2011”, Heiberg, S., 
Laud, P., & Willemson, J. (2011), where two real problems related to the i-Voting application were 
reported and are analysed. The first one was related to an “Invalid I-vote” in 2011, during the 
tabulation phase of the Riigikogu Elections. In paper voting there are plenty of invalid votes, while in 
the case of the I-Voting Client Application, the casting of one invalid vote means that the application 
66 
 
was manipulated. Possible causes were raised, such as a bug (either in the  Client Application, or 
Forwarding Server, or Vote Counting Server), a human mistake (incompatible candidate lists on the 
counting server and forwarding server), or someone that intentionally casted an invalid i-vote. After 
reviewing the code and performing some tests, the bug possibility was disregarded, and the possible 
cause of an intentional spoiled vote was considered. However, the root cause is unknown. Also, the 
involvedness of the NEC (Estonian National Electoral Committee) and the fact that the ballot secrecy 
is highly dependent from this body (it is technically possible for them to do not anonymize these 
votes and break the secrecy). Another real problem faced was the “Student’s attack”. A student 
named “P.” emailed NEC claiming that designed a prototype of an election rigging malware, capable 
of manipulating the voter to believe that he has voted for his election candidate, although the 
malware actually voted for another candidate. By analysing the election logs, the longest session 
registered came from P. Also, all sessions created while P. was voting, were marked as suspicious. 
Later on, the source code was made available by P. at the same time the Electoral Committee 
claimed that the malware was detected. Without giving up, P. claimed that was able to do the same 
procedure, but for selected candidates in order to favour one over the others. NEC replied again 
stating that no attempts to attack the I-Voting Server have occurred. Summing up, this potential 
attack brought up the fact that the detection system implemented is not enough and only indicates if 
some kind of malware is occurring, it doesn’t prevent it. There are several alerts detected and visible 
in the logs, but the absence of countermeasures against voter disenfranchisement attack (taking 
away the right to vote from a citizen) is the main weakness of this detection system. Also, nobody 
from the NEC analysed the logs timely. 
In a paper named “Secure I-Voting System with Modified Voting and Verification Protocol”, by Ajish, 
S., & Anil Kumar, K. S. (2020), the security weakness of relying only on the PIN stored in the national 
ID card is identified. The attacker can easily re-vote by using Re-voting Malware (PIN in the national 
ID card is collected and later when the voter uses the ID card for other use, the malware casts the 
vote), and can cast any vote from any voter he/she wants by using Self-voting Malware (once the 
voter’s device makes part of a botnet, administrated by the malware, it records the PIN code and 
then cast the vote without the voter’s awareness). Also, the vote change is not reflected in the vote 
verification application – Vote Modification Malware. For these two situations, the authors tested 
the inclusion of OTP, One-Time Password, to prevent the Re-voting and Self-voting malwares. On the 
other hand, to prevent a fake verification of the vote, they also propose the use of the private key of 
the server to digitally sign the vote. In order to present a product that is more secure than the 
current Estonian I-Voting system, the authors analysed theoretically and technically the major client-
side attacks in the Estonia i-voting system: Vote Modification Malware (VMM), Re-Voting Malware 
(RVM) and; Self-Voting Malware (SVM). Consequently, they tested and validated the security of a 











Once the candidate list is made available in the app, the voter makes his/her choice 
and it is generated a random number. The Modified protocol uses instead an OTP 
that is sent to the voter’s phone by the VSS. Then, once the voter inserts the OTP in 
the application, the voter applications pads the OTP and the candidate, and encrypts 
it with the server’s public key. 
Prevents the Re-Voting and Self-Voting Malware attacks. In this modified protocol, 
the vote is not casted in the background. In case of attack, with the OTP, the voter 




The encrypted vote is digitally signed by the VSS’s private key before it is sent to the 
verification application, so the hacker cannot modify the vote at this stage. In this 
modified protocol, the voter should verify the vote so it can be accounted in the VSS. 
Also, the VCA and verification application may run on different devices. 
There is a two-level security offered by the VCA: using the PIN and OTP. The 
cryptogram includes the OTP, so the voter can check it and make he/she is verifying 
the vote and make sure it belongs to him/her. A third-level is ensured by the 
encryption of the cryptogram by using the private key of the server before it is 
forwarded to the verification application.  
 
Table 15 - Modified Voting and Modified Verification Protocols (Ajish, S., & Anil Kumar, K. S. (2020)) 
Learning from the known Estonian success case, not only about the growing I-Voting adoption rates 
among the voting population, but because of what triggers it: transparent voting procedures, good 
coordination between different bodies involved and technical requirements that guarantee system’s 
credibility. Moreover, learning from the potential security weaknesses presented and from 
academics and other experts that suggest system development improvements, Portugal can take a 








5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PORTUGAL 
 
So far, the select case, design data collection protocol, conduct case study and write individual case 
report phases were fulfilled across the previous chapter. Right after, one may draw cross-case 
conclusions, modify theory, develop policy implications and, finally, write the cross-case report. 




Figure 12 - Dissertation phases based on Yin, R. K. (2009) methodology 
 
5.1. FRAMEWORK OF THE ELECTORAL LAW IN PORTUGAL 
 
As already explored previously, the lack of legal acceptance is considered a major limitation 
regarding the adoption of Blockchain. In the “E-Voting and Blockchain” chapter, some of the 
problems in the paper ballots are solved with the introduction of Electronic Voting devices and, in its 
turn, Blockchain is capable to overcome security issues related E-Voting as studied before. 
In Portugal, despite of some initiatives for the exploration of Blockchain applications and 
modernization of the current electoral procedures, the political legislation and electoral law are still 
resistant to the technological potential. For the purpose of this dissertation, it matters to understand 
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the critical articles documented in the Electoral Legislation, divided according to the political body to 
be elected (Electoral Law for the Republic President, Republic Assembly, Local Authorities and 
European Parliament elections, mainly). From this documentation, one will explore the articles that 
may describe better how the Portuguese electoral law works and if exists any challenge to the 
adoption of and Electronic Voting system and/or Blockchain. They are grouped by the corresponding 
theme: early vote; localization; voting method; vote secrecy; requirements to exercise the right to 
vote; supervision at polling stations; counting of votes; disabled voters; doubts, complaints, protests 
and against protests and, last but not least; legal violations when voting and associated punishment. 
The paragraphs below resume important topics about the crucial articles that matter to be analysed 
for the purpose of this dissertation. It is a similar analysis as the one performed in the sub-chapter 
4.2. Case Identification, where the provisions with all the procedures that may be followed prior and 
during the electronic voting in Estonia were documented. 
In the table below, one took as example the Assembly of the Republic Electoral Law. The President of 











Nº Article Description 
40 Polling stations 
One polling station per parish. 
(>1500) electors: number of electors shall be divided into polling station sections  




At least one station in the chief municipality of a constituency (in Autonomous Region of Madeira two stations, in Autonomous 
Region of Azores, nine stations, one per island). 
If no voters have been registered in one municipality, the mayor may order that it will be exempted from operation. 
The number of voters per station if significantly exceeds 1500, the mayor may determine the necessary divisions so this number 




Public buildings (schools or seats of municipal councils or parish councils) offering capacity, security and access. Private buildings 
shall be requisitioned in case needed. 
79 Casting a vote 
Only the registered elector has the right to cast his/her vote. 
The vote can only be casted in person or by post (in the case of electors residing abroad). 
79.B Advance voting Not everyone can vote in advance. There is a list in which circumstances an elector can cast his/her vote in advance. 
82 Secret ballot 
Nobody can be obliged to disclose their vote or be asked about it by any authority (save in the case of unidentifiable statistical 
data collection). 
No one may reveal which list they voted or are going to vote for (both inside and outside of the polling station, withing a 
distance of five hundred meters outside). 
83 
Requisites for 
exercise of the 
right to vote 
The voter may be registered in the electoral roll book and his/her identity must be recognized by the board of officers. 
84 Location in 
which the right 
The vote only be exercised at the electoral station that corresponds to the location for which the elector is registered (save in 
the case of advance voting). 
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to vote is 
exercised 
88 Voting order 
Electors vote in the order in which they arrive at the polling station and may exercise their right to vote as soon as they present 







Voting operation is concluded as soon as all the registered electors have voted or, if it is past 7 p.m., as soon as all the electors 
who are present inside the polling station have voted.  
95 
Voting slips and 
templates in 
Braille 
Voting slips shall present all the lists that are being put to the vote in each constituency to fit on them, and 
shall be printed on a blank sheet of paper. 
Braille templates of the voting slips, in all respects identical to these and with spaces corresponding to the squares of the 





First, the voter gives his/her identification document to the president of the table (can an identification document other than 
the citizenship card). 
Secondly, once the voter has been identified, the presiding officer says the name and civil identification number aloud and, after 
checking the registration, gives them a voting slip. 
Voter, alone in the polling station, marks a cross in the respective square of his/her choice. 
In the ballot table, voter gives the paper to the president who puts in the ballot right after and other officer registers in the 
paper that that elector had voted. 









Blank and null 
votes 
Blank votes - no mark of any kind has been made on the voting slip. 
Null votes - more than one square has been marked or there are doubts about which square was marked; when the voter votes 
for a list that is no longer running in the elections; any cut, drawing, written words or tear has been made. In the case of 








Any elector who is registered at a polling station and any of the delegates for lists may raise doubts and lodge written 
challenges, protests or counter-protests 
101 
Counting voters 
and voting slips 
The electors that were marked in the electoral roll books along the day are counted. 
Once the number is known, the presiding officer shall order the opening of the urns and the counting of the slips. 
In case number of electors is different than number of slips, the latter number must be considered for counting purposes. The 
number of voting slips may be of public knowledge.  
102 Counting votes 
One of the scrutineers shall unfold the slips one by one, and shall announce out loud which list has been voted for. The other 
scrutineer shall separately record on a blank sheet of paper or preferably on a clearly visible board. 
The presiding officer together with another scrutineer group the votes into separate batches corresponding to each of the lists 
that have received votes, blank votes, and null votes. 
The presiding officer counter-check the counting of the votes in each batch after the steps above. 
Delegates for lists have the right to subsequently examine the separate batches of voting slips and ask for clarifications and/or 
protest before the presiding officer. 




Anyone who is not eligible to vote and presents himself/herself voting, will be punished with a fine of 500 to 5,000 escudos. 
If a citizen takes the identity of a registered elector will be punished with six months to two years imprisonment and a fine 
ranging from 20,000 to 200,000 escudos. 
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150 Disloyal agents 
Anyone who accompanies a blind or disabled person to vote and willfully expresses the latter’s wish in a manner that is not 
faithful thereto shall be punished by a prison term of between six months and two years and a fine of between five thousand 
and twenty thousand escudos. 
151 
Breach of voting 
secrecy 
Anyone who in, or within the five hundred meters immediately around, a polling station enforces another voted to get to know 
in which list he/she voted for, shall be punished by a prison term of up to six months. 
Anyone who says who voted for in or within the 500m immediately around the polling station shall be punished by a fine of 








In case anyone who employs any kind of violence or threat over an elector in order to persuade him to vote for a given list or to 
withdraw from standing for a given list shall be punished by a prison term. 
 










After getting to know more about the Portuguese electoral law, some questions regarding the 
Internet Voting procedure are raised. The following questions are based in some of the main articles 
described above and the respective answers are based on the information presented in the table of 
chapter 4.2. Case Identification. The purpose of this table is mainly to do a cross information about 
legal aspects between the Portuguese articles and how they are transcribed in the Riigikogu Election 
Act, specifically in the Electronic Voting articles. 
Article Question Answer 
Polling 
stations 
What details are 
communicated/prepared 
prior to any election in 
the case of I-Voting? 
State Electoral Office has a crucial role as organizer: 
receives the amendments to the list of voters at least 
once a day and must organize these entries at the same 
time frequency; ensure and inform about the operating 
systems compatible with the voter application; creation 
of the encryption key for electronic votes and the vote-
opening key; guarantee support to visually impaired 
citizens in the voter application usage; publish the 
voter application, votes verification application and the 
authenticity and integrity of the website information. 
All these procedures may be completed not later than 




Where is the location of 
polling stations in I-
Voting and paper 
voting? 
Any voter's computer with an operating system 
compatible with the Voter application. Also guarantee 
the installation of the vote’s verification application 
and the authenticity and integrity of the website 
information. 
Voting in custodial institutions, hospitals and twenty-




How is advance voting 
processed in the case of 
I-Voting and paper 
voting? 
Any voter who installs the required applications to cast 
the vote can do it between the tenth and fourth days 
before the election day, twenty-four hours a day and 
closing at 6 p.m.  
The voter has the right to change his/her vote during 
the seven day-period mentioned before. It is also 
possible to change from Electronic Voting to ballot 
paper voting, during the same seven day-period for the 





What are the requisites 
to exercise the right to 
vote? 
State Electoral Office, as organizer, receives the 
amendments to the list of voters at least once a day 
and must organize these entries at the same time 






What is the voting order 
and the manner in which 
each elector votes? 
The list of candidates is then displayed to the voter 
after his/her identification. The candidate is chosen, 
the vote is encrypted with the vote-encryption key and 
the digital signature is used to confirm the vote. 
The E-Voting procedure ends with the notice displayed 






In case there are any 
problems with electronic 
voting, what are the 
procedures to be 
followed by the National 
Electoral Committee?  
Suspension of electronic voting à the National Electoral 
Committee must notify voters and ask to restart the 
electronic voting; 
Not starting or termination of electronic voting à the 
National Electoral Committee must notify voters and 
provide the alternative to electronic voting; 
Suspension or termination of electronic voting and the 
National Electoral Committee must notify voters about 
the necessity to vote again and provide the alternative 
to electronic voting. 
Counting 
votes 
How is processed the 
counting of votes? 
The conciliation between electronic voting and paper 
ballot voting systems is reached. First of all, in case of 
several electronic votes submitted by the same voter, 
only the last one is taken into account. Then, in order 
to avoid misleading information, the State Electoral 
Office may send not later than two days before the 
election day to all "rural municipality or city 
secretaries" the list of voters who voted electronically 
by voting district. One day before the election day, all 
district committees may have access to this list. 
In case a voter voted electronically and ballot paper, 
only the ballot paper vote is taken into account. 
 
Table 17 - Portuguese articles and how they are transcribed in the Riigikogu Election Act 
 
5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS AND/OR BLOCKCHAIN E-VOTING MODEL PROPOSAL 
 
In the previous sub-chapter, one presented the main articles documented in the Portuguese 
Assembly of the Republic Electoral Law. Consequently, it was possible to do a cross information 
between the Portuguese and Estonian electoral law on the main articles. Hereupon, it remains to 




First of all, independently of the technology used, the possibility of voting remotely (via Internet), 
implies by itself major changes and several amendments and adaptations to the Portuguese scenario.  
Currently, as already mentioned before, it is only allowed paper voting, by post (in the case of 
residents abroad) and the last pilot project conducted in the district of Évora where voting machines 
were made available for the first time in the polling stations. The possibility of voting anywhere, only 
by turning on a computer and submitting the vote through an application, requires not only legal 
changes, as well as political agreement, social knowledge and engagement, technical expertise and 
consequent technical development. All of these aspects are addressed in the sub-chapter 4.4. Case 
Analysis, where the issues and limitations of internet voting mentioned in the literature review are 
put side by side with the Estonian case. We may depart from these examples but adapted to the 
Portuguese scenario. Thus, one may be able to understand upfront what major aspects may be taken 
into consideration in the implementation of a solution and make recommendations based on the 
success and failure points of the case study of this dissertation. At the same time, in the sub-chapter 
4.5. Discussion/ Key Learnings, two real problems faced in Estonia were described, as well as two 
possible solutions presented in the paper named “Secure I-Voting System with Modified Voting and 
Verification Protocol”, by Ajish, S., & Anil Kumar, K. S. (2020). The proposed protocols are integrated 
in the set of recommendations.  
First of all, one may reflect about the genesis of E-Voting in Estonia, the case-study of this 
dissertation. In the sub-chapter 4.1 Case Selection, it was already mentioned that Estonia announced 
in 2001 the adoption of electronic voting and the increased responsibility to this nation become the 
first one establishing a legal procedure in the adoption of Electronic Voting that was introduced one 
year later: the Riigikogu Election Act. Considering the technology subject to frequent maintenance 
and development, the legal act has been amended and many changes will step into force in 2021. 
These events are important to understand before introducing a similar technology in Portugal. 
Hence, the following chronology figure resumes the important events taken until the implementation 





Figure 13 - Events that marked the implementation of I-Voting in Estonia (Drechsler W., Madise Ü. 
(2004)) 
 
The Constitution of 1992 was revised with the drafts and amendments done to the four different 
electoral laws. Also, in this case-study, it matters to say that was the political elite which started with 
the e-voting initiative and not the general population. 
Right below, a set of Recommendations are listed based on the Legal Considerations, Political 
Considerations, Technological and security challenges – Human-related technological risks, 
Technological and security challenges – Tech-related technological risks and Social challenges, that 
were previously presented in the case discussed in this dissertation. 
 
“Legal Considerations” 
“Digital Divide” is 
introduced here as the 
critical aspect: people 
who do not have 
access to the Internet 
would not be able to 
vote 
Portuguese Reality 
Currently, only paper ballot voting and by post (in the case of 
electors residing abroad) are allowed. 
Recommendation 
Similar to the Estonian case, people who do not have access to the 




Processes of counting 
the votes and 
checking who voted 
may be independent, 
ensuring “privacy and 
security” 
Portuguese Reality 
According to the “Counting voters and voting slips” and “Counting 
votes” articles, under the Portuguese Electoral Law, the electors 
that were marked in the electoral roll books are counted after the 
voting closure. After known the number of voters, the slips are 
counted. For counting purposes, only the number of slips is 
considered and it may be publicly known. Regarding the counting 
votes process, the voting slips are separated into batches 
according to the different lists. These storing and counting 
processes (number of electors and voting slips, as well as votes per 
list) can be translated in two different servers. 
Recommendation 
In the case of Estonia, Vote Storing Server (VSS) which stores the i-
votes and anonymization of the i-votes before the tabulation and 
the Vote Counting Server (VCS) does the tabulation and is offline. 
It may exist a legal 
basis for the adoption 
of this mechanism, so 
it can be adopted in 
more member states 




The electoral procedure in Portugal is supported by the different 
Electoral Law acts published in the Portuguese Electoral National 
Committee website. In the case of adopting electronic voting, a set 
of articles and/or chapter(s) shall be documented in the respective 
legal acts. 
Recommendation 
An English version shall be available, as well as a communication 
about the E-voting adoption to the European authorities. 
“Political Considerations” 
Procedure of I-Voting 
may be “transparent, 
participatory, and 
involve all the relevant 
political actors and 
stakeholders”, so its 
implementation can 
be consensual and 
strong political 
consensus will 
motivate and increase 
confidence of citizens 
to use Internet Voting 
Recommendation 
 
A legal revision of the Portuguese Electoral Law may be executed 
and some articles and amendments may be drafted in order to 
present a plan to the Government. An analysis about the 
provisional budget and possible methods and risks may be drawn 
up. After both legal, economic, social and technological 
considerations, a plan may be debated and voted in the 
Parliament. A strong consensus between different political parties 
and a clear communication to the Portuguese citizens about the 
process may be outlined. 
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Technological and security challenges – “Human-related technological risks” 
Citizens with lack of 
technical 
competencies to deal 
with remote I-Voting 
Recommendation 
The percentage of internet users in Portugal was around 75% in 
2019 (according to the World Bank), where internet users have 
used the Internet (from any location and any device) in the last 3 
months). This relevant majority of the Portuguese population who 
are familiar with Internet, makes the I-Voting process easier to 
understand and enhances its use. 
Electoral officials 
missing technical skills 
to be able to control 
the I-Voting process in 
an effective way 
Portuguese Reality 
In the case of the Assembly of the Republic Electoral law, the 
candidates or agents of the different lists shall send to the mayor 
of the city details of the delegates and alternates for the respective 
assemblies and polling stations. Therefore, an officer is nominated 
by each list to the polling station and section. These delegates and 
officers nominated do not require any technical and/or 
technological specialized skill to control the voting process. 
Recommendation 
 
In case of introducing Electronic Voting, the technical skills 
required to deal with informatic systems and manage the E-Voting 
process demand different or more skilled human resources. 
Observing E-Voting requires these computational skills and 
understanding of the cryptographic protocol. 
In the example of Estonia, the anonymization of i-votes occurs in 
the presence of at least 2 election officials, an auditor and possible 
external observers. All procedures are defined beforehand in 
written form, and all actions and outcomes are recorded on tape. 
Without enforcing those regulations, the IVS owner could 
manipulate the election results on a large scale by adding or 









regarding secrecy and 
privacy of their votes 
Portuguese Reality 
In the current Portuguese electoral process, the paper ballot voting 
also carries the risk of keeping citizens’ secrecy and privacy of their 
votes. They can both be violated in case the voter decides to reveal 
which list he/she voter for, when an authority agent asks or tries to 
obligate the voter to reveal who voted for, and/ or anyone who 
employs any kind of violence or threat over an elector in order to 
persuade him to vote for a given list or to withdraw from standing 
for a given list. All these scenarios (breach of voting secrecy and 
violation of privacy through violence or threat over electors), is 
punished by a fine or a prison term, respectively. However, the fact 
that in the paper ballot voting the citizen is isolated in the moment 
that votes and is observed when inserts the paper in the urn is 
undoubted. This situation provides confidence and helps the voter 
to assure the secrecy of voting. 
Recommendation 
In E-Voting, the citizen cannot assure by himself/herself the 
secrecy of the vote. Further knowledge about how the system 
works (asymmetric encryption and the use of the public and 
private keys) is required in order to know how the secrecy is 
ensured.  
A simple notation may be used in order to explain the general 
population how the e-vote will not be associated to any personal 
details, ensuring the secrecy. 
“Lack of transparency 
when voters cannot 
be sure whether their 
votes are correctly 





According to the current Portuguese voting system, this lack of 
transparency is present once the counting and storage is executed 
at closed doors. The number of votes and the election results are 
publicly known, but if a citizen wants a guarantee that his/her vote 







Taking as example the Estonian case, a QR Code is made available 
for the voter to use it through his/her mobile phone in order to 
verify that the vote was correctly received through a different 
communication channel. This QR code is only valid for few minutes 
so by sharing it on the internet for everyone to see who the citizen 
voted for is not possible. This way, any citizen can verify if his/her 
vote was correctly stored. 
According to Ajish, S., & Anil Kumar, K. S. (2020), the Modified 
Verification Protocol would be able to add another level of security 
while the voter verifies its vote with the QR code. 
Possibility of 
intimidation or any 
other kind of 
enforcement against 
the voter’s will while 




It is only possible to intimidate or threat a voter in order to change 
his/her intention to vote before or after voting. The truth is that 
only the citizen can cast the vote in private, choosing the 
list/candidate he/she actually wants to vote for. Also, this kind of 
intimidation behaviour over another is punishable in the eyes of 
the electoral law, as discussed earlier. 
Recommendation 
In the case of voting remotely, the possibility of changing the 
electronic vote during a seven-day period guarantees that the 
voter can vote safely in another time. Also, the voter can always go 
to the polling station on the election day.  
In Portugal, the advance voting period (between the 14th and 10th 
days prior to that of the election) could coincide with the remote 
voting period, so the election day would be exclusively dedicated 
to the voting in polling stations. 
If I-Voting becomes 
the only way of voting, 
a significant portion of 
the population may 













Technological and security challenges – “Tech-related technological risks” 
“Possibility of system 
attack or breakdown, 
or connection failure” 
Portuguese Reality 
There is no technology involved in the voting and counting 
processes. However, both can be attacked or suffer any kind of 
irregularity (wrong counting of votes, a person votes on behalf of 
another, either on purpose by making use of the citizen card and 
voter number, or due to an error in the registration of the elector 
name by an officer). 
Recommendation 
In the case of remote voting, all anomalies are related to 
technology. It can happen that the voting application is executed in 
malicious environment, where malware could manipulate its 
behaviour. Through logs, it is possible to analyse events that 
indicate real-life attacks. From these events, the responsible 
people for the application maintenance can work toward new, 
more secure protocols. Other important topics are to find 
mechanisms to reduce the level of trust required in the voter’s 
computer, and provide the Electoral Committee with means to 
show that it could not act malicious even if it wanted to. The 
electoral legislation may be updated with these requirements. 
Correct identification 
of the voter 
complexity 
Portuguese Reality 
According to the article “Requisites for exercise of the right to 
vote”, the voter may be registered in the electoral roll book and 
his/her identity must be recognized by the board of officers. 
His/her identify is recognized by presenting and displaying to the 
officer the respective writ of appointment or credential (citizen 
card). 
Recommendation 
The voter may also be registered in the electoral roll book and 
his/her identification is confirmed by asking the voter to submit 
his/her personal identification code. The credentials users by the 
citizen to authenticate can be “knowledge-based” – 
username/password and PIN, or physical authentication token 
(“chip card, SIM-card, etc.”) combined with a knowledge-based 
PIN. The identity of the voter is proven by the digital signature, and 












According to the article 84 “Location in which the right to vote is 
exercised”, Portuguese electors can only exercise the vote at the 
electoral station that corresponds to the location for which the 
elector is registered (save in the case of advance voting). It is 
required coordination between bodies that manage the voters 
enrolled to vote in advance and the ones enrolled to vote on the 
election day, so double voting is impossible. 
Recommendation 
Under the Estonia’s electoral law, the conciliation between 
electronic voting and paper ballot voting systems is reached. First 
of all, in case of several electronic votes submitted by the same 
voter, only the last one is taken into account. Then, in order to 
avoid misleading information, the State Electoral Office may send 
not later than two days before the election day to all "rural 
municipality or city secretaries" the list of voters who voted 
electronically by voting district. One day before the election day, 
all district committees may have access to this list. Regarding the 
electronic voting and traditional voting, the Act sets some rules to 
ensure the unique vote. 
According to Ajish, S., & Anil Kumar, K. S. (2020), with the Modified 
Voting Protocol, the re-voting is also prevented with the 
introduction of an OTP that is sent to the voter’s phone by the VSS. 
The voter inserts right after the OTP in the application, the voter’s 
application pads the OTP and the candidate and encrypts it with 
the server’s public key. 
Voter’s personal 
computer can have 
virus and affect the 
system 
Recommendation 
As with the IVS (I-voting system) server’s side problems, there exist 
i-voting protocols which handle the problem of trusting voter’s 
computer. The Estonian i-voting scheme relies on the assumption 
that we can trust the owner of the IVS and we can trust voter’s 
computer. However, some measures to reduce the necessary trust 
have been taken. A detection system for known attack-vectors is 
built into IVCA (I-voting client application) and methods are used 
to complicate reverse engineering. 
With the same modified protocol presented in the previous 
recommendation, the Self-Voting malware can also be avoided 





regarding who has a 
personal computer 
and internet at home” 
and “who is 
sufficiently 
technologically literate 
to be able to interact 
with an online voting 
platform”. Age, 
income level and 
literacy level are key 
components 
Portuguese Reality 
The number of internet users in Portugal is significantly high, 
around 75% in 2019 (according to The World Bank, as mentioned 
previously). Also, according to Pordata, around 84.5% of the 
Portuguese households have an internet connection at home, 
while 71.5% have a computer (2020). 
Regarding age, over 90% of citizens between 16- and 44-years old 
use internet, while in the age group of between 55 and 64 years 
old this number decreases to 65.3% and to 39% in citizens older 
than 64 years old (2020). When it comes to the percentage of 




Considering that the majority of Portuguese citizens have access to 
a computer and internet connection, one can say that are social 
and technological conditions to proceed with the implementation 
of an Electronic Voting system in Portugal. 
 
Table 18 - Recommendation for Portugal based on the Estonian experience 
 
5.2.1. Critical Analysis considering Blockchain Architecture 
 
So far, the discussion, key learnings and recommendations regarding the Portuguese framework 
were based on the case-study’s methodology developed in this dissertation. The Estonia’s I-Voting 
system was selected as the case of study due to three main arguments: the first nation to hold legally 
binding general elections over the Internet for the municipal elections in 2005, the first country 
worldwide to use internet voting in the Parliamentary Election and, finally, the adaptability of the 
new system with the traditional one in order to facilitate the voter’s understanding of its process. 
However, one has learnt about the Blockchain architecture, its applicability in e-voting, the 
blockchain applications in Estonia (apart from the e-voting system), and it matters to analyse its 
viability to integrate in a possible Portuguese e-voting solution. 
First of all, one may analyse if and why a Blockchain-based e-voting system is “more secure and 
anonymous” than other voting systems. As investigated in the chapter 2.3.5. E-Voting and 
Blockchain, the privacy of the votes is kept due to the decentralized system without a third-party 
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involved and the use of an ID instead of the real identity. Another reason is the difficulty of forge the 
votes due to the Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) model that ensures security. Not less 
important, the ECC model guarantees non-repudiation, and, finally, the possibility of changing the 
final vote is also possible due to a withdrawable model as designed and defended in Yin, H. (2019), 
which is similar to the voting model. 
Secondly, one will revisit what happens in the Estonian model. Regarding decentralization, this 
system is not decentralized, as well as there is a third-party involved (the National Electoral 
Committee). Also, each voter may use his/her PIN1 and PIN2, besides the ID-card or mobile-ID. In the 
case of Blockchain integration, there is also an ID as said before, but this is randomly assigned to the 
voter, and in order to proceed with the asymmetric encryption, the private key is generated by the 
voter and the public one is computed also by the voter. Then, no ID-card is used in order to the voter 
authenticate (no real identity). On the other hand, this technology does not depend from the trust in 
an electoral body (third-party) involved, once it is a decentralized network. Both facts are also 
capable of overcoming two of the limitations mentioned in chapter 4.4. Case Analysis: “Keep the 
votes anonymized in E-Voting” and “Decide the votes that are valid without a privileged role”. 
Concerning non-repudiation and difficulty of forgery of votes that are avoided by the ECC model and 
DTL model, respectively in the Blockchain technology, in the case of the Estonian’s system both 
security properties are not guaranteed at the same level.  
On one hand, the potential of forgery is mitigated due to the digital signature infrastructure. During 
the tabulation phase, forgery of the voting result can be identified. There is a countermeasure based 
on the audit procedure, “which involves retabulating the votes and comparing the result with the 
published one”. However, taking into consideration a possible attack that starts in the VSS while it is 
online (during the voting period, and not during the tabulation phase when it is offline), the set of 
encrypted votes sent to tabulation can be replaced by the malicious VSS. Right after, the set of 
forged votes would be used as basis for audit log forgery. According to Heiberg, S., Martens, T., 
Vinkel, P., & Willemson, J. (2017), there is no audit implemented that detects this type of forgery. On 
the other hand, during the same conference paper, the authors propose several improvements to 
achieve the end-to-end verifiability of Estonian Internet voting. In particular, the tabulation integrity 
improvement. 
Regarding non-repudiation, it is a situation when a “user cannot deny (repudiate) having performed a 
transaction”. This concept combines “authentication and integrity: non-repudiation authenticates 
the identity of a user who performs a transaction, and ensures the integrity of that transaction” 
(Conrad, E., Misenar, S., & Feldman, J. (2016)). Hence, by simply entering other voter’s identification 
number (PIN1, PIN2 and ID-card or mobile-ID), people can vote on behalf of someone.  
From the two previous paragraphs, one can understand that avoiding forgery and ensuring non-
repudiation are subject to different procedures in an I-Voting system as the one used in Estonia than 
in a e-voting system where Blockchain is integrated. 
By revisiting the chapter 2.3.4. Issues and Limitations, some technical and nontechnical limitations 
may be considered and highlighted for this Blockchain analysis’ chapter. Below, one can read more 
about them and their contextualization in a Blockchain-based e-voting system. 
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Lack of Privacy: If on one hand Blockchain is a decentralized network "purely distributed peer-to-
peer ledger" and transparency is required, on the other hand it presents a big limitation for the 
implementation of this algorithm in applications that require a higher level of privacy. According to 
Yi, H. (2019), as discussed in chapter 2.3.5. E-Voting and Blockchain, the author presents techniques 
that improve the security in a Blockchain-based e-voting system. The Blockchain's architecture is 
similar but the entire scheme is improved. Consequently, in blockchain-based e-voting, votes can be 
counted by everyone but the identity of a voter associated to his/her vote, no one is able to know, as 
well as no one is able to see for which candidate a citizen has voted, once the voting ballot is marked 
with a signature by each voter.   
The Security Model: The Blockchain’s security is strong and based on asymmetric encryption. The 
problem comes in case the private key of a user is lost to someone else: the security of the first 
user’s account is compromised immediately. There is no “plan B” for this situation. In fact, in chapter 
2.3.5. E-Voting and Blockchain, the proposed model by Yi, H. (2019) also states that the private key 
generated by the voter may be kept, once it guarantees the ballot secrecy. Hence, the lack of an 
efficient mechanism to recover a lost key is a possible bottleneck of the system. Proposed solutions 
are already published, as in this study from Aydar, M. Çetin, S., Ayvaz, S., & Aygun, B. (2019), where 
two bottlenecks related to keys are mentioned and object of study: “users not having an efficient and 
secure way to store their keys” and “no efficient recovery mechanism exists in case the keys are 
lost”. From this study, the authors make use of “concepts of revocable fingerprints and erasure codes 
for key encryption, and distributed secret sharing scheme for key recovery”. 
 
Limited Scalability: The capacity of Blockchain of adding to the chain new transactions grouped in 
blocks has as a trade-off processing speed that is reduced and scalability which is limited. 
Applications that need high processing speed and high scalability face a big limitation by using 
Blockchain. Also, in the case of a Blockchain-based e-voting solution, storing large volumes of 
historical data is not desirable in case of an eventual hacker attack in the future. 
 
Lack of Flexibility: Immutability of the algorithm avoids people to develop further on the blockchain. 
Then, a Blockchain-based e-voting solution requires to be built on top of a protocol that is very 
robust and bugs may be detected and corrected since the very beginning. 
 
Critical Size: Ensure “robustness against manipulations” and that the “history of transaction data” is 
trustworthy, are the principal characteristics of a peer-to-peer system that guarantees a majority of 
honest nodes and becomes more resistant to attackers with a lot of computational power. Building 
an e-voting system on top of Blockchain, working in an uncontrolled environment, leaves the system 
vulnerable to attackers trying to take control of the system.  
 
Although all mentioned limitations are worth of attention, the next two are considered especially 




Hidden Centrality: Not everyone has the required financial resources and computing skills to invest 
in specialist hardware. Considering the basis of Blockchain, the more mathematical computational 
problems members are capable of solving, the more blocks they add to the chain and receive 
rewards for “contributing to the integrity of the system”. As long as users do not have all the same 
computing skills, the decentralization is questionable, once the integrity ends up to be managed by a 
small number of users. In the case of voting, this logical cannot be replicated. Each user shall have 
one and only one vote associated in the end (considering also the possibility of the withdrawable 
model as defended in chapter 2.3.5), and candidates shall not be elected based on who computes 
the most and the best. 
High Costs: To guarantee the high level of security desirable, it implies powerful pieces of hardware, 
high electrical energy consumption and money. Not every user will have in his/her position a 
computer capable of solving the computational problems in short-time, neither he/she has the 
technical skills to deal with this algorithm. Another important factor is the energy consumption which 
is not desirable especially during an era that people are investing resources in reducing the carbon 
footprint. 
 
In the case of Portugal, the lack of Legal Acceptance is also an impediment.  
The fact that is a decentralized system, different from the “centralized approaches” that are 
currently in the European law (European Union Blockchain Observatory & Forum. written by Lyons, 
T., Courcelas, L., & Timsit, K. (2019)) and, also, five of the six critical legal issues presented in chapter 
2.3.4. Issues and limitations, are the basis to explore the legal acceptance of this algorithm in 
Portugal, at a national perspective. 
The legal value of Blockchain as registries (the transactions do not have legal authority by 
themselves, according to eIDAS); territoriality (in case of fraud, the responsibility is assigned based 
on the location where the act occurred, and considering this distributed network, the legal 
responsibility is not clear where and whom to be assigned); enforceability (the individual who breaks 
the law may be identified. As known, this algorithm ensures the full anonymity of members. 
Identification tools could be used by courts in order to enforce the law and responsibility over the 
individuals); liability (assign the responsibility to software developers for illegal acts committed by 
members in the network, only because they are the creators, is not correct) and, finally; data 
protection (since GDPR rules within EU member-states entered into force, blockchain was not 
considered in these norms). 
Summing up, despite of bringing security and anonymity to an electronic voting system, Blockchain is 
still a technology which requires not only more powerful hardware and software resources, but also 
higher technical skills from a common citizen. In a country where not everyone has neither a 
computer or access to the internet, some steps may be taken first in order to build the necessary 






In order to discuss the possible implementation of a national electronic voting system in Portugal and 
collect some opinions and points of view to take into consideration for this analysis, three questions 
were made to Professor Luís Alfredo Amaral, Associate Professor at Department of Information 
Systems in the School of Engineering of University of Minho, and to Miguel de Azevedo Moura, 
Professor at Private Law in NOVA School of Law.  
After a brief introduction about the subject and objectives of this dissertation, the three questions 
indicated below were made to the participants for them to answer according to their personal and 
professional experiences: 
1 – “Do you consider that the introduction of an electronic voting system in Portugal would be 
beneficial, taking into account the current social, political, legal and technological framework?” 
2 – “Do you consider that adapting and/or replicating an identical system to Estonia would be a good 
option?” 
3 – “Do you think that an algorithm as Blockchain could add confidence to the electronical voting 
system?”   
 
Regarding question 1, the answers were as follow: 
 
LA: Me and some colleagues of mine had the opportunity to follow and review some years ago the 
Portuguese national elections (Parliamentary, Presidential, European and Local elections). My 
opinion is based on the technology and organizational advancements (not judicial). In another words, 
it is based on the information systems of the national electoral system, but not in the legal and 
political components.   
In order to share my opinion about the electronic voting I need first to clarify if we are talking about 
the electronic voting machines or Internet voting. Regarding the electronic voting machines, I am 
against, I think it is a bad investment, a waste of money, time and opportunity. Curiously, in the last 
European elections, these machines were used in the district of Évora. It would be necessary to 
appear accounts that justify the investment and associated risk, balanced with the benefit. Currently, 
the paper ballot voting is a process that goes well, without economic problems, and substitute this 
process by electronic voting machines (where millions would be invested), it would be a waste. 
About the electronic voting via Internet, I am totally in favor. Several years ago, when me and my 
colleagues sent the elections’ reports to the Prime Minister, the last paragraph was always appealing 
to the need of the Portuguese electoral system’s modernization, namely the use of I-voting. We have 
had the opportunity to speak to the person in the government responsible for these matters and we 
always pass this message.  
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Everybody is concerned about the abstention rate increase, with the disinterest especially by the 
youngest, and it can only get worse once these younger citizens socialize through the use of a 
smartphone, study and work under the use of technological equipment, consume culture through 
the digital devices, but when it comes to the time to vote, they need to travel to a place in their 
parish in order to vote. It goes against what is natural nowadays, and people will distance themselves 
from this process. The only way to appeal to the votes of the youngest is to give the possibility of 
voting in the “place where they live”, so to speak, through the digital devices.  
However, when this subject is debated in the Parliament, I see a big reaction, not rational in my 
perspective.  
Answering to your question, I am in favor of Internet Voting and I consider retrograde the blocking of 
electronic voting advancement nowadays. The technology is there, other countries are already doing 
it as it is the Estonian case (started with low participation rates, but in the last elections it reached 
49%), proving that people are more confident about this system. There is not the guarantee of voter 
uniqueness, but the weaknesses also exist in the traditional system. After these years, I reached the 
conclusion that everybody acknowledges the paper ballot voting falls, but when it comes to the time 
to change to the electronic voting via Internet, it needs to be perfect, without failures. This is not 
rational; it would be enough to be equal or better. Here I give reason to one of the conservatives’ 
arguments: there is no guarantee that one person will use another person's credentials to vote on 
behalf of the second. 
However, there are some mechanisms capable to minimize the risks: vote multiple times and counts 
only the last vote, as it is in the case of Estonia; give two credentials, one dummy and other real, 
where only the voter knows what are they. There are several methods capable to overcome this 
problem presented and being truth that is not perfect, the same happens in a traditional system. The 
truth is that any political party, either right or left-wing, are not comfortable to make a change in this 
topic. However, in my opinion, it will be inevitable. As sooner the better but there is no political will 
to advance for this experimentation. But we need to keep in mind that the technology is there and I 
don’t believe the costs are higher than the current system (just in postage to send the ballot papers 
to emigrants, it was more than one and a half million euros, excluding the remaining associated 
costs). It is not due to the costs of Internet voting that it does not move forward. 
 
MM: In my point of view, and maybe I will give an antagonistic opinion, Portuguese citizens see with 
good eyes the technologic advancement, the debureaucratization, the technical progress of daily 
activities, such as the MBWay massification and Via Verde. Nowadays, also due to Covid, there has 
been an advancement for carrying out online activities. This is to say that, on one hand there is trust 
(an important word for this subject) in the demand of technological solution. The electronic vote 
only, without thinking about the technology and/or language behind, it seems to me that would be 
welcome in the electoral act. 
There will always be a percentage of the political population that will criticize, think that it is a way to 
control the votes, it is inevitable. However, it is a small percentage of the Portuguese population 
when compared to the Blockchain case. 
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Answering briefly, the electronic vote seems adequate and the Portuguese welcome it, and I believe 
that would lead to a reduction in the abstention rate. 
There is nothing in the law that prohibits it, that restricts it or that we have to make a very profound 
constitutional or legislative change. No. There will have to be legislative changes, but it is from the 
point of view of changing ordinary and non-constitutional law, which would be more difficult to make 
(by qualified majority in parliament). The change would be made by the government or Republic 





LA: I think copying models never leads to a good result. I support inspiration, not reinventing the 
wheel, but inspiration in the good practices. I am not an expert in the Estonia’s technological solution 
but it seems like a solid one, more proven, more tested, and would work as a good starting point for 
a process in Portugal. However, all processes need to be adjusted, taking into consideration the 
cultural specificities, for example. Estonia is a smaller country, with a population more concentrated 
and less inequality in digital literacy of the population (in Portugal, we have an illiterate population 
on the one hand and a highly qualified population on the other). The realities are not the same. But a 
solution as the one implemented in Estonia would certain be a great starting point for Portugal. 
 
MM: Even for a population a little uninformed and confused, as it can be the Portuguese one, the 
Estonian system as it is presented to me, is adaptable. If I do not have a computer, I can vote in the 
polls, if I am in doubt, I can always change, if I do not have trust in the system, I can always go to the 
polls and vote. However, there will always exist people who are in doubt and question about the 
eventual vote duplication. This system can only exist if there will be confidence that when someone 
goes to the polls voting in paper, that vote will override the last electronic vote, and Portuguese 
people will tend to considerate a problematic topic: how does the electoral body guarantee, in an 
independent manner, this system? Only through the integration of all intervenient bodies in the 
electoral act, making part of the commission, approving all the technical aspects and following and 
monitoring this process, then they would be able to transmit confidence to people vote.  
 
Finally, question 3: 
 
LA: I can answer to this question in two or three parts. 
There are other technologies other than Blockchain which guarantee the anonymity of votes: e-Vote, 
used in University of Minho for several years ago, with a duly thought out and improved architecture, 
following international standards on the best way to do it. Through this system, whenever I vote, I 
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can verify my vote (not in who I voted for but if the vote was well counted or not), and I can 
guarantee (the system is audited) that nobody knows who voted for whom and all votes are counted. 
This solution has nothing to do with Blockchain, so there are further alternatives. 
Regarding Blockchain itself, I have some animosity. I know reasonably how it works and I believe that 
in its more transparent purpose is competent. However, it has some weaknesses: if there are a 
majority of miners in the network, the balance of a group that verify the others can be taken apart. In 
case the network is balanced, everyone can verify the other’s actions. But if a majority of machines 
controls the network, it is not balanced anymore. One of the principal advantages and its robustness 
ends with this lack of balance. In the example of cryptographic coins this situation happens when we 
have a set of machines operating in one place and controlling the system, becoming centralized, and 
at that moment we questioned about where is the virtue of Blockchain. We must fear about this. 
In the democracy and elections spectrum, this manipulation and centralization of power is very 
desirable, such as in the Brexit referendum and Trump elections examples. It is always possible, even 
with the Blockchain capabilities, to “trick the game”. Another topic is the Blockchain’s carbon 
footprint that continues to be very significant. It needs hard work, a great computational power, 
energy consumption, heat, so everything works fine. It requires a lot of money, not only in 
computation, but also in ecological terms once it is a technology not environmentally friendly. Each 
transaction has the “history” of every previous transaction, forming the chains, which is its strength, 
but on the other hand, associated with each bit is a transmission and computing energy. 
This bit of energy times billions and billions has a very high and energetic footprint and negative. I am 
not aware at the moment if there were already improvements to reduce this energy consumption, 
but according to its principals it is not even possible so it is able to prove the history in chain at any 
time and, in case it is not solvable, it is not a future solution. Although safe it will be very expensive. 
And in case yes, it cannot be a good engineering solution. This technology can be used in contexts 
where security is extremely crucial, but in a national electoral system, with millions of voters, I have 
difficulties to understand that this technology has a space. The truth is, after all these years, we still 
have no national systems based on Blockchain. Theoretically, it works well, but it raises several 
problems in practice.  
 
MM: On the one hand, the Blockchain technology guarantees confidence and timelessness, 
undoubtedly. The anonymity question I do not think it would be that relevant because, if it is true 
that we want the anonymity of the vote, it is also true that we do not question the eventual non-
anonymity in the paper voting at the polls. The topic of non-anonymity can be considered a “known 
issue”. Another point is the timelessness and the fact that it is possible to save the data in a safely 
manner would be an advantage certainly. Furthermore, Blockchain allows an intercommunication 
with other data, as I think it is in the case of Estonia, where there is an associated number to the 
citizen card that represents the person and this key that no one can link to the citizen besides the 
technology itself, replicates the data. I do not have technical knowledge about Blockchain to say if a 
hacker would be able to do a match between the citizen’s keys with the physical person, but in case 
no, it seems to me a positive point.  
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My problem with Blockchain is not related to the technology itself, but to the social awareness. If I 
say to the voters that we have Blockchain, I do not have any doubt that people would start to 
investigate and ask about it, to associate Blockchain to money laundering, Bitcoin, dark payments, 
cryptocurrencies, and that still has a negative connotation in terms of sensitivity nowadays and could 
cause some noise in the electoral process. If I was the responsible for the implementation, unless 
someone asks me, I would not say to the electorate that the technology behind the electronic voting 
system is Blockchain (I would not hide it but would not make a campaign about it). I have no doubt 
that the Portuguese would quickly associate to something negative. There isn’t neither enough 
culture or a solid education (at Academy level) regarding this technology. My only fear in case the 
Blockchain would be implemented in the E-Voting is that no campaign could be made, otherwise the 
Portuguese people would not accept due to lack of culture regarding this topic. It could be a good 
trigger to start a discussion and to explain to the citizens what the technology is, what are the 
advantages, what are the disadvantages in the national panorama, and that would be the “best of 
both worlds”, but I am certain that in a near future I would not be able to do this implementation 




In this section, three analysis will be made. The first one concerns the introduction of an electronic 
voting system in Portugal, if it would be beneficial and what are the social, political, legal and 
technological factors that may be taken into account. The second analysis is related to the case-study 
of this dissertation, the Estonia’s I-Voting system and if a similar solution would be reasonable to 
adapt and/or replicate in Portugal. The third and last analysis is about the Blockchain algorithm and 
its place in an e-voting system regarding confidence. This discussion will be based on the 
interviewees’ perspective and opinions as a way to validate the conclusions and recommendations 
that were obtained after the Case Study’s analysis and discussion, and Recommendations for 
Portugal chapters of this dissertation. 
Regarding the first topic, both Professors interviewed consider beneficial and agree with the 
introduction of an electronic voting system in Portugal. Important opinions and conclusions were 
collected, from the different spectrums (legal, social, political and technological): 
• Associated costs: Electronic voting machines (kiosks) may be differentiated since the very 
beginning from Internet voting. The first one implies an opportunity cost (time and money) 
very high when compared to the benefit that brings to the electoral population. The 
investment done in e-voting shall consider the balance between risk and benefit and, in that 
logic, Internet voting is beneficial in opposition to kiosk voting. Also, the associated costs are 
not higher when compared to the traditional system and it may not be used as an excuse to 
block its advancement. 
• Abstention rate: Another topic discussed was the participation of electors and what 
incentive e-voting could bring to the population (especially to the youngest). There is a 
political and social concern in regard to the uninterest and abstention of the youngest 
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electors to vote in elections. Nowadays, they socialize, study and work under the use of a 
technological equipment but, when it comes to the time of voting, most of them need to 
travel long distances. Summing up, both interviewees agree that an electronic internet voting 
system would impact the abstention rate positively. 
• Legal amendments: There is nothing in the Portuguese Constitution that blocks the 
implementation of E-Voting in Portugal. There will have to be legislative changes, but it is 
from the point of view of changing ordinary and non-constitutional law. 
• Social perspective: Portuguese citizens see with good eyes the technologic advancement, the 
debureaucratization and the technical progress of daily activities. Covid-19 pandemic proves 
even more the importance of these changes.  
• Technology intervention: Its retrograde to block the implementation of a national electronic 
voting system in Portugal once the technology exists. The traditional system weaknesses also 
exist, however, at the time of creating a system under the use of internet, it needs to be 
perfect, without falls (according to political debates), and this is not rational.   
 
The second question was simple: if adapting or replicating an identical system to that of Estonia 
would be a good option to the Portuguese electoral system. Both interviewees agree that would 
certain be a great starting point for Portugal and it is also adaptable which is a great advantage (if an 
elector does not have a computer, or if he/she doesn’t trust the e-voting system, or is in doubt for 
any possible reason, can always go to the urns and vote personally). Other two topics were 
discussed: 
• Cultural perspective: In the case of Portugal, a system as it is presented in Estonia, would 
need to be adjusted accordingly. Estonia is a smaller country, with a higher population 
density and lower literacy inequality. Both realities are different and replicating an identical 
system would not be correct. 
• Trust: In case of replicating the possibility of an elector to choose if he/she prefers to vote 
personally in the polls or through the internet, confidence becomes a sensitive topic when 
someone asks about the independency and integrity of the system, and if the problem of 
double voting is mitigated indeed. Only through the integration of all intervenient bodies in 
the electoral act, making part of the commission, approving all the technical aspects and 
following and monitoring this process, then they would be able to transmit confidence to 
people vote.  
 
The third and last topic discussed was about the inclusion of Blockchain and if it would add 
confidence to the e-voting system. This question raised up different opinions and perspectives about 
its possible integration in an e-voting solution. However, both Professors interviewed presented 
some animosity and disbelief about the algorithm itself and its use as the basis technology for the 
voting system in the short- and medium-run. Below, one writes more about the opinions and 
conclusions collected during both interviews: 
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• Confidence, anonymity and timelessness: This algorithm guarantees confidence and 
timelessness (the possibility of saving data in a safely manner would be an advantage 
certainly). Another positive aspect to note is how difficult it is to find a match between 
citizen’s keys (private and public) and the physical person itself.  
• Technology weaknesses: There are other alternatives to Blockchain and some animosity was 
presented. If a majority of machines start to control the network, it is not balanced anymore. 
One of its major advantages and robustness ends with this lack of balance. This problem 
could influence democracy and the election spectrum in a way that manipulation and 
centralization of power is very desirable for some parties and could benefit from this. 
• Energy cost: One of the interviewees mentioned the concern with the energy consumption, 
which is very high the energetic footprint associated. Hence, it cannot be considered a good 
engineering solution once we are dealing with millions and millions of transactions. Although 
it is safe, it becomes very expensive. 
• Social awareness: The word Blockchain itself brings a negative connotation to the most 
common citizen and would cause some noise in the electoral process: Bitcoin, money 
laundering, dark payments and cryptocurrencies. There isn’t neither enough culture or a 
solid education (at Academy level) regarding this technology. The interviewee also believes 
that due to these reasons, Blockchain might not be used as the basis technology for a 
national e-voting system. 
Summing up, the possibility of voting anywhere, from home, by only accessing an application, it 
is a solution with potential and worth of investment. The mobility problem and abstention 
concern could be mitigated, not only, but also with this technological solution (considering other 
factors that may explain both issues). However, the introduction of Blockchain as the technology 
behind this application, presents some disadvantages and fears that may prevent its use. In an 
economic analysis of the opportunity cost associated to the investment in a Blockchain-based e-
voting schema, it is sufficiently high. The non-repudiation and difficulty of forgery of votes are 
not enough to make people accept that this is the solution for the next elections. Also, this 
technology does not depend from the trust in an electoral body (third-party) involved, once it is a 
decentralized network, and in a country that is used to a National Electoral Committee that 
manages the electoral process in rigorous and transparent way, its absence would generate 




6.1. SYNTHESIS OF THE DEVELOPED WORK 
 
In order to conclude this dissertation and the recommendations associated to the proposal of a 
Blockchain-based e-voting system in the Portuguese electoral law, it is important to mention that the 
initial presented questions were studied and answered throughout this work. 
First of all, some E-Voting solutions already implemented in other countries were studied. From this 
sample, Estonia was the country selected as the case of study of this dissertation (the methodology 
that was chosen in order to conclude on the recommendations for Portugal). By becoming the first 
country worldwide to use internet voting in the Parliamentary Election, the adaptability of the new 
system with the traditional one in order to facilitate the voter’s understanding of its process and the 
fact that this country was a pioneer of Internet Voting were the arguments presented to defend the 
choice. Regarding the study method chosen, the set of research questions initially presented in this 
dissertation are of type “why” and “how”. “Why” a Blockchain-based voting system in Portugal 
would be beneficial and a solution to the mobility concern and trust crisis and, on the other hand, 
“how” its adoption would impact the abstention rate and the trust in the Portuguese political system. 
Based on these two questions of “why” and “how”, one found Case Study as the most suitable 
methodology to explore, draw conclusions, validate and discuss possible solutions. 
After selecting the I-Voting system of Estonia as the case of study, some important conclusions were 
achieved from the case analysis chapter, where the Estonian E-Government technical architecture 
was studied in the light of a model documented in the literature review. Still in connection with the 
same chapter, the architecture of the I-Voting system was revised (how the different components 
are associated from the moment when the citizen opens the voting client application until the 
moment when the vote is successful registered for tallying and the voter can verify his/her vote by 
reading the QR Code with the smartphone in the verification application), so the voter’s experience 
could be analysed from the end user’s perspective. Right after, a list of issues and limitations (legal, 
political, social and technological), reported in the literature review, were put side by side with the 
Estonian case. From this analysis one was able to understand that this system is capable to overcome 
most of the challenges documented in the bibliography, which makes it highly accepted by the 
European Commission, Estonian’s government and Estonian citizens in general. In the end, the 
possible integration of a Blockchain-based E-Voting system was discussed and in order to understand 
the current vision of this country regarding this topic, one have asked Florian Marcus, Digital 
Transformation Adviser e-Estonia Briefing Centre, to make a question to Sven Heiberg, I-Voting 
Product Manager Cybernetica AS (company also known for the Internet Voting development), as we 
can read in appendix 10. This question was focused on the thought of implementing Blockchain for I-
Voting, in the present, future or if not, a possible explanation why it is not necessary. The Product 
Manager affirmed that the possibility of integrating Blockchain was considered and investigated. 
However, the major argument for retarding the usage of this technology is the fact that currently the 
Online Voting system relies on a “single component to store the information” and exists a 
“separation of duty and distribution of tasks” which is crucially in the current implementation 
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architecture. Blockchain does not rely on a single component, or, in another words, it is a 
decentralized system that does not involve a third-party. 
In the end, a set a of recommendations concerning the Portuguese framework and based on the 
Estonian experience were listed. Departing from the main Portuguese electoral law articles that were 
studied and documented in this dissertation, the principal differences and what is missing in the 
electoral acts to implement an e-voting solution in Portugal were identified. Also, two interviews 
were conducted in order to understand the vision of two professors regarding the implementation of 
an E-Voting solution in Portugal. From this validation, one was able to conclude from both interviews 
that exists some animosity and disbelief about the algorithm itself and its use as the basis technology 
for the voting system in the short- and medium-run. 
Summing up, the mobility problem and abstention concern could be mitigated, not only, but also 
with a technological solution (considering other variables that may explain both issues). However, 
the introduction of Blockchain as the technology behind this application, presents some 
disadvantages and fears that may prevent its use. This technology does not depend from the trust in 
an electoral body (third-party) involved, once it is a decentralized network, and in a country where 
the National Electoral Committee manages the electoral process in a rigorous and transparent way, 
its absence would generate untrust and doubts about its integrity and credibility in the voter’s point 
of view. 
 
6.2. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
Despite of recommending the investment in an Electronic Voting system, through the Internet 
(instead of kiosks), based on a case study analysis and issues and limitations that may exist, no 
practical application was developed and tested by a sample of electors.  
Other limitation is the inexistence of a country nowadays that uses Blockchain integrated in a 
national electronic voting procedure. Hence, no real case scenario was explored and its possible 
integration was based exclusively on existing papers and researchers’ conclusions. 
Last but not least, Blockchain technology is not recommended as the solution most feasible in the 
short-medium run due to the reasons presented. However, this study aims to contribute for breaking 
the assumption that still exists a long path to the adoption of technology that supports the online 
voting. 
 
6.3. FUTURE WORK 
 
During the validation phase and in line with what was mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, some 
topics and questions were raised. One believes that the development of a practical e-voting 
application, for testing purposes, and share it with a set of potential Portuguese voters (a sample), 
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would make it possible to assess, receive opinions, vision and perception of its security by the end-
users. At the same time, some blockers suggested during the validation phase would be confirmed 
whether they are indeed a cause for concern. The manipulation and centralization of power, energy 
consumption and social perception would be studied and measured when introducing Blockchain as 
the technology behind the user’s experience. 
This application should be used for testing purposes and its usage in a real-life scenario should be 
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Appendix 3 – The proposed Cloud based e-government framework (Mosa, A., El-Bakry, H., El-Razek, 

















































Appendix 9 – Discussion with Florian Marcus, Digital Transformation Adviser in E-Estonia. 
Firstly, it was mentioned that elderly people are actually using I-
Voting (according to statistics available in the Valimised website, retrieved from https://www.valimis
ed.ee/en/archive/statistics-about-internet-voting-estonia, 17% of I-
Voters in the European Parliament elections 2019 belong to the age group >65 years old, 
for instance);  
Secondly, the number of internet users in Estonia is significantly high, around 90% in 2017 (according 
to The World Bank, retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS, where 
internet users have used the Internet (from any location and any device) in the last 3 months). This 
relevant majority of the Estonian population who are familiar with Internet, makes the I-Voting 
process easier to understand and enhances its use.  
Thirdly, it was mentioned the digital identity that is issued to every citizen. Estonians are able to 
identify themselves through a digital signature, using an ID-Card, Mobile-ID and/or Smart-ID. It’s not 
technically illegal to give citizens ID and PINs away, but the person who abuses the ID and PINs does 
something illegal. Just like in the physical world, where someone shows to another person his/her 
paper signature is not illegal but the one who gets to know about the signature will do something 
illegal by forging the same signature for another document. Regarding the ID-Card and PIN code, this 
issue is considered more of a matter of awareness raising rather than jailing people. 
To the question related to Malware attacks and Social Engineering: the voting application is 
download from a unique place, reducing the chance for hacking attacks, as well as any other 
application downloaded from a malicious website, will not be able to access the same points, server 
and data as the official one. Also, the vote is not submitted through email, against what is verified in 
other voting systems, in other countries.  
A demo of how a voter can cast his/her vote was presented. It is a process that goes from  




The voter’s identification details are confirmed (authentication), the favourite party is selected, the 
voter needs to confirm that the selection was correctly done and, finally, the vote is registered. A QR 
Code is made available for the voter to use it through his/her mobile phone in order to verify that the 
vote was correctly received through a different communication channel. This QR code is only valid 
for few minutes so by sharing it on the internet for everyone to see who the citizen voted for is not 
possible. Also, to generate a new QR code, a new vote needs to be submitted. 
How does the government know that every citizen does not vote under intimidation or any other 
kind of enforcement against his/her will while casting the vote remotely? For that situation, the 
solution is “You can vote again electronically in order to change your choice.” According to 
the Riigikogu Election Act, chapter 71, the “Change of electronic votes” provision states that the 




Florian is not so confident that it might be used in the near future once contains a certain and 
verifiable record of every single transaction ever made, and this might be critical while dealing with 
voting secrecy and citizens personal data. On the other hand, KSI Blockchain is already used in 






Appendix 10 – Questions from Florian Marcus, Digital Transformation Adviser e-Estonia Briefing 
Centre on 18th June 2020 to Sven Heiberg, I-Voting Product Manager Cybernetica AS, in the 
conference “e-Estonia Live: i-Voting as key to future elections”, minute 22:07. 
 
FM: While Estonia started to using Blockchain on a national level almost 10 years ago, I-Voting is not 
really associated with Blockchain implementation. Was there ever the thought of implementing 
Blockchain for I-Voting, maybe even right now, or for the future, and if not, why do you think is not 
necessary?  
 
SH: Using Blockchain on top of Online Voting system definitely crossed our minds. We have looked 
into the properties and capabilities of Blockchain applications, such as Etherium or Bitcoin, and we 
have determined that it is not suitable for Online voting at this stand. At the same time, we are 
researching an approach to integrate Online voting with Blockchain using a different model which is 
“private permissions” blockchain and see if we can add value to the observers through this way. The 
important thing in case of Blockchain is that you are not relying on a single component to store your 
information so this kind of separation of duty and distribution of the tasks is a key element in the 
online voting system architecture and is actually also present in the current Estonian Online Voting 
system, meaning that each vote that is stored in the digital ballot box is also registered in the external 
ledger system and there is a later audit step to verify that all of these views match and, of course, if 
there are any differences, than these steps already taken to sort out those differences where, purely 
because of technical reasons: “Do we have to reboot?” or “Do we have major cross issues?” 
 
FM: Public Blockchain – distribution of the data, would be also a philosophical question whether if 
ballot secrecy would be still given because is technically everywhere (the vote transaction, across 
different chains, several copies), if you wanna put it like that. 
 
SH: That’s a perfect point. Currently, in I-Voting system, the kind of encryption we rely on, this is 
asymmetric encryption, its security depends on the Key length. We publish some encrypted 
information so there is the risk that, in a period of time like 30 years, this key length is already 
approachable to hackers so we might be linking historical voting results is possible to make a link 
once this key is saved for years, which is a risk assessment to question it, to see if it is risk acceptable 
or not. To go through Blockchain, we need a different kind of encryption and we need to consider 
every last thing towards we publish into the Blockchain.  
 
FM: Blockchain probably will not come for the next 30 years. Nowadays, we are not in the situation 
where half of the population have a super computer or quantum computer but one day we will have a 
lot more computation power than we have right now.  
 
Page | i  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
